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Nederlandstalige samenvatting 
Motivatie 
De ontwikkelingen in de Midden- en Oost-Europese (CEE) landen zijn een erg populair 
onderzoeksonderwerp in bijna elk aspect van de economische theorie. Hervormingen die in de 
laatste twee decennia plaatsvonden in de regio bieden overvloed van hypothesen die kunnen 
getest worden, en bijna een natuurlijk experiment set-up die onderzoekers kunnen gebruiken 
om de moderne theorieën tegen de nieuwe gegevens te beoordelen. In dit opzicht, thesis 
ontwikkelt nieuwe benaderingen van de bestaande praktijken, maar pakt ook sommige 
bestaande thema's in de nieuwe instelling. 
 
Algemene economische omstandigheden in de regio 
De regio Centraal- en Oost-Europa wandelde een lange weg, beginnend met de macro-
economische onevenwichtigheden, beleid onzekerheid en crisis in het laatste decennium van de 
20ste eeuw. Daarna een periode van groei, en in de laatste periode soortgelijke problemen als 
de rest van de Europa. De weg naar het EU-lidmaatschap werd vergezeld door vele 
hervormingen in zowel economische als politieke systemen. Zij de initiële voorwaarden 
verschilden, het uitgangspunt was meestal centraal geleide economie en de weg naar 
marktgerichtheid was niet altijd gemakkelijk. Transformatie hat grondige remake van de 
instellingen en regels nodig, vergezeld van processen van liberalisering van de markt en de 
prijzen, decentralisatie, liberalisering van de handel en uitwisseling systeem, privatisering, 
herstructurering van bedrijven, eigendomsrechten verbetering en een groot aantal 
bijbehorende voorzieningen. 
Centrale autoriteiten en planning waren overgestapt voor krachten van de markt en nieuwe 
verordeningen zijn ingevoerd. Streaming van de buitenlandse investeringen was impliciet 
geconditioneerd op de eigenschap rechtshandhaving, waarbij een concurrentiële omgeving met 
een gemakkelijker toegang tot de markt en afrit moest ook worden vastgesteld. Staat eigendom 
werd vervolgens geprivatiseerd, met verschillende privatisering programma's en met een 
verschillend succes, variërend van een geval-per-geval verkoopmethode tot massale voucher 
privatisering. Resterende staatsbedrijven werden geherstructureerd en het bestuur heeft 
verbeterd. 
In de loop van de transformatie, de prijs en de markten waren ook geliberaliseerd, en lijken op 
systemen van het "oude Europa". De uitwisseling en handel systeem liberalisering vergezelt de 
uitwisseling van kapitaal. De ontwikkeling van kapitaalmarkten en andere niet-bancaire 
financiële instellingen bleef echter enigszins smal in de meeste van de landen van de regio. 
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Het is ook belangrijk om op te merken dat de heterogeniteit in de regio gebleven is, zodat we 
niet altijd alle landen onder de dezelfde noemer kunnen stellen. Economische prestaties, 
financiële voorwaarden en andere indicatoren verschillen tussen de CEE landen, net zoals er 
verschillen tussen de West-Europese landen bestaan. 
 
Financiën en bankieren in de CEE landen 
Genoemde economische groei kwam in wisselwerking met de ontwikkeling in de financiële 
sector van de regio. Financiële sector bezorgde diensten die handel, risicobeheer, mobiliseren 
van spaargelden en toezicht vergemakkelijkt. 
De overgang van mono-bank systeem naar commerciële bankieren die we nu observeren is 
getuige geweest van vele proeven en fouten. De eerste liberalisering met soepele 
toegangsvoorwaarden, zwakke toezicht en het gebrek aan know-how bracht mee probleem van 
de slechte leningen, bank mislukkingen en ernstige financiële crisis in sommige landen. Golf van 
consolidatie en harde budgettaire beperkingen voor banken, samen met optreden van de 
buitenlandse banken bracht bankieren in de regio tot een meer duurzame niveau zij het met 
een hoge groei van de kredietverlening. Onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat buitenlandse banken 
kunnen de toegang tot de internationale kapitaalmarkten verbeteren, concurrentie stimuleren 
en efficiëntie verbeteren, geavanceerde bancaire technologie en risicobeheer introduceren, en 
kunnen zelfs tot de betere financiële infrastructuur en regelgeving brengen. 
Ondanks de genoemde mogelijke voordelen van buitenlandse bank entry, sterke aanwezigheid 
van buitenlandse banken in de CEE regio bezorgde over de hogere besmetting risico's tijdens de 
meest recente crisis. Dit heeft geleid tot de vorming van het Vienna initiatief waarin publieke en 
private sector: toezichthouders, centrale banken en fiscale autoriteiten uit host en binnenlandse 
landen van belangrijkste grensoverschrijdende banken en ambtenaren van de EU en de 
internationale financiële instellingen samenkomt om de wanordelijke deleveraging en credit 
crunch te voorkomen. 
Ontwikkelingen op de financiële markten waren meer heterogeen dan in het bankwezen. In de 
afgelopen decennia ontwikkelden sommige landen van de regio concurrerende, 
gereglementeerde en verfijnde beurzen die op internationaal niveau aantrekkelijk zijn en deel 
namen aan fusies en overnames, overwegende dat andere landen helemaal geen 
aandelenmarkten creëert hebben. Daartussen staan de landen die aandelenmarkten in de 
vroege stadia van de overgang ontwikkelden, maar na verloop van tijd worden die niet-liquide 
en veel bedrijven waren delisted. Hun duurzaamheid is twijfelachtig, hoewel er veel potentiële 
voordelen voor hun continuïteit bestaan. 
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Tot slot, financiële systemen in de regio blijven bank gebaseerd, en activa van de banken vormt 
een meerderheid van de activa van de totaal financiële sector. Financiële markten tonen 
meestal hoge volatiliteit en illiquiditeit, overwegende dat de bedrijven toevlucht tot de intern 
gegenereerde funding, leningen en handelskrediet als financieringsbronnen nemen. 
 
Overzicht van het proefschrift 
Deze thesis behandelt verschillende aspecten van financiële markten en het bankwezen in de 
Midden- en Oost-Europese landen. We bekijken eerst een opvallend kenmerk van de regio die 
veel belang eist, en dat is de groei van de kredietverlening. Het onderwerp verdient terdege 
aandacht vanwege het effect ervan op de macro-economische stabiliteit. Bovendien, als gevolg 
van de hoge deelname van buitenlandse banken op deze markten, bezorgdheid over de 
mogelijke spillovers zijn redelijk. We gaan door hetzelfde fenomeen te onderzoeken tijdens de 
meest recente crisis, op zoek naar de leads op waar beleid zou het meest efficiënt kunnen zijn 
als zij versnellen of vertragen van de groei van de kredietverlening wil. We doen dit door te 
onderzoeken in welke mate kredietgroei en determinanten daarvan verschillen in de tijden van 
crisis, en voor verschillende types van banken. Naast de bancaire kredietverlening hebben de 
ondernemingen andere financiering bronnen die ze kiezen kunnen. Daarom onderzoeken wij 
wat zijn de meest voorkomende keuzes en wat is de relatie tussen kapitaalstructuur, of 
financiering mix, en bedrijf kenmerken. Ook, bedrijfsspecifieke determinanten hebben invloed 
op de soort van de banken relatie die het bedrijf zal vestigen. Tot slot, we nakijken wat is het 
belang van de instellingen voor de economische welvaart, naar een voorbeeld van kleine, open 
economie. 
We pakken de onderwerpen van de kredietverlening groei, financiële structuur, bank relaties en 
belang van de instellingen met een brede reeks technieken. Complexiteit van problemen 
verschilt, evenals de gegevenssets. We passen de schatting methodologie naar het onderwerp 
en tewerkstellen modellen die het meest geschikt zijn voor het testen van onze 
onderzoekshypothesen na de literatuur. Voor het onderzoek van determinanten van de 
kredietverlening groei hanteren wij cointegration aanpak samen met lineaire en niet-lineaire 
error correctie model. Voor de determinanten van de kapitaalstructuur gebruiken wij panel 
schattingstechnieken, en voor de impact van instellingen op de economische ontwikkeling 
kiezen we cliometrie. 
Voor de analyses gebruiken we gegevens samengesteld uit verschillende bronnen - sommige 
openbare, andere private of anoniem gemaakt. Het onderzoek naar de groei van de 
kredietverlening maakt gebruik van brede gegevensset, in de eerste plaats op het landenniveau 
en vervolgens op het niveau van de bank. We analyseren van zowel vraag- en aanbodzijde 
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determinanten van kredietverlening groei op het macro-niveau, en vervolgens op micro-niveau. 
Wanneer we de relaties tussen de kenmerken van het bedrijf en de financiering keuzes, samen 
met de bank relaties die worden gemaakt analyseren, gebruiken we balansen van 
ondernemingen en gegevens op leningen van het krediet register. Gegevens voor het testen van 
de hypothesen over het belang van de instellingen was meestal uit secundaire bronnen, die op 
hun beurt afhankelijk zijn van de archieven onderzoek. 
In het tweede hoofdstuk analyseren we de determinanten van kredietverlening groei in de elf 
CEE landen. Onze aanpak maakt een verschil tussen het aanbod - en vraagzijde determinanten, 
scheidt van de analyse van de kredietverlening aan bedrijven en huishoudens en identificeert 
subperioden met een verschillende impact van krediet groei determinanten. Dit draagt bij tot 
de literatuur aangezien studies op dit niveau van aggregatieniveau waren nog steeds zeldzaam. 
Analyseren van de variabelen die bepalend zijn voor kredietverlening groei in de korte termijn 
en met name de uiteenlopende gevolgen daarvan na verloop van tijd is belangrijk om risico's de 
financiële sector te beoordelen en past in de literatuur over de macrofinanciële stabiliteit in de 
CEE regio. Wij vinden dat economische activiteit de meest significante op lange termijn 
determinant is van binnenlandse bancaire kredietverlening aan de particuliere sector. Op de 
korte termijn passen we zowel lineaire en Markov-switching error correctie model en vinden dat 
bankdeposito's en eigen vermogen een groot deel van de variatie in de kredietverlening groei 
verklaren. Met behulp van het niet-lineaire model, vinden we dat het effect van korte termijn 
determinanten verschilt van de geïdentificeerde regimes. Het regime switches zijn tweede, 
meestal door verschillen in de korte termijn krediet levering factoren in plaats van de 
aanpassing gedreven om het krediet evenwicht. Ten derde, zij het lineaire model suggereert dat 
er een zeer langzaam of geen correctie naar het krediet evenwicht als het krediet niveau vanaf 
de onderliggende macro-economische fundamentals vertrekt, vanuit de Markov-switching error 
correctie model blijkt dat, in sommige landen correctie plaats in het bijzonder subperioden vindt 
en is gecorreleerd met de herstructurering van banken of lage groei fasen. Hoewel de 
meerderheid van de regime switches lijkt land-specifieke bepaald te zijn, vinden we voor de 
meeste van de landen gemarkeerd regime switch net vóór of tijdens de huidige wereldwijde 
crisis. 
Het derde hoofdstuk volgt het idee van de vorige, overwegende dat we nu expliciet kijken hoe 
de determinanten van kredietverlening groei veranderd hebben tijdens de wereldwijde crisis. 
Onze onderzoeksvraag bestaat uit drie delen. Ten eerste onderzoeken we of het micro- of 
macro-economische factoren die de kredietverlening groei beïnvloeden, en is er sprake van een 
verandering in de determinanten van de kredietverlening tijdens de meest recente crisis. Ten 
tweede, we controleren of kredietverlening in dezelfde mate voor buitenlandse en 
binnenlandse banken gewijzigd is. In de laatste stap onderscheiden we tussen verschillende 
soorten eigendom / modus van binnenkomst, om mogelijke verschillen in leningen 
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determinanten tussen binnenlandse staats, binnenlandse privé-eigendom, buitenlandse 
greenfield en buitenlandse brownfield banken op te sporen. We passen fixed effects estimator 
om onze hypothesen op de paneel data set (bestaande uit balans bankgegevens en macro-
economische variabelen voor de elf landen CEE) te testen. De belangrijkste bijdrage is die verder 
gaan dan de analyse van de ontwikkelingen van de kredietverlening groei en de verschillen 
tussen binnenlandse en buitenlandse banken te ontleden de wisselwerking tussen macro - en 
micro-economische factoren, en we vinden dat ze allebei op een andere manier van belang zijn. 
Namelijk, tot zekere mate, was er een verschuiving van macro - tot micro-economische 
determinanten tijdens de laatste crisis. In deze instelling vinden we dat de economische 
activiteit drijft leningen in normale tijden, terwijl bankliquiditeit als een belangrijkste 
determinant tijdens de crisis neemt. Vandaar, de maatregelen die de bancaire kredietverlening 
tijdens de crisis herstellen moeten eigenlijk minder op macro-economische variabelen gericht 
zijn, en meer op liquiditeit. 
In het vierde hoofdstuk gebruiken wij de kapitaalstructuur literatuur als een beginpunt en 
onderzoeken schuld structuur en bancaire relaties op een brede gegevensset die het hele 
universum van Kroatische bedrijven en kredieten omvat. We pakken drie belangrijke vragen, 
met behulp van bedrijf kenmerken als de verklarende tool. Eerst onderzoeken wij of bepaalde 
bedrijf kenmerken betrekking op de waargenomen schuld kunnen hebben. Ten tweede, 
onderzoeken we of ze betrekking hebben op de verschillen in de passiva mix, en ten slotte 
onderzoeken we of er verbindingen bestaan tussen specifieke variabelen en de bank relatie die 
ondernemingen tot stand brengen. Onze bijdrage ligt in het gebruik van een gedetailleerde 
gegevensverzameling die het testen van een brede set van hypothesen mogelijk maakt, meestal 
niet getest of afzonderlijk getest in de vorige literatuur als gevolg van de beperkte gegevens. Als 
wij drie verschillende kwesties onderzoeken, splitsen we de schatting deel in drie sets van 
afhankelijke variabelen. Bedrijfsspecifieke variabelen zijn gekozen op basis van de meest 
robuuste bevindingen in het vorige onderzoek. Laten we zien dat industrie kenmerken een 
belangrijke determinant van vennootschappelijk kapitaal, leningen en leningen relatie zijn. Ook 
vinden we aanwijzingen van maturity matching, waarin staat dat bedrijven met meer lange 
termijn activa voor langere termijn passiva kiezen, overwegende dat bedrijven met korte 
termijn activa zijn lange termijn verplichtingen niet intensief gebruiken. Winstgevendheid is 
positief gerelateerd met eigen vermogen en negatief naar andere financieringsbronnen, die 
bevestigt theorie volgens welke ondernemingen passief winst doorheen de tijd accumuleren. 
Onderzoek van de bank relaties wijst op de grootte als de belangrijkste determinant, waar 
grotere bedrijven de neiging om hun leningen verspreiden tussen vele banken. In de loop van 
het onderzoek hebben we daarnaast geanalyseerd het belang van het handelskrediet, zoals 
later bleek dat ondernemingen vaak als financiële tussenpersonen optreden. Daarom is een 
sterke juridische handhaving van betaling overeenkomsten van cruciaal belang voor een 
gezonde liquiditeit van de Kroatische economie. 
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Aangezien de onderzochte CEE regio door een moeizaam proces van hervorming van de 
instellingen en van de economische omstandigheden in de laatste twee decennia ging, 
concluderen we met het vijfde hoofdstuk waarin wij een vroeg voorbeeld van een kleine open 
economie die een aanzienlijk succes op goede instellingen en gunstige bedrijfsklimaat 
opgebouwd hebt. We testen een aantal hypothesen over de economische prestaties en hun 
onderbouwing, om aan te tonen hoe ondanks geen landbouw of andere middelen, een 
economie veel groter en sterker concurrenten kan overtreffen als gunstige instellingen, 
commerciële know-how en wijs overheidsfinanciën in plaats zijn. 
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1 Motivation 
The developments in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries are a very popular 
research topic in almost every aspect of the economics theory. Reforms that took place in the 
region in the last two decades offer abundance of hypotheses to be tested, and almost a natural 
experiment setting which researchers use to assess the modern theories against the new data 
and facts. In this respect, thesis develops new approaches and ideas to examine the observed 
practices, but also tackles some existing topics within the new setting.  
 
1.1 General economic conditions in the region 
 
The Central and Eastern European region has come a long way, starting with macroeconomic 
imbalances, policy uncertainty and crisis in the last decade of the 20th century, enjoying a period 
of sustained growth afterwards and experiencing similar difficulties in the most recent crisis as 
the rest of the Europe. The path toward the EU membership was accompanied by many reforms 
in both political and economic systems. Albeit the initial conditions differed, the starting point 
was mostly centrally planned economy and the way towards market orientation was not always 
smooth. Transformation needed thorough remake of the institutions and regulations, 
accompanied by processes of decentralization, market and prices liberalization together with 
the liberalization of the trade and exchange system, privatization, restructuring of companies, 
property rights enhancement and a myriad of associated developments.  
Central authorities and planning were switched for market forces and new regulations have 
been put in place. Streaming of the foreign investments was implicitly conditioned on the 
property rights enforcement, whereby a competitive environment with easier market entry and 
exit had to be established as well. State owned companies were subsequently privatized, under 
different privatization schemes and with a different success, ranging from a case-by-case sales 
method to mass voucher privatization scheme. Remaining state companies were restructured 
and the governance has improved substantially.  
In the course of the transformation, price and markets liberalized as well, resembling more the 
systems of the “old Europe”. The exchange and trading system liberalization accompanied the 
emergence of capital markets and securities exchanges. However, the development of capital 
markets and other non-bank finance institutions remained somewhat narrow in most of the 
countries of the region.  
It is also important to notice that the initial heterogeneity in the region persisted, so that we 
cannot always put all of the countries under the same denominator. Economic performance, 
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financial conditions and other indicators differ among the CEE countries, just as there are 
differences among the Western European countries. 
 
1.2 Finance and banking in CEE countries 
 
Mentioned economic growth interacted with the development in the financial industry of the 
region. Financial sector provided services that facilitate trade, risk management, mobilize 
savings and enhance monitoring, i.e. corporate governance. 
The transition from mono-bank system to commercial banking we are observing now witnessed 
many trials and failures. After the initial liberalization, lenient entry conditions together with 
weak supervisory capabilities and the lack of know-how yielded bad loans problem, bank 
failures and severe banking crisis in some countries. Afterwards, a wave of consolidation and 
hard budget constraints for banks, coupled with foreign bank entry brought banking in the 
region to a more sustainable level albeit with a high rates of credit growth.  
Research has shown that foreign banks can improve access to international capital markets, 
stimulate competition and improve efficiency, introduce sophisticated banking technology and 
risk management, and can even stimulate improvements in financial infrastructure and 
regulation (e.g. adhering to the European legislation). In spite of the mentioned possible 
benefits of foreign bank entry, strong presence of foreign banks in the CEE region has raised 
concerns on the higher contagion risks during the most recent crisis. This has led to the forming 
of the Vienna initiative which brings together public and private sector: supervisors, central 
banks and fiscal authorities from host and home countries of major cross-border banks, as well 
as officials from the EU and international financial institutions in order to prevent disorderly 
deleveraging and credit crunch. 
Developments on the financial markets were more heterogeneous than in the banking industry. 
During the past decades, some countries of the region developed competitive, regulated and 
sophisticated stock exchanges which became attractive on the international level and 
participated mergers and acquisitions, whereas other countries did not create stock markets at 
all. In-between are the countries which developed stock markets in the early stages of transition 
but became illiquid over time and delisted many companies. Their sustainability is questionable, 
although there are many potential benefits of their survival. 
Overall, financial systems in the region remain bank based, with bank assets making up a 
majority of financial sector assets. Financial markets mostly witness high volatility and illiquidity, 
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whereas the companies resort to internally generated funds, loans and trade credit as sources 
of finance. 
 
2 Overview of the dissertation 
This thesis deals with different aspects of financial markets and banking in the Central and 
Eastern European countries. First we examine one remarkable feature of the region which 
raised a lot of interest, and that is expansion of the credit growth. The topic deserves due 
attention because of its impact on macroeconomic stability. Furthermore, due to the high 
participation of foreign banks on these markets, concerns about the possible spillovers were 
reasonable. We proceed by examining the same phenomenon during the most recent crisis, 
looking for the leads on where policies could be the most efficient when accelerating or 
decelerating the credit growth. We do this by examining what drives the credit growth and do 
these determinants differ in the times of crisis, and for different types of banks. Besides the 
bank credit, enterprises have abundance of financing choices they can choose from. Therefore 
we examine what are the most common choices and what is the relation between capital 
structure i.e. financing mix and company characteristics. Also, firm-specific determinants have 
impact on the kind of lending relationship the company will establish with banks. Lastly, we 
check for the importance of the institutions and economic prosperity, following an example of 
small open economy at the times that Venice was master of maritime trade and Italian banks 
were setting the standards.   
We tackle the topics of credit growth, capital structure, banking relationships and importance of 
the institutions employing a wide set of techniques. Complexity of issues differs, as well as the 
data sets.  We adjust the estimation methodology to the topic and employ models which are 
the most appropriate for testing our research hypotheses, following the literature in particular 
field. For the investigation of the drivers of credit growth we employ cointegration approach 
together with linear and non-linear error correction model. When examining whether these 
drivers differ between periods and types of banks, we employ panel estimation techniques. For 
the determinants of capital structure we also resort to panel estimation techniques, and for the 
impact of institutions on the economic development we choose cliometrics.  
For the analyses we use data assembled from different sources- some public, other proprietary 
and anonymized. The research on credit growth makes use of broad data set, firstly on the 
aggregate country level, then on the bank level. We analyze both demand and supply side 
determinants of credit growth on the macro- level, and then expand the analysis to the micro-
level data. When establishing the relations between the company characteristics and funding 
choices it makes, together with banking relationships it creates, we use balance sheets of 
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companies and firm-level data on loans from the credit register. Data for testing the hypotheses 
on the importance of the institutions was mostly culled from secondary sources, which in turn 
rely on the archival research. 
In the second Chapter we analyze the determinants of private sector credit growth in eleven 
CEE countries. Our approach distinguishes between supply- and demand-side determinants, 
separates analysis of lending to firms and to households and identifies subperiods with a 
different impact of credit growth determinants contributes to the literature since studies at this 
level of disaggregation were still rare. Analyzing the variables that determine credit growth in 
the short run and especially their varying impact over time is important to assess financial 
sector risks and fits into literature on the macrofinancial stability in the CEE region. We find that 
economic activity is the most significant long-term determinant of domestic bank lending to the 
private sector. In the short run, we apply both linear and Markov-switching error correction 
model and find that bank deposits and equity explain a main part of the variation in the credit 
growth rates. Using the non-linear model, we find that the impact of short-run determinants 
differs across the identified regimes. Second, the regime switches are mostly driven by 
differences in the short-run credit supply factors rather than by the adjustment to the credit 
equilibrium. Third, albeit the linear model suggests that there is either a very slow or no 
correction toward the credit equilibrium if the credit level departs from its underlying 
macroeconomic fundamentals, the Markov-switching error correction model reveals that, in 
some of the countries, correction does take place in particular subperiods and is correlated with 
bank restructuring or low growth phases. While the majority of regime switches seems to be 
country-specific rather than determined by the global environment, we find for most of the 
countries marked regime switch just before or during the current global crisis.  
The third Chapter follows the idea of the previous one, whereas now we explicitly look at how 
the determinants of credit growth changed during the global crisis. Our research question 
consists of three parts. First, we investigate whether it is micro- or macroeconomic factors that 
drive credit growth, and whether there was a change in determinants of the bank lending during 
the most recent crisis. Second, we check if bank lending drivers changed to the same extent for 
foreign and domestic banks. In the last step we distinguish between different types of 
ownership/ mode of entry, in order to detect possible differences in lending determinants 
between domestic state-owned, domestic private-owned, foreign greenfield and foreign 
brownfield banks. We apply fixed effects estimator to test our hypotheses on the panel data set 
consisting of bank balance sheet data and macroeconomic variables for the eleven CEE 
countries. The main contribution is going beyond the analysis of developments of credit growth 
and differences between domestic and foreign banks, to dissect the interplay of macro- and 
micro-economic factors, and we find that both matter in a different way. Namely, to a certain 
extent, there was a shift from macro- to microeconomic determinants during the last crisis. In 
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this setting, we find that economic activity drives lending in normal times, whereas bank 
liquidity takes over as a main determinant during the crisis. Hence, the measures aiming at the 
recovery of bank lending during the crisis which are geared toward macroeconomic variables 
might not have as positive effects as measures directed to liquidity enhancements. 
In the fourth Chapter we use the capital structure literature as a starting point and examine 
debt structure and banking relationships on a broad data set encompassing the whole universe 
of Croatian companies and credit register data. We address three important questions, using 
company characteristics as the explanatory tool. First we check if we can relate certain company 
characteristics to the observed debt maturity. Second, we relate them to the differences in the 
liabilities’ mix, and finally we examine if there are links between firm specific variables and the 
bank relationship that firms establish. Our contribution lies in using a detailed data set which 
allows for testing of a wide set of hypotheses, usually not tested or tested separately in the 
previous literature due to the limited data. As we examine three different issues, we split the 
estimation part in three sets of dependent variables- broad or narrow liabilities categories for 
the first two questions and the concentration of borrowing within the single biggest lender for 
the last question. Firm-specific variables are chosen based on the most robust findings in the 
previous research. We show that industry characteristics are an important determinant of 
company’s equity, loans and relationship lending. We also find evidence of maturity matching, 
which states that firms with more long term assets opt for longer term liabilities, whereas firms 
with short term assets are not using long term liabilities intensively. Profitability is positively 
related with equity and negatively to all other financing sources, which confirms theory 
according to which firms passively accumulate profits over time. Examination of the bank 
relationships points to the size as the most important determinant, where bigger firms tend to 
disperse their borrowing due to many possible reasons. We find that the foreign owned 
companies concentrate credits within one lender, just like the more creditworthy enterprises. In 
the course of the research we have additionally analyzed the importance of the trade credit in 
our sample, as it turned out that firms often act as financial intermediaries and a strong legal 
enforcement of payment agreements is crucial for a sound liquidity of Croatian economy.   
Since the CEE region went through a laborious process of institutions and economic conditions 
reformation in the last two decades, we conclude with a fifth Chapter in which we take an early 
example of a small open economy which built up a considerable success upon good institutions 
and favorable business climate. We test a couple of hypotheses on the economic achievements 
and their underpinning, in order to show how in spite of having virtually no agricultural or other 
resources such an economy can outperform much bigger and stronger competitors if favorable 
institutions, commercial know-how and prudent public finance are in place. 
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Abstract 
This paper provides an analysis of the long- and short-run determinants of domestic bank lending to the 
private sector in eleven Central, Eastern and Southeastern European (CESEE) countries. We identify 
regime shifts for the observation period of 1997 to 2009, and the resulting subperiods are characterized 
by a different impact of the credit growth determinants. Estimating a credit demand equation as the 
long-term relation, we find – for most countries – a cointegration relationship with economic activity. We 
then examine the short-run dynamics by applying both a linear and a nonlinear (Markov-switching) error 
correction model. While there is a significant correlation between credit growth and supply factors, 
namely bank deposits and banks’ equity, its impact differs across the subperiods. Identified regime 
switches in the short-run relation are driven primarily by differences in the credit supply factors rather 
than by the adjustment toward the credit equilibrium as the error correction coefficients show only slight 
cross-regime differences. In terms of regime switching, we distinguish between two groups of countries: 
those with one dominant regime, which is only briefly interrupted by a second one, and those with two 
equally pronounced regimes. In the latter group, a marked switch occurred just before or when the global 
crisis hit the CESEE region in the latter part of 2008. This regime shift is associated with a decreased 
correlation between deposit and credit growth. 
Keywords: Bank lending to the private sector, transition economies, credit dynamics, Markov-switching 
error correction model 
JEL: C3, E4, E5  
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1 Introduction  
 
Analyzing credit growth in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe (CESEE) has become very 
popular in the past few years, especially during the period of rapid credit expansion that was 
observed in most countries of this region before they were hit by the global crisis in the latter 
part of 2008. In this paper, we add to this literature by studying the long-run (demand-side) and 
short-run (supply-side) determinants of domestic private sector credit developments in eleven 
CESEE countries (CESEE-114) from January 1997 to April 2009.  
Based on the notion that lending evolves in the long run in line with macroeconomic 
fundamentals (behavioral definition of equilibrium credit levels; for a respective literature 
overview, see section 2), we test for a cointegration relation between credit levels and demand-
side macroeconomic determinants. To examine the short-run credit dynamics, we apply both a 
linear and a nonlinear error correction model.  
We contribute to, and go beyond, the existing literature by (1) conducting our analysis not only 
for total domestic private sector credit, but in several cases also separately for lending to firms 
and to households to get more information on how credit dynamics are determined depending 
on different target groups, (2) including in the error correction equation new supply-side 
explanatory variables that are expected to be directly linked to credit dynamics in the short run, 
and (3) examining whether short-run determinants show a nonlinear behavior over time (i.e. 
whether their impact differs across particular subperiods). To capture these nonlinearities, 
which can be interpreted as frictions in the adjustment of credit toward its equilibrium, we 
apply a Markov-switching error correction model (MS-ECM).  
The MS-ECM relies on the idea that there is a cointegration relation, albeit not during each 
specific subperiod (or “regime” in the diction of this methodology). This approach reveals 
subperiod-specific particularities in the examined relationships. For instance, it is of interest 
whether we can separate episodes with adjustment toward the credit equilibrium (stable 
regime) from episodes where a departure of credit from the underlying macroeconomic 
fundamentals is not corrected (unstable regime). Moreover, regime switches that separate such 
subperiods are endogenously identified from the sample data for each country. A particular 
regime switch can obviously be expected for the current global crisis that resulted in sharply 
decelerating credit growth rates in the countries under review (see chart 1 in section 4). 
                                                          
4
 The ten CESEE countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, respectively, and Croatia. In the 
following, CEE-5 refers to the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, SEE-3 to 
Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania and ―Baltic countries‖ to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
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The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives an overview on related research. Section 3 
introduces our methodological setting with a special focus on the Markov-switching error 
correction model. Section 4 provides descriptive statistics for the evolvement and structure of 
credit markets in the CESEE-11 as from 1996. The estimation results are described in section 5, 
and section 6 is a summary. Basic data issues and a description of the variables are covered in 
the annex. 
 
2 Literature Overview  
 
In this section, we distinguish three strands of related literature: we refer to (1) the existing 
evidence for the (predominantly long-run) drivers of credit development, (2) the evidence for 
“excessive” credit growth in terms of a deviation of credit from its equilibrium in CESEE 
countries and (3) related applications of the Markov-switching methodology. 
 
2.1 Findings on Long-Run Determinants of Credit Development 
 
Real GDP as well as the short- and long-run real interest rates are commonly used as 
explanatory variables for estimating the long-run determinants of credit developments (see e.g. 
Calza, Gartner and Sousa, 2003, or Brzoza-Brzezina, 2005). Alternative specifications may 
include PPP-based GDP per capita instead of real GDP, other interest rates, such as the nominal 
lending interest rate, or additional variables like government credit, inflation, house prices and 
financial sector liberalization (as e.g. in Backé, Égert and Zumer, 2006). The latter variables 
incorporate both the demand for and the supply of credit. Demand for credit in CESEE countries 
has been driven by the expectation of increased income and growth. Supply of credit, on the 
other hand, has grown due to the entry of foreign banks and their funding support to CESEE 
subsidiaries. In addition, new banking products became more broadly available (with 
households emerging as a new market segment in the mid- to late 1990s), which went hand in 
hand with higher competition. Most of the previous research shows, however, that in the long 
run bank lending is mainly driven by demand (see Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Fase, 1995; 
Calza, Gartner and Sousa, 2003; Frömmel and Schmidt, 2006). 
Using the cointegration methodology for data from the euro area, Calza, Gartner and Sousa 
(2003) find that, in the long run, real loans are positively related to real GDP and negatively 
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related to real short- and long-term interest rates. Backé, Égert and Zumer (2006) apply a 
dynamic panel cointegration framework and find that from 1996 to 2004, the private credit-to-
GDP ratio was associated positively with GDP per capita (yet not always significant for the CEE-5 
and the Baltic countries) and financial market liberalization. The findings for the nominal lending 
rate (negative sign in the CEE-5 and the Baltic countries; positive sign in the SEE-3), for PPI 
inflation (negative sign in the SEE-3; inconclusive for the CEE-5 and the Baltics), and for 
government credit (negative sign for the CEE-5 and the Baltics; inconclusive for the SEE-3) are 
rather mixed. Kraft (2007) examines the determinants of bank lending to households (the ratio 
of household loans to GDP being the dependent variable) in a panel of 23 transition countries, 
and shows that GDP per capita has a strong positive influence, whereas CPI inflation inhibits 
household lending and has a negative sign. 
 
2.2 Findings on Deviations of Credit from Its Equilibrium in CESEE  
 
Although there is no general measure of “excessive” credit growth, the literature tends to 
define a credit boom as a period of significant deviation of the observed credit level from its 
long-run equilibrium that is in turn determined by the macroeconomic fundamentals as 
discussed in the previous subsection. The most recent related investigation is that of Zumer, 
Égert and Backé (2009), who applied an out-of-sample approach and estimated the 
cointegration equation (similar to equation (1) below) for a panel of 14 small OECD benchmark 
countries. They used the estimated coefficients (country-specific intercepts and panel-wide 
slope coefficients) together with realized values for the fundamentals from the CESEE countries 
to calculate fitted values for the credit-to-GDP ratio in CESEE: CESEEOECDOECDiCESEE XY  
ˆˆˆ
, . 
This fit defines the equilibrium credit levels. Evidence for overshooting credit levels is given if 
there is a clear indication that observed credit-to-GDP ratios deviated from the fitted 
equilibrium levels, i.e.  OECDiCESEECESEE YY ,ˆ,0
ˆ  . Applying this conception, they found that in 
the first quarter of 2009, domestic private sector credit levels were rather high in Estonia, 
Latvia, Bulgaria, and Croatia given the underlying fundamentals (to a somewhat lesser extent 
also in Lithuania and Hungary), which indicates that private sector credit had possibly grown 
beyond the equilibrium path in these countries.  
Earlier papers came to similar conclusions, though the country-specific assessments and the 
methodological approaches differed. Boissay, Calvo-Gonzalez and Koźluk (2005) estimated the 
elasticity of credit with regard to three main macroeconomic determinants: GDP growth, the 
interest rate, and the gap between the observed and the equilibrium credit-to-GDP ratio. From 
these elasticities they derived estimates of expected credit growth and considered credit 
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growth to be excessive if the observed values were significantly higher than the expected ones. 
Accordingly, they found evidence for excessive credit growth in Bulgaria, Latvia and – to a lesser 
extent – in Lithuania, Estonia, Hungary and Croatia. Kiss, Nagy and Vonnák (2006) define a credit 
boom as follows: Either (1) the observed credit growth exceeds the one implied by the long-run 
equilibrium relationship on the basis of macroeconomic fundamentals, or (2) the observed 
credit growth rate is higher than the speed of adjustment to the credit equilibrium in the error 
correction model (i.e. 
1
ˆ)log( bct   when referring to equation (2) below). They detected 
excessive credit growth only for Estonia and Latvia. 
Policy challenges of and responses to lending booms were widely discussed in Kraft and Jankov 
(2004) for Croatia, in Duenwald, Gueorguiev and Schaechter (2005) for Bulgaria, Romania and 
Ukraine, or in Backé, Égert and Walko (2007) for the whole European emerging market region. 
Hilbers, Ötker-Robe and Pazarbasioglu (2007) elaborated how prudential and supervisory 
policies could be used in strengthening the resistance of the financial system to adverse 
consequences of rapid credit expansion in CESEE. 
 
2.3 Related Markov-Switching Applications 
 
For first applications of switching error correction models, one can go back to Hall, Psaradakis 
and Sola (1997), who use them to identify periods in which real house prices differ from what is 
implied by economic fundamentals in the U.K. Markov-switching models have only recently 
been used in the analysis of bank lending. For instance, Frömmel and Schmidt (2006) look for 
overshooting bank lending (related to stock market bubbles) in countries of the euro area. 
Kaufmann and Valderrama (2008) use a Markov-switching VAR model to investigate differences 
between bank lending in Germany and the U.K. Their model is not based on error correction, 
however. 
Frömmel and Karagyozova (2008), whose method is closest to our analysis, examine the relation 
between bank lending and asset prices in Bulgaria, using a Markov-switching error correction 
model to control for regime changes. They find a positive relationship between real estate 
prices and banks’ lending to households. Moreover, they find evidence for the existence of 
regime switches linked to administrative measures for curbing credit expansion. In line with 
their methodology, they take a different view on the stability of credit growth: They no longer 
look at “excessive” growth in terms of the distance to equilibrium, but instead examine the 
adjustment process toward equilibrium levels (i.e. the error correction coefficients). A regime is 
then interpreted as unstable if cointegration between credit growth and its determinants is not 
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given for particular subperiods, which does not necessarily coincide with the error exceeding a 
particular threshold.  
Regime switches in credit equations are usually interpreted as a deviation from equilibrium (e.g. 
Psaradakis, Sola and Spagnolo, 2004). Their model does not require the deviation to be of any 
sign, however. It may thus model both lending restrictions, such as a credit crunch, and lending 
booms. Furthermore, the use of the MS-ECM model for credit equations can be derived from 
theoretical models, based on the interaction between banks and borrowers. This interaction has 
been analyzed in theoretical studies, e.g. in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) or in Chen (2001), where 
the borrower’s net worth serves as collateral for lending. This net worth is highly affected by the 
value of the borrower’s assets and expectations about their future evolution. Consequently, if 
the price of assets rises (falls), the borrower’s capacity for lending will rise (fall), too. Other 
models that explicitly lead to switches between different equilibria in the credit market are 
presented by Scheinkman and Weiss (1986) or Azariadis and Smith (1998). The latter is based on 
constraints in borrowing and asymmetric information and leads to transitions between a 
Walrasian regime and a regime of credit rationing with slowing economic activity, falling 
interest rates and binding credit constraints. Linking theoretical models and empirical studies of 
credit markets, this model thus serves as a theoretical foundation for using the MS-ECM. 
 
3 The Empirical Model 
 
In the analysis of credit volume, it has become common to apply the cointegration approach 
(see the previous section), since the credit volume itself and most of its determinants 
empirically turn out to be integrated of order one. However, while in econometric analysis it is 
often assumed that the adjustment of the credit volume toward its equilibrium is linear, this 
need not necessarily be the case in reality. First, there may be periods during which unusual 
events cause credit markets to be temporarily in a disequilibrium. Second, determinants of 
credit growth may be subject to shifts, i.e. the impact of economic variables may change over 
time. Accordingly, the Markov-switching error correction model applied in this paper allows the 
coefficients to switch between different regimes.  
Psaradakis, Sola and Spagnolo (2004) suggest proceeding in two steps: checking the long-term, 
equilibrium-defining relation for cointegration and then investigating the short-term dynamics 
for Markov-switching. As a result, one may find a stable long-term equation, but more complex 
dynamics in the short run. In our setting, we follow this two-step procedure and use a credit 
demand equation as the long-term relation, which is common in the empirical literature 
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(Pazarbasioglu, 1997; Ghosh and Ghosh, 1999; Barajas and Steiner, 2002; Calza, Gartner and 
Sousa, 2003):  
 
 
 

 

 
 ,)log()log( 3210 t
CPI
tttt aLRaIPaac  

                             (1) 
 
where the dependent variable is the logarithm of the real (CPI-deflated) domestic private credit 
stock tc  (in the empirical analysis we differentiate between total domestic private sector credits, 
firm credits, and household credits), 0a  is a constant, tIP  represents real industrial production 
(proxy of economic activity, as we work with monthly data), tLR  denotes the (nominal) lending 
rate, and CPI
t is the CPI-based inflation rate (year-on-year changes). For details on the data, see 
section 4 and the annex.  
The signs below the coefficients indicate the theoretically predicted sign. Higher economic 
activity is expected to increase the demand for loans and thus credit volumes should expand (
01 a ). A higher lending rate, in turn, is expected to reduce the demand for credit, as debt 
servicing costs increase ( 02 a ). The expected negative correlation of inflation and credit 
demand ( 03 a ) may be attributed to two reasons (in line with Kiss, Nagy and Vonnák, 2006): 
First, once inflation has exceeded a certain threshold, it is associated with greater inflation 
volatility that can significantly hinder the functioning of financial markets through increased 
uncertainty. Second, if nominal rates are high, and even if the real interest rate is low, private 
agents can primarily get loans with shorter duration, which, in turn, limits the maximum lending 
volume.  
If the variables from equation (1) are cointegrated, one may model the short-run dynamics as 
an error correction equation:  
 
 ,)log(
,
)log( 132110 ttttt ucbZbbbc    (2) 
 
with )log( tc  the real credit growth rate (month-on-month changes), 1t  the error term from 
the long-run equation (1), 1b  the error correction coefficient governing the speed of adjustment 
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to the long-term equation, and tZ  a set of possible explanatory variables. We also include a 
lagged dependent variable to account for potential inertia in the credit dynamics.5  
In the vector 
tZ  of short-term determinants, we include four groups of variables. First, banks’ 
domestic liabilities (equity and deposits) account for the source of funds available for lending 
within the country. As soon as more funds are available, more loans can be extended, and thus 
we expect a positive sign for this variable. Second, the banks’ net external position (external 
assets minus external liabilities) covers additional supply of loans by acquiring funds from 
abroad (positive correlation with credit growth). Yet, this position also comprises net foreign 
assets as a substitute for lending to domestic customers (negative relation – thus the concrete 
sign of this variable is ambiguous ex ante). Third, we include the interest spread between 
lending and deposit rates to account for the effects of banking competition on credit growth. 
Signaling profitability, a considerable positive spread acts as an incentive for new banks to enter 
the market. Lending can be expected to accelerate owing to such new entrants. At the same 
time, competition among banks increases, which results in a narrowing spread. At that point, 
the question arises whether – at the lower end of the spread – banks still increase lending in 
pursuit of market share or rather scale back lending (in which case a positive sign can be 
expected for this variable). Fourth, we include variables taking external exposure and credit risk 
into account (industrial production in the euro area as well as exchange rate volatility of the 
local currency vis-à-vis the euro, as the share of euro-denominated loans is relatively high in a 
number of CESEE countries). 
While equation (2) is based on the assumption that the adjustment process to the equilibrium is 
regime-invariant, we drop this assumption in the MS-ECM framework and let the coefficients 
switch according to unobservable states. Thus, there is no single error correction equation and, 
in the case of a first-order Markov process with two states,6 equation (2) evolves to:   
 
 ,)log(
,
)log( 1312111101 ttttt ucbZbbbc   if 1ts ,                (3a) 
                                                          
5
 Note that we do not include lagged differences of the explanatory variables of equation (1) as we 
presume their impact to be mainly a long-run demand-side one. Moreover, residual graphs do not 
really hint at missing lagged variables. Since we already have a highly nonlinear model with short 
sample periods, we prefer not increasing the number of variables to be able to execute the quasi-
maximum likelihood estimation in the MS-ECM. 
6
 The MS-ECM could also be extended to a model with more than two regimes. However, the model then 
becomes highly nonlinear, which causes problems for the estimation (in our case quasi-maximum 
likelihood). Furthermore, models with more than two regimes do not necessarily perform much better 
(see Gallo and Rossi, 2006). Note further that the setting of the model includes the existence of one 
single switch, i.e. an absorbing state, as a special case. Thus, the model is a very flexible one in terms 
of the possible cases included. 
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where the short-term equation is conditional on the unobservable regime variable ts . The 
coefficients 
tsk
b , , where k=1,...,3 (i.e. three different groups of explanatory variables) and st=1,2 
(i.e. two different states), may now take different values conditional on st. The regime variable 
follows a two-regime Markov chain process and is characterized by the following transition 
probabilities 
ijp  for moving from regime i to regime j: 
 
    1|1 111  tt ssPp ,  1|21 11112  tt ssPpp ,  (4)  
  2|2 122  tt ssPp ,  2|11 12221  tt ssPpp . 
 
Thus our model extends the standard (linear) error correction model by allowing the 
parameters in the error correction equation to depend on the stochastic outcome ( ts ) of the 
unobserved Markov process. The main advantages of this approach are the ability to capture 
different kinds of adjustment processes including temporary nonstationarity, periods of 
differing short-term variables, and the estimation of the regime switches from the sample data. 
Consequently, it is not necessary to make a priori assumptions about the exact occurrence of 
regime changes.  
To assess the stability of the adjustment toward equilibrium and respective regime-specific 
deviations, we need the following characterizations: a stable (or corrective) regime i is given by 
01 ib  (a significantly negative error correction coefficient), as in this case any departure of 
credit from the underlying macroeconomic fundamentals is corrected by a change in credit 
growth. In turn, an unstable (or noncorrective) regime is defined by 01 ib , whereby 01 ib  
marks an explosive deviation and 01 ib  indicates a very sluggish or constant and persistent 
deviation from the credit equilibrium in the case of temporary over- or undershooting of credit 
levels. As Psaradakis, Sola and Spagnolo (2004) pointed out, it is no contradiction that one finds 
cointegration in the long run (indicated by 01 b  in equation (2)), whereas locally the 
connection between the variables may get temporarily lost as if cointegration had been 
“switched off” and there was no disequilibrium adjustment in particular regimes. However, the 
model is flexible enough to cover situations where the variables in both regimes are 
cointegrated, where both regimes have different adjustment speeds, or where additional short-
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run determinants show a regime-dependent impact (even if the adjustment speed does not 
change at all). 
The MS-ECM is estimated by quasi-maximum likelihood, based on Kim and Nelson (1999). From 
the estimation procedure we directly receive the ex ante probabilities )|( 1 tt isP  and the 
filter probabilities )|( tt isP  . These are the probabilities of being in a particular regime at 
time t based on all the information available up to time t-1 or up to time t, respectively, i.e. t = 
{c1,..,ct; Z1,..,Zt} for the variables from equation (3). For an ex post analysis, however, it is more 
appropriate to rely on the smoothed probability )|( Tt isP  , where T  is the set of all the 
information available up to time T, i.e. for the whole sample period with T = {c1,..,cT; Z1,..,ZT}. 
The smoothed probability requires an additional filter algorithm for the estimation procedure. 
Alternative algorithms have been proposed in the literature; we use the one by Kim (1994), 
which is easy to implement and commonly used in the literature. For a detailed description of 
the smoothing algorithm, see Kim and Nelson (1999).  
One could also think of using alternative empirical approaches to model credit growth, e.g. by 
letting the long-term equation change instead of the adjustment process or by introducing a 
time trend into the long-term equation that captures the deepening of the financial market. The 
first approach could be justified by financial sector reforms that resulted in new equilibria, 
which could also be captured by including dummy variables (see our robustness checks in 
section 5.3). In contrast, a time trend would represent a more gradual evolution of the financial 
sector. However, the residuals of equation (1) do not give any reason to include a time trend in 
the model. 
 
4 Descriptive Statistics: Evolvement of Credit Stocks and Credit Growth  
 
This section describes our basic variable of interest – the evolvement and composition of credit 
stocks and credit growth in the CESEE-11 since 1996 (which we compare with the euro area). 
Basic data issues and a description of other variables are covered in the annex (see table A1). 
[Chart 1 about here] 
 
Chart 1 depicts, for each country, domestic private sector credit stocks (dark blue area) and 
cross-border credit stocks (orange area) as a percentage of GDP. Whenever disaggregate 
information was available, be it for the whole observation period or for particular subperiods, 
we distinguished domestic private credit by households (purple area) and by firms (light blue 
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area). Moreover, we also show the year-on-year real growth rate of domestic private credit 
(black line). 
 
After some disruptions due to country-specific crises in the 1990s, most CESEE-11 countries 
experienced a strong and smooth expansion of private sector loans until late 2007/early 2008. 
Nevertheless, as a result of the global economic crisis, credit growth rates decelerated sharply; 
in the Baltic countries, the year-on-year change of domestic private credit turned even negative 
in real terms in the first quarter of 2009.  
 
In terms of the evolvement of domestic private sector credit over time, we can distinguish three 
groups of countries. First, the Czech Republic and Slovakia already disposed of considerably high 
credit stocks in the mid-1990s (around 60% of GDP). However, credit stocks shrank remarkably 
as a consequence of bank restructuring in the late 1990s and early 2000s. As a case in point, 
Slovakia recorded real average change of –20% in 2001 and the Czech Republic –28% in 2002. 
Credit stocks have still not reached the degree of financial intermediation observed earlier (the 
high values registered in the Czech Republic and Slovakia in the mid- and late 1990s have to be 
interpreted with caution as they were “inflated” by a comparatively high share of 
nonperforming loans; see Eller and Haiss, 2003). Second, Poland and Hungary were 
characterized by real credit growth rates of more than 20% already in the late 1990s but have 
experienced a comparatively moderate and steady expansion of credit since then. Third, 
Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, and especially the Baltic countries went through a brisk increase of 
credit stocks as a percentage of GDP starting with 2000–2003. From January 2003 until 
December 2007, the average (year-on-year) real credit growth rate was 19% in Slovenia, 28% in 
Estonia, 35% in Bulgaria, 38% in Romania, 40% in Latvia, and 44% in Lithuania. 
 
Croatia is a special case, where the expansion of domestic credit was comparable with Hungary 
or the Czech Republic (at least since 2003), but at the same time the share of cross-border 
credits increased strongly and reached more than 40% of GDP in December 2008. In the CESEE-
11, this is by far the highest share of cross-border credits, followed by 30% in Bulgaria, and 
around 22% in Estonia and Latvia. 
 
Given these different patterns of financial development, we expect that also the dates for the 
regime shifts in the MS-ECM will differ across countries (see chart 2). Generally speaking, a 
regime shift can be expected when the country under examination experienced pronounced 
changes in the pattern of credit growth (e.g. in the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 2001–2002 or 
in the Baltic countries after mid-2007) or in the shape of GDP growth (e.g. in some of the CESEE-
11 countries in the wake of the 1998 Russian financial crisis or during the most recent crisis 
situation). 
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Besides the overall expansion of domestic private sector credit, the share of household credit 
increased considerably over time in all the CESEE-11 countries (especially in the Baltic countries 
and Croatia). The bulk of new lending is attributable to housing loans, which already account for 
more than 50% of total household loans (see Walko, 2008). 
 
Even though the degree of financial intermediation has been on the rise over the last decade, 
there is still a considerable catching-up potential vis-à-vis the euro area. The latter’s share of 
domestic private sector credit in GDP lies just above 140% (see the last panel of chart 1). Only 
Estonia7 has reached a respective share of nearly 100%, while on the other end, Romania (40%) 
and Slovakia (45%) clearly lag behind. 
A final aspect that we want to address here is the currency decomposition of domestic private 
sector credits. In line with deepening integration of the CESEE-11 into European financial 
markets, the massive entry of foreign banks8 and the prospects of joining the euro area in the 
foreseeable future, the share of foreign currency loans in total domestic private sector loans has 
risen steadily in most of the countries. Nevertheless, there is still a great deal of cross-country 
heterogeneity in the region. In August 2008 (i.e. just before these shares were distorted in a few 
countries due to crisis-related depreciations of the local currencies), we can distinguish three 
groups of countries (based on data from national central banks and the ECB): Estonia and Latvia 
with a very high foreign currency loan share of about 85%; Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Croatia 
and Lithuania with a medium share ranging between 55% and 63%; and finally, countries with 
relatively small shares: Poland (26%), Slovakia (19%; this share fell to nearly 1% after the 
introduction of the euro in January 2009), the Czech Republic (9%) and Slovenia (7%; before 
euro adoption in January 2007, the share was 64% and had risen substantially in the period 
immediately before euro adoption). In most of these countries, the euro accounts for a clear 
majority of total foreign currency loans to the nonbank private sector. Notable exceptions are 
Hungary and Poland, where the Swiss franc predominates foreign currency loans to households.  
 
5 Results and Interpretation  
 
5.1 Long-Run Evolution of Credit Aggregates: Cointegration Relation 
                                                          
7
 However, if we also include cross-border credits, the share of total private sector credit lies clearly above 
100% of GDP not only in Estonia, but also in Latvia, Bulgaria and Croatia (in Slovenia at 100%). 
8
 According to the EBRD structural change indicators (see EBRD, 2009), the share of banks with foreign 
ownership exceeding 50% at year-end in total bank sector assets amounted to a CESEE-11 average 
of 81% in 2008. The individual CESEE-11 figures range from 31% (Slovenia) to 99% (Slovakia). 
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To identify the long-run determinants of the credit volume, we estimate equation (1) from 
section 3; the results are presented in table 1. Since unit root tests on the data indicate the 
presence of unit roots in levels (see table A2),9 we can test for cointegration. The statistics for 
Johansen's cointegration test show evidence for at least one cointegration relation between 
credit volume, industrial production, interest rates and inflation rates in all cases but Slovakia, 
and partly also Hungary and Croatia.10,11  
[Table 1 about here] 
All countries show a positive and robust correlation of industrial production and credit volume. 
The comparatively large coefficients, with the impact being much stronger for household credits 
than for firm credits, highlight an economically meaningful relationship between credit levels 
and economic activity in the CESEE-11. As in Kiss, Nagy and Vonnák (2006) or Backé, Égert and 
Zumer (2006), inflation shows mostly the expected negative correlation with lending. This is 
particularly the case for Estonia, the SEE-3 and most of the CEE-5. In contrast, the lending rate 
does not show the expected negative sign in most of the countries. The counterintuitively 
positive and in some cases even significant sign, however, corroborates existing empirical 
evidence (Backé, Égert and Zumer, 2006, for Southeastern European transition and non-
European emerging market economies; Fair, 2004; for some countries also Boissay, Calvo-
Gonzalez and Koźluk, 2005). A possible reason for the positive correlation between credit and 
interest rates could also be reverse causality: While higher interest rates are expected to 
decrease the demand for credit, there could also be a reversed impact, namely that a stronger 
demand for credit by the private sector creates more incentives for banks to increase lending 
rates in order to maximize their profits. If the causality really ran in the opposite direction, we 
would have the problem – as some of our regressors are endogenous – that ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimation would deliver biased and inconsistent estimates.  
                                                          
9
 A unit root in levels is clearly the case for the credit aggregates and industrial production, while the 
results point to a certain degree of stationarity of the lending and the inflation rate. This is, however, in 
line with existing empirical evidence (Crespo Cuaresma et al., 2009) and with the expectation that the 
price level is integrated of order one. In our cointegration analysis, we include all variables, because – 
although it is less common to use stationary and nonstationary data in the same analysis – Johansen 
and Juselius (1992) recommend this approach if the fit can be improved. 
10
 This may be due to the well-known lack of power of the Johansen test in small samples, but also to 
strong deviations from the equilibrium at the beginning (initial undershooting) and at the end (the 
global economic crisis 2008–2009) in our sample. Furthermore, the inclusion of country-specific 
dummies for economic crises and extraordinary data outliers improve the cointegration evidence. The 
results are not presented here, but available on request.  
11
 If the trace- and the maximum eigenvalue-based assessment of the number of cointegration relations 
differ from each other, we rely on the trace-based assessment as Monte Carlo simulations by 
Lütkepohl, Saikkonen and Trenkler (2001) show that the power performance of the trace test is 
superior in small samples.  
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We are also aware of another potential source of bias in equation (1): Backé, Égert and Zumer 
(2006) emphasize that the estimates in the long-run equation could be upward biased because 
of initial undershooting in the case of transition countries (i.e. these countries started with 
lower credit-to-GDP ratios than countries with the same level of development given their 
repressed financial system under communism). Backé, Égert and Zumer (2006) thus use the 
estimated long-run coefficients for nontransition benchmark economies and realized values for 
the transition countries to properly fit equilibrium credit-to-GDP levels (out-of-sample 
approach). 
We did not explicitly test for endogeneity of the regressors, but there are some reasons not to 
go deeper into the mentioned sources of biased coefficients in our analysis: First, the 
coefficients – particularly for industrial production – are large enough such that even after bias 
correction there should still be a non-negligible positive correlation with credit. Second, as the 
cointegrating vector is super-consistently estimated by OLS, conventional residual-based 
cointegration tests constructed under the assumption of linear adjustment toward equilibrium 
will still be valid and can be expected to be able to detect the presence of an equilibrium 
relationship (see Psaradakis, Sola and Spagnolo, 2004) – the basic prerequisite for our 
subsequent error correction analysis. Third and finally, also the out-of-sample approach used by 
Backé, Égert and Zumer (2006) has some challenges, such as the necessity that there is long-run 
parameter homogeneity between benchmark and transition countries and a stable structural 
relationship in the benchmark countries over time. 
  
5.2 Short-Run Determinants of Credit Developments: Error Correction Model 
 
In this subsection, we focus on the determinants of short-run private sector credit dynamics, 
arguing that changes in supply-side variables are directly correlated with credit growth. We do 
this by estimating the error correction equations (2) and (3a), (3b) for the linear and nonlinear 
case, respectively.  
 
5.2.1 Evidence from the Linear Error Correction Model 
 
The estimation results for the linear error correction model (i.e. for the whole sample period 
without subperiod-specific differences that are elaborated in section 5.2.2) are given in table 2. 
The error correction coefficient is in most of the cases significantly negative, which confirms the 
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finding of cointegration between the variables of equation (1) and indicates that in most 
countries there is an adjustment toward the credit equilibrium in the long run. However, there 
are also a few countries with an error correction term that is not statistically different from zero 
(such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania, and Croatia). In these countries there is thus 
either a very sluggish disequilibrium adjustment (that can be explained with frictions and 
transaction costs in the credit market; see Calza, Manrique and Sousa (2006) for respective euro 
area evidence) or a constant and persistent deviation from the credit equilibrium. 
We find that bank deposit and equity growth explain a major part of the variation in credit 
growth rates. Romania is the only exception, showing a significantly negative relation between 
the growth rate of aggregate and corporate credit and equity growth. However, in the case of 
Romania this seems to be offset by a much more pronounced positive relation with the changes 
in deposits. The latter finding is also corroborated by the other countries, where the coefficient 
for deposit growth is in the majority of cases large and highly significant (e.g. in Poland a 1% 
increase of bank deposit growth is associated with an increase of total domestic private sector 
credit growth by 0.67%). 
In contrast, changes in the net external position provide – in line with its theoretical 
inconclusiveness discussed before – only low explanatory power (i.e. very small coefficients), 
although there is mostly a negative relation (less pronounced in the CEE-5, but more so in the 
Baltic countries and the SEE-3). The remaining variables (interest spread, exchange rate 
volatility, output in the euro area and lagged credit volume) do not show a clear pattern. For the 
Baltic countries there seems to be weak evidence for a positive correlation with industrial 
production in the euro area. A positive relation with lagged credit growth can be unambiguously 
detected only for some credit aggregates in the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Baltic countries 
and Romania. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
5.2.2 Evidence from the Markov-Switching Error Correction Model 
 
Let us now turn to the Markov-switching error correction model that relaxes the assumption of 
a time-invariant short-run relation.12 The series for firm and household credits are shorter for 
                                                          
12
 We do not formally test for Markov-switching, i.e. k=1 versus k=2. The reason is that testing in a 
Markov-switching framework is highly nontrivial and requires a grid search over all combinations of 
the transition probabilities, and the critical values from the literature (see Garcia, 1998) do not apply 
to our particular model. However, looking at the clear results of the Wald tests (see table A3), which 
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some countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Estonia), which poses challenges to the 
estimation of the highly nonlinear MS-ECM and leads to less pronounced regime switches in 
these cases. Therefore, and for the sake of brevity, we do not present MS-ECM results for the 
disaggregate series (available from the authors on request). The MS-ECM results for total 
domestic private sector credit are presented in table 3.  
The overall picture that equity and deposit growth are the most important explanatory variables 
of total domestic private sector credit growth is confirmed for all countries. However, their 
impact differs significantly across the two identified regimes in most of the countries (see the 
Wald tests in table A3), which suggests that the main short-run determinants of credit growth 
do not have the same (i.e. linear) impact over the whole sample period. 
There are only slight differences between the error correction coefficients of the respective 
regimes, which points to a broadly regime-independent adjustment process. Table A3 shows 
that the error correction terms differ significantly across the two regimes in Romania, Lithuania 
and Slovakia only. In Romania, both adjustment coefficients are negative, but there is a faster 
disequilibrium adjustment in regime 1. In Lithuania, the regime switches are broadly correlated 
with ups and downs of the business cycle (see table 4 and a broader discussion below). During 
downturns, credit corrects toward the equilibrium, which is not the case during booms.13 In 
Slovakia, regime 1 (early 2001, late 2002 and early 2003) coincides with the aforementioned 
period of bank restructuring and shows a correction of credit toward its equilibrium, while the 
long-lasting regime 2 can be classified as a noncorrecting one14 (in line with the overall lack of 
finding a cointegration relation for this country). This evidence for Slovakia and Lithuania 
highlights that, for the direct linkage between policy measures and the correction of over- or 
undershooting credit levels, the type of policy measure (in the case of Slovakia bank 
restructuring) as well as the business cycle position of a country are important. 
The existence of only slight differences in the error correction coefficients together with the fact 
that in most of the countries there is at least one 
tZ  variable that has a significantly different 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
are often used as a heuristic approach (see e.g. Dewachter, 2001), we feel sufficiently confident 
about the existence of regime switches in our sample.  
13
 One might wonder why we were not able to find a similar behavior in the other two Baltic countries. 
First, the Wald tests in table A3 do not indicate a significant cross-regime difference of adjustment 
coefficients in Estonia and Latvia (where regime shifts are apparently driven by the short-run supply 
factors). Second, compared with Lithuania, credit growth rates in Latvia and Estonia were clearly 
higher (reaching about 80% year on year in real terms; Lithuania: only about 30%, see chart 1) 
before the spillover of the Russian financial crisis in the late 1990s. This might change the impact of 
determinants in the regimes coinciding with economic boom periods. 
14
 A closer inspection of the residuals of the long-term equation reveals that there was not really a need 
for correction in Slovakia, as the actual credit level only rarely departed from the level fitted on the 
basis of the underlying macroeconomic fundamentals. 
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impact across the two regimes (in most cases banks’ equity or deposits, see again table A3) 
indicates that the switches are driven primarily by the short-run supply factors rather than by 
the adjustment process itself.  
[Table 3 about here] 
From the MS-ECM estimation we directly get the regime-switching probabilities. Chart 2 shows, 
for each country, the probability of being in regime 1 (prob=1) or regime 2 (prob=0) at time t. In 
terms of regime-switching behavior, we can divide the countries into two groups: While the first 
group shows clear and long-lasting regime switches (Poland, the Czech Republic, the Baltic 
countries and Bulgaria), the second group mainly stays in one regime with only short switches 
(Croatia, Romania and Slovenia, to a lesser extent Hungary and Slovakia). This is also reflected in 
the transition probabilities 
iip  for staying in regime i if the country is already there (last column 
in table 3). While mostly exceeding 90%, the probabilities are generally low for the second 
group of countries in one of the regimes, with Croatia accounting for the minimum value of 64% 
in regime 2.  
For the first group of countries with long swings in the error correction equation, i.e. 
iip  is above 
90% for both regimes, we find at least one regime for which bank equity and/or deposits show a 
very pronounced positive relation with credit growth. However, the dates of observed regime 
switches vary from country to country and show no common pattern. This means that the 
switches are likely to be due to country-specific rather than global determinants. Nevertheless, 
just before and during the current global crisis, all countries in this group except for the Czech 
Republic show a regime switch. This shift, which occurs between early 2007 (Poland) and late 
2008 (Lithuania), invariably shows a weakened relation between credit growth on the one hand 
and bank equity or deposit growth on the other hand. The coefficient thus becomes insignificant 
or the coefficient remains significantly positive, but gets smaller. The only exception is Bulgaria, 
which shows a positive credit-deposit relation in both regimes and moves toward the larger 
coefficient. For Estonia, we observe the same behavior found in the other countries of the first 
group for equity, but not for deposits.  
Most countries with only short-lived regime swings (Croatia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) 
have one characteristic in common: The regime in which they stay most of the time shows a 
textbook-like positive relation with deposits, whereas the short-lived regime is characterized by 
significant impacts of the external position with both a negative and a positive sign depending 
on the country under review. One may thus argue that the short-run dynamics of these 
countries were from time to time affected by external determinants.  
[Chart 2 about here] 
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Regime-specific descriptive statistics for real GDP growth and real domestic private sector credit 
growth (table 4) provide more information about the macro factors that underlie the two 
different regimes in each country. It is evident that in the three Baltic countries and in the Czech 
Republic, the two regimes clearly coincide with the respective business cycle position of the 
country: One regime represents a boom period with high GDP and credit growth, while the 
other regime represents more of a crisis period with relatively poor economic performance, 
higher economic volatility and relatively low – if not negative – credit growth. In the other 
countries, the regime differences appear to be less business cycle-dependent. 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
5.3 Robustness Checks 
 
Finally, we performed various robustness checks, whose results are not presented here but are 
available from the authors on request. In particular, we checked various alternative 
specifications of the long-term equation. First, we replaced in equation (1) the interest rate with 
alternative ones, namely real interest rates and different maturities. This had almost no effect 
on the results; the observed positive relation between credit volume and the interest rate, in 
particular, remained stable.  
Second, we included cross-border credits in our analysis, since they account for a substantial 
share of total credit volume in some of the CESEE-11 countries (especially in Croatia and 
Bulgaria, but also in Estonia and Latvia; see section 4). Their inclusion did not substantially affect 
the sign and size of coefficients in the cointegration equation, however. Since our proxy for 
cross-border credits is only available on a quarterly basis for households and firms combined 
(and thus, in contrast to other variables, interpolation would be necessary), we decided to work 
exclusively with the domestic private sector credit stock in the estimations.  
Third, we included government credit as an additional variable in the cointegration equation to 
account for potential crowding-out effects. Again, there was no impact on the estimation 
results.  
Fourth and finally, we constructed a dummy15 that captures substantial reform progress in the 
financial sector based on the EBRD transition indicator for banking reform and interest rate 
                                                          
15
 Based on the EBRD transition indicator for banking reform and interest rate liberalization (see EBRD, 
2009), the dummy was constructed as follows: 0 if the transition indicator’s score was smaller than 
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liberalization. We included it in the cointegration equation to account for long-run structural 
conditions that are most likely to have determined the evolvement of credit volumes over time 
(in contrast to short-run competition effects approximated by the interest spread in the credit 
growth equation). There is a strong and positive correlation with credit volume in nearly all of 
the CESEE-11, which indicates that credit expansion in CESEE had also been based on better-
functioning financial institutions. The effect on the other coefficients in the long-term equation 
and on the residuals to be used in the ECM is, however, only marginal. 
 
6 Summary  
 
In this paper, we analyze the determinants of domestic private sector credit developments in 
eleven CESEE countries, namely the CESEE EU Member States and Croatia, from January 1997 to 
April 2009. Our multidimensional approach (distinction between supply- and demand-side 
determinants, separate analysis of lending to firms and to households, identification of 
subperiods with a different impact of credit growth determinants) contributes to the existing 
literature since studies researching determinants of credit developments at this level of 
disaggregation are still rare (see Aisen and Franken, 2010). The finance and growth literature 
showed that countries with more developed financial systems tend to record stronger growth 
than countries with less developed systems (see e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Thus, it is crucial 
to learn more about the long-run driving forces of credit developments in order to assess the 
catching-up potential of the examined CESEE countries. Moreover, analyzing the variables that 
determine credit growth in the short run and especially their varying impact over time is 
important to assess financial sector risks and macrofinancial stability in the CESEE region. 
We find long-term equations that are in line with our expectations. In most countries, there 
exists at least one cointegration relationship. The most significant long-term determinant of 
domestic bank lending to the private sector is economic activity (especially pronounced for 
household credits). Inflation shows the expected negative relation to lending for most countries, 
whereas the lending rate displays in some cases a counterintuitively positive sign, which is, 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
3.33 and 1 if it was larger than or equal to 3.33. Note that 3 marks ―substantial progress in 
establishment of bank solvency and of a framework for prudential supervision and regulation; full 
interest rate liberalisation with little preferential access to cheap refinancing; significant lending to 
private enterprises and significant presence of private banks‖ and 4 stands for ―significant movement 
of banking laws and regulations towards BIS standards; well-functioning banking competition and 
effective prudential supervision; significant term lending to private enterprises; substantial financial 
deepening.‖ As the transition indicators are only available at an annual frequency, a change in the 
dummy starts in July of the respective year. 
47 
 
however, in line with the existing empirical evidence. In the short run, credit supply factors like 
bank deposits and banks’ equity explain a major part of the variation in credit growth rates. 
 
Applying a Markov-switching error correction model, we provide a model that is more plausible 
than a simple linear error correction model and that relaxes the assumption of a time-invariant 
credit growth relation. We arrive at the following findings: First, deposits and equity remain the 
main short-run determinants of credit growth; yet, the strength of their impact differs 
substantially across the identified subperiods (“regimes” in the diction of the Markov-switching 
error correction model). This finding is important for financial stability analysis as it should – in 
the assessment of short-run credit developments – focus also on bank-related credit supply 
variables and their apparently changing impact over time. Second, as the error correction 
coefficients differ significantly across the identified regimes only in a few countries, the regime 
switches are mostly driven by differences in the short-run credit supply factors rather than by 
the adjustment to the credit equilibrium. Third, for a few countries, the linear model suggests 
that there is either a very slow or no correction toward the credit equilibrium if the credit level 
departs from its underlying macroeconomic fundamentals. The Markov-switching error 
correction model, in contrast, reveals that, in some of these countries, correction does take 
place in particular subperiods and is correlated with bank restructuring or low growth phases. 
Fourth, the subperiods separated by the regime shifts differ across the countries under review. 
We nevertheless identify two groups of countries: those with one dominant regime that is only 
temporarily interrupted by a second, short-lived one and those with two equally pronounced 
regimes leading to long-lasting regime switches. While the majority of regime switches seems to 
be country-specific rather than determined by the global environment, we find for most of the 
countries in the latter group a marked regime switch just before or during the current global 
crisis. This switch pushed the way credit growth was determined back to a regime that had 
already been observed earlier (in most cases, before the economic boom period from 2000 to 
2007) and that is characterized by a weaker relation of deposit growth and credit growth. 
Based on this evidence, future research could further explore country-specific reasons for the 
detected regime switches. This could shed light on the effectiveness of policy measures that 
were implemented to curb rapid credit growth in the period up to 2007–200816 and that have 
been used to sustain lending during the more recent crisis situation.  
  
                                                          
16
 Such as the tightening of capital adequacy requirements, of minimum reserve requirements, or of 
foreign exposure regulations; particularly in Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland, and, to a more 
limited extent, in the Baltic countries. 
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Chart 1: CESEE-11: Stock and Growth Rates of Domestic Private Sector Credit Compared with Cross-Border Credit 
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Chart 1 (continued) 
 
 
Source: Authors' calculations based on IMF (1996), national central banks (1997-2003), and the ECB 
(2004 onwards). 
 
Note: End-of-month credit stocks are presented as shares of nominal GDP (in local currency), whereby a 
rolling 12-month GDP, which was previously linearly interpolated from quarterly to monthly frequency, is 
used. The (real) growth rate of domestic private credit is calculated as the year-on-year percentage 
change, deflated by the CPI-based inflation rate. Cross-border credits are approximated by external debt 
of the non-bank private sector, excluding intercompany loans and trade credits (liabilities). They were 
only available on a quarterly basis (not available at all for the euro area) and thus we interpolated the 
end-of-quarter stocks linearly to monthly frequency (this type of interpolation should be straightforward 
as credit stocks evolve quite moderately over time). For further details see table A1. 
 
Chart 2: Regime Switching Probabilities from the MS-ECM for Real Domestic Private Sector Credit Growth 
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Chart 2 (continued) 
 
 
Source: Authors' estimations. 
 
Note: We show the time-varying probability of being in regime 1 as reported in table 3 at time t, based 
on all available information up to time t-1 (ex ante probabilities), up to time t (filter probabilities), and up 
to time T, i.e. as an ex post analysis for the whole sample period (smoothed probabilities). 
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Table 1: Cointegration Relation
Dependent variable: log(ct)
Country ct log(IPt) LRt π
CPI
t Adj. R² Sample Trace Max-Eig
CEE-5
Total 0.753***
(0.000)
0.063***
(0.000)
0.022
(0.146) 0.48
1997M01-
2009M04
4 1
Firms 1.227***
(0.000)
0.204***
(0.000)
-0.006
(0.567) 0.68
2002M01-
2009M04
1 1
Households 2.807***
(0.000)
-0.049
(0.702)
0.013
(0.592) 0.75
2002M01-
2009M04
3 1
Total 2.146***
(0.000)
0.062***
(0.001)
-0.044***
(0.002) 0.94
1997M01-
2009M04
0 0
Firms 1.415***
(0.000)
0.035***
(0.007)
-0.042***
(0.000) 0.92
2000M01-
2009M04
0 0
Households 4.186***
(0.000)
0.111***
(0.000)
-0.147***
(0.000) 0.93
2000M01-
2009M04
1 1
Total 1.643***
(0.000)
0.019***
(0.000)
-0.028***
(0.000) 0.87
1997M01-
2009M04
2 2
Firms 0.774***
(0.000)
0.020***
(0.000)
-0.031***
(0.000) 0.65
1997M01-
2009M04
2 1
Households 2.511***
(0.000)
0.017***
(0.006)
-0.031***
(0.000) 0.93
1997M01-
2009M04
2 1
Total 1.198***
(0.000)
0.058***
(0.000)
-0.006
(0.382) 0.52
1997M01-
2008M11
0 0
Firms 0.428
(0.129)
0.058***
(0.000)
-0.006
(0.473) 0.68
1997M01-
2008M11
0 0
Households 3.581***
(0.000)
0.003
(0.753)
0.006
(0.398) 0.95
1997M01-
2008M11
0 0
Total 2.195***
(0.000)
-0.058***
(0.000)
0.008
(0.573) 0.88
1997M01-
2009M04
1 1
Firms 2.378***
(0.000)
-0.057***
(0.000)
0.004
(0.794) 0.89
1997M01-
2009M04
2 1
Households 1.755***
(0.000)
-0.058***
(0.000)
0.019
(0.178) 0.87
1997M01-
2009M04
1 1
Total 2.791***
(0.000)
0.051**
(0.033)
-0.014
(0.484) 0.92
1998M01-
2009M04
2 2
Firms 1.440***
(0.000)
0.119***
(0.000)
-0.018*
(0.097) 0.87
2004M01-
2009M04
1 0
Households 4.008***
(0.000)
0.302***
(0.000)
-0.073**
(0.015) 0.84
2004M01-
2009M04
4 1
Total 6.150***
(0.000)
0.012
(0.741)
-0.008
(0.818) 0.78
1997M01-
2009M04
1 0
Firms 3.849***
(0.000)
0.010
(0.711)
0.037***
(0.006) 0.84
1998M01-
2009M04
1 0
Households 7.049***
(0.000)
0.002
(0.974)
0.065***
(0.009) 0.84
1998M01-
2009M04
3 3
Total 3.741***
(0.000)
0.036
(0.189)
0.027
(0.242) 0.92
1998M01-
2009M04
2 1
Firms 3.043***
(0.000)
0.023
(0.295)
0.019
(0.330) 0.92
1998M01-
2009M04
2 1
Households 6.018***
(0.000)
0.062
(0.179)
0.036
(0.333) 0.91
1998M01-
2009M04
2 2
SEE-3
Total 3.109***
(0.000)
-0.033
(0.251)
-0.003***
(0.000)
0.89
1997M12-
2009M04
1 1
Firms 2.681***
(0.000)
-0.031
(0.233)
-0.002***
(0.000) 0.87
1997M12-
2009M04
1 0
Households 4.193***
(0.000)
-0.046
(0.201)
-0.005***
(0.000) 0.91
1997M12-
2009M04
1 1
Total 4.039***
(0.000)
-0.004
(0.447)
-0.002
(0.174) 0.72
1997M01-
2009M04
3 3
Firms 2.333***
(0.000)
-0.0009
(0.807)
-0.006***
(0.000) 0.71
1997M01-
2009M04
4 4
Households 7.024***
(0.000)
-0.020**
(0.026)
-0.012***
(0.000) 0.85
1997M01-
2009M04
3 3
Total 3.578***
(0.000)
-0.022
(0.143)
-0.286***
(0.000) 0.95
1997M01-
2009M03
1 0
Firms 2.606***
(0.000)
-0.003
(0.817)
-0.276***
(0.000)
0.94
1997M01-
2009M03
0 0
Households 4.725***
(0.000)
-0.069***
(0.004)
-0.305***
(0.000) 0.94
1997M01-
2009M03
1 0
Czech 
Rep.
Selected (5% level) 
number of 
cointegrating relations
Estonia
Hungary
Poland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Baltic countries
Latvia
Lithuania
Croatia
Bulgaria
Romania
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Source: Authors' estimations 
Note: Coefficients are estimated with OLS. The p-values in parentheses (for the null hypothesis of a 
coefficient being equal to zero) are based on Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent standard errors. The asterisks *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. All regressions contain a constant (not reported). Trace (Max-Eig) indicates the 
cointegration test assessment based on the trace statistic (the maximum eigenvalue statistic). We refer 
to a specification where we do not allow for a determinstic trend in the data, but include an intercept in 
the cointegration equation (in line with the specification in equation (1)). Significance stems from critical 
values based on MacKinnon, Haug, and Michelis (1999). 
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Table 2: Linear Error Correction Model
Dependent variable: Δlog(ct)
Country ct εt-1 Δlog(equity) Δlog(depos) Δlog(extpos) Δ(spread) er_vola Δlog(IP_EA) Δlog(ct-1) Adj. R² Sample
CEE-5
Total -0.011 0.514*** -0.007 0.0004*** 0.024* 0.024 -0.087 0.177**
(0.243) (0.000) (0.966) (0.002) (0.065) (0.347) (0.468) (0.030)
Firms -0.017 0.509*** 0.113 0.033 0.005 -0.025 -0.113 0.345***
(0.203) (0.002) (0.577) (0.132) (0.069) (0.376) (0.163) (0.008)
Household
s
0.005 0.166*** 0.181* -0.005 0.017* -0.083*** 0.057 -0.144
(0.231) (0.003) (0.070) (0.687) (0.060) (0.000) (0.168) (0.225)
Total -0.002 -0.022 0.103 -0.029 -0.001 0.055*** 0.103 0.149
(0.865) (0.617) (0.495) (0.191) (0.762) (0.007) (0.213) (0.201)
Firms -0.036** 0.187** 0.322** -0.025 0.005 0.04 0.069 0.226***
(0.022) (0.042) (0.015) (0.286) (0.316) (0.100) (0.481) (0.005)
Household -0.012 0.127 0.280** -0.025 0.001 0.049** 0.027 0.25
(0.286) (0.251) (0.015) (0.287) (0.702) (0.010) (0.796) (0.294)
Total -0.012* 0.049 0.676*** -0.0003 0.001 0.024** -0.087 0.036
(0.099) (0.440) (0.000) (0.113) (0.635) (0.031) (0.399) (0.688)
Firms -0.016** 0.202*** 0.226*** -0.0003 0.005* 0.007 -0.195*** 0.273***
(0.015) (0.000) (0.002) (0.134) (0.087) (0.211) (0.006) (0.000)
Household -0.013 -0.149 1.178*** -0.0003 -0.002 0.042** 0.079 -0.167**
(0.183) (0.315) (0.000) (0.594) (0.616) (0.010) (0.639) (0.041)
Total -0.027 -0.137 0.174 -0.0007 0.002 0.009 0.016
(0.183) (0.584) (0.395) (0.357) (0.306) (0.966) (0.794)
Firms -0.036 -0.165 0.137 -0.0005 0.002 0.011 0.002
(0.134) (0.572) (0.546) (0.512) (0.308) (0.961) (0.975)
Household 0.005 0.013 0.257** -0.007 0.001 0.02 0.229*
(0.373) (0.516) (0.021) (0.479) (0.107) (0.738) (0.069)
Total -0.014** 0.049 0.043 0.001 -0.005** -0.030 0.176*
(0.019) (0.756) (0.711) (0.161) (0.024) (0.703) (0.064)
Firms -0.012** 0.06 -0.034 0.001* 0.005** -0.069 0.017
(0.026) (0.708) (0.765) (0.073) (0.025) (0.464) (0.882)
Household -0.028** -0.005 0.143 0.001 -0.002 0.016 0.146
(0.025) (0.973) (0.356) (0.155) (0.407) (0.881) (0.155)
Total -0.016** 0.089*** 0.132** -0.0003** 0.0001 0.238*** 0.21
(0.026) (0.001) (0.035) (0.024) (0.909) (0.001) (0.112)
Firms -0.081* 0.227** 0.199 -0.001*** 0.010* 0.553*** -0.089
(0.094) (0.031) (0.151) (0.000) (0.061) (0.000) (0.325)
Household -0.0007 0.133** 0.235*** -0.0007*** 0.001 0.141 0.676***
(0.894) (0.010) (0.001) (0.000) (0.538) (0.117) (0.000)
Total -0.013*** -0.003 0.459*** -0.001* -0.0004 -0.094 0.167
(0.000) (0.401) (0.000) (0.050) (0.372) (0.219) (0.119)
Firms -0.017*** -0.004 0.406*** -0.001 -0.0009 -0.129 0.16
(0.000) (0.151) (0.000) (0.123) (0.170) (0.122) (0.217)
Household -0.006** -0.008 0.439*** -0.0002 -0.0005 0.158* 0.392***
(0.022) (0.247) (0.000) (0.837) (0.583) (0.088) (0.002)
Total -0.007 0.219*** 0.405*** -0.001* -0.0001 0.168* 0.287***
(0.347) (0.007) (0.000) (0.065) (0.944) (0.086) (0.001)
Firms -0.016 0.235** 0.453*** -0.002** -0.0001 0.157 0.148
(0.162) (0.013) (0.000) (0.010) (0.965) (0.132) (0.104)
Household -0.012 0.141 0.121 0.0005 -0.003 0.391** 0.433***
(0.114) (0.181) (0.463) (0.749) (0.572) (0.030) (0.000)
SEE-3
Total -0.016** -0.032 0.796*** -0.0009* -0.0006 -0.028 -0.053**
(0.015) (0.389) (0.000) (0.075) (0.654) (0.84) (0.015)
Firms -0.008 -0.061 0.964*** -0.001* -0.001 -0.033 -0.054*
(0.306) (0.161) (0.000) (0.072) (0.515) (0.832) (0.050)
Household -0.015** 0.197*** 0.229 -0.003 0.001 0.028 0.552***
(0.022) (0.000) (0.120) (0.345) (0.154) (0.806) (0.000)
Total -0.018** -0.071*** 0.752*** -0.001*** -0.004** 0.095** -0.035 0.373***
(0.017) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.046) (0.017) (0.800) (0.000)
Firms -0.038 -0.093*** 0.151 -0.001 -0.001 0.06 -0.172 -0.093
(0.112) (0.006) (0.819) (0.434) (0.740) (0.242) (0.371) (0.345)
Household -0.014*** 0.01 0.372*** -0.0005 0.0009 0.023 0.025 0.636***
(0.000) (0.542) (0.009) (0.452) (0.610) (0.486) (0.889) (0.000)
Total -0.0005 0.392*** 0.609*** -0.0002 -0.0007 -0.021 -0.062 0.002
(0.952) (0.000) (0.000) (0.408) (0.266) (0.934) (0.462) (0.640)
Firms -0.0004 0.460*** 0.546*** -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.076 -0.073 0.003
(0.968) (0.000) (0.000) (0.247) (0.449) (0.756) (0.476) (0.516)
Household -0.009 0.257** 0.737*** -0.0003 -0.001 0.024 0.002 0.004
(0.417) (0.039) (0.000) (0.398) (0.206) (0.919) (0.977) (0.616)
Bulgaria
Romania
Croatia
Baltic countries
0.39
1997M02-
2009M03
0.32
0.39
2002M03-
2009M03
2002M03-
2009M03
0.09
1997M02-
2009M03
0.16
0.14
2000M03-
2009M03
2000M03-
2009M04
0.41
1997M02-
2009M03
0.31
1997M02-
2009M03
0.45
1997M02-
2009M03
0.00
1997M02-
2008M11
0.00
1997M02-
2008M11
0.13
1997M02-
2008M11
0.09
1997M02-
2009M03
0.03
1997M02-
2009M03
0.05
1997M02-
2009M03
0.20
1998M02-
2009M03
0.13
2004M03-
2009M03
0.79
2004M03-
2009M03
0.48 1997M02-
2009M03
0.30 1998M03-
2009M03
0.51
1998M03-
2009M03
0.33
1998M02-
2009M03
0.25
1998M02-
2009M03
0.23
1998M02-
2009M03
0.52
1998M01-
2009M03
0.49
1998M01-
2009M03
0.72
1998M01-
2009M03
0.52
1997M06-
2009M03
0.00
1997M06-
2009M03
0.56
1997M06-
2009M03
0.99
1997M03-
2009M03
0.99
1997M03-
2009M03
0.99
1997M03-
2009M03
Czech 
Rep.
Hungary
Poland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
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Source: Authors' estimations 
Note: Coefficients are estimated with OLS. The p-values in parentheses (for the null hypothesis of a 
coefficient being equal to zero) are based on Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent standard errors. The asterisks *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. All regressions contain a constant (not reported). 
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Source: Authors' estimations 
Note: Coefficients are estimated with quasi-maximum likelihood. p-values for the null hypothesis of a 
coefficient being equal to zero are in parentheses. The asterisks *, **, *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The transformed probability represents the transition probability  pii 
for staying in regime i, if the country is already there. All regressions contain a constant (not reported).  
Table 3: Markov Switching Error Correction Model
Dependent variable: Δlog(ct), with ct representing total domestic private sector credit
Country Regime εt-1 Δlog(equity) Δlog(depos) Δlog(extpos) Δ(spread) er_vola Δlog(IP_EA) Δlog(ct-1)
Transformed 
probability
Sample
CEE-5
Czech Regime 1 0.013 0.381** 0.279 0.010 0.009 -0.075 -0.018 0.120 0.993 1997M02-
Republic (0.279) (0.015) (0.175) (0.368) (0.373) (0.141) (0.392) (0.332) 2009M03
Regime 2 0.018 0.468*** -0.083 0.000 0.020** 0.259 -0.213 -0.077 0.993
(0.119) (0.000) (0.305) (0.278) (0.016) (0.132) (0.211) (0.215)
Hungary Regime 1 0.012 0.648*** -0.827** 0.028** 0.012 0.123*** 0.474** -0.284** 0.743 1997M02-
(0.324) (0.004) (0.048) (0.034) (0.148) (0.000) (0.011) (0.017) 2009M03
Regime 2 0.012 -0.074** 0.129* -0.068*** -0.002 0.034** -0.007 0.440*** 0.945
(0.178) (0.010) (0.069) (0.000) (0.327) (0.031) (0.398) (0.000)
Poland Regime 1 -0.010 0.094 0.822*** -0.008 0.000 0.021 0.203* -0.026 0.950 1997M02-
(0.283) (0.250) (0.000) (0.146) (0.397) (0.342) (0.060) (0.371) 2009M03
Regime 2 -0.018 -0.017 0.168 0.000 -0.001 0.019 -0.301*** -0.260 0.942
(0.107) (0.395) (0.159) (0.267) (0.395) (0.117) (0.002) (0.220)
Slovakia Regime 1 -0.272*** -1.325*** -0.667 0.043*** 0.082*** -0.533 -0.318** 0.769 1999M01-
(0.000) (0.000) (0.179) (0.005) (0.000) (0.256) (0.013) 2008M11
Regime 2 -0.014 0.166*** 0.355*** -0.001 0.003* 0.172 0.280*** 0.976
(0.206) (0.000) (0.002) (0.331) (0.061) (0.201) (0.000)
Slovenia Regime 1 -0.135* -0.571*** 0.248 -0.046 -0.072*** 0.540 -0.008 0.766 1997M12-
(0.075) (0.000) (0.306) (0.246) (0.002) (0.146) (0.398) 2008M11
Regime 2 -0.014** 0.227*** 0.154** 0.002 -0.004* 0.069 0.184** 0.982
(0.028) (0.000) (0.012) (0.125) (0.057) (0.188) (0.022)
Baltic countries
Estonia Regime 1 -0.020 0.154** 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.206* -0.129 0.983 1998M02-
(0.164) (0.020) (0.373) (0.169) (0.363) (0.076) (0.144) 2009M03
Regime 2 0.002 0.117** 0.209** 0.000 0.001 0.107 0.419 0.983
(0.387) (0.015) (0.039) (0.397) (0.193) (0.316) (0.120)
Latvia Regime 1 -0.010 -0.003 0.320** 0.001 0.000 0.094 0.379*** 0.949 1997M02-
(0.111) (0.376) (0.011) (0.366) (0.398) (0.309) (0.006) 2009M03
Regime 2 -0.014*** -0.005 0.416*** -0.002 0.000 -0.308* -0.064 0.958
(0.001) (0.380) (0.002) (0.121) (0.388) (0.063) (0.342)
Lithuania Regime 1 -0.040*** -0.077 0.113 0.000 0.000 0.082 -0.033 0.902 1998M02-
(0.001) (0.367) (0.307) (0.391) (0.398) (0.363) (0.395) 2009M03
Regime 2 0.004 0.308*** 0.377*** -0.001 -0.005 -0.085 0.190** 0.950
(0.351) (0.000) (0.001) (0.334) (0.164) (0.364) (0.043)
SEE-3
Bulgaria Regime 1 -0.038** -0.089* 0.403*** 0.000 -0.001 0.373** 0.117 0.912 1998M01-
(0.016) (0.051) (0.000) (0.270) (0.353) (0.050) (0.120) 2009M03
Regime 2 -0.022*** -0.027 1.125*** 0.000 0.001 -0.088 -0.081*** 0.927
(0.001) (0.288) (0.000) (0.396) (0.239) (0.299) (0.000)
Romania Regime 1 -0.086*** -0.109*** -0.895*** 0.050 -0.010*** 1.356*** 0.942 -0.066 0.674 1997M06-
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.167) (0.000) (0.000) (0.216) (0.296) 2009M03
Regime 2 -0.006* -0.018 0.515*** -0.001** -0.001 0.047** 0.104 0.355*** 0.969
(0.099) (0.259) (0.000) (0.050) (0.330) (0.025) (0.234) (0.000)
Croatia Regime 1 -0.001 0.289*** 0.715*** 0.000 0.000 0.105 0.026 0.003 0.963 1997M03-
(0.392) (0.000) (0.000) (0.217) (0.395) (0.366) (0.382) (0.315) 2009M03
Regime 2 0.029 0.549*** 0.043 0.047*** -0.007*** 3.915*** -1.297*** 0.026 0.636
(0.226) (0.000) (0.371) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.322)
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Source: Eurostat, IMF, NCBs, ECB, authors' calculations. 
Note: Averages and standard deviations (SD) are calculated for the yoy percentage change of quarterly 
GDP at market prices and for the yoy percentage change of CPI-deflated monthly domestic private sector 
credit stocks. These statistics are calculated separately for regime 1 and regime 2 as indicated by the 
smoothed probability depicted in chart 2 (as soon as it is larger than 0.5 we classify the related subperiod 
as regime 1). 
Table 4: Regime-specific Descriptive Statistics for GDP Growth and Credit Growth
Average SD Average SD
Countries with two equally-pronounced regimes
Czech Rep. Regime 1 4.4 2.6 11.4 11.3
Regime 2 1.3 1.9 -9.7 9.2
Poland Regime 1 4.0 2.4 7.8 6.4
Regime 2 5.2 2.0 22.8 5.2
Estonia Regime 1 8.3 2.1 24.5 7.3
Regime 2 0.6 7.1 11.8 16.9
Latvia Regime 1 3.0 7.3 24.8 19.8
Regime 2 8.7 3.5 41.8 15.7
Lithuania Regime 1 1.5 5.5 7.6 10.0
Regime 2 7.9 2.3 36.6 14.6
Bulgaria Regime 1 4.9 2.3 19.8 18.1
Regime 2 4.8 2.5 25.2 26.6
Countries with mainly one regime and only short switches
Hungary Regime 1 2.6 4.3 16.8 3.8
Regime 2 3.8 1.4 14.3 6.2
Slovakia Regime 1 4.3 2.5 1.5 11.2
Regime 2 4.9 4.2 3.0 16.0
Slovenia Regime 1 3.6 0.8 11.5 9.6
Regime 2 4.1 2.6 15.3 7.6
Romania Regime 1 na na -18.3 21.9
Regime 2 na na 20.3 27.3
Croatia Regime 1 4.6 4.7 13.8 10.2
Regime 2 5.8 8.5 5.3 16.7
Real GDP growth in % Real credit growth in %
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Appendix 
Data Issues and Description of Variables  
 
For our analysis we use data with monthly frequency (from January 1997 to April 2009) that are 
real-valued, seasonally adjusted and denominated in local currency. Those variables that are 
only available in nominal terms are deflated by using the all-items HICP index (2005=100). All 
series are seasonally detrended by applying the Census X12 method (also used by Eurostat to 
de-seasonalize EU series). Table A1 provides detailed definitions and sources of the variables 
used in the analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Description Source
1) Credit variables 
Total domestic private sector credits Credit to resident non-monetary financial institutions (MFIs) excluding the general 
government in local currency (LC) mn, end-of-period (eop)
IMF (1993-1996), NCB (1997-
2003), ECB (2004 onwards) 
Domestic firm credits Domestic credit to resident enterprises (non-financial corporations and other 
financial intermediaries) in LC mn, eop
"
Domestic household credits Domestic credit to resident households and non-profit institutions serving 
households in LC mn, eop
"
Cross-border credits to the private sector Calculated as external debt of the non-bank private sector, excluding intercompany 
loans and trade credits (liabilities); in EUR mn, eop (conversion to LC mn using the 
eop exchange rate). Available only on a quarterly basis, and thus we interpolated 
them linearly to monthly frequency
NCB and IMF (International 
Investment Position)
Industrial production (IP) Real industrial production (excl. construction), gross volume index (wiiw). For the 
Baltic countries and the euro area (IP_EA) we use working day adjusted data from 
Eurostat
wiiw, Eurostat
Lending rate (LR) Weighthed average rate charged by non-MFIs on short-term loans to the private 
non-financial sector. The counterparties, maturites and weightings vary slightly from 
country to country
IMF International Financial 
Statistics (Datastream)
Inflation rate (π
CPI
) Year-on-year percentage change of the all-items HICP (index, 2005=100) Eurostat
Bank equity (equity) Banks' capital and reserves in LC mn, eop IMF (1993-1996), NCB (1997-
2003), ECB (2004 onwards) 
Domestic bank deposits of households 
and firms (depos)
Deposits of residents excluding the general government in LC mn, eop. For Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Latvia, and Slovakia we used deposits of resident non-MFIs 
excluding the central government (longer time series available)
"
Banks’ net external position (extpos) External assets minus external liabilities, LC mn, eop "
Lending-deposit rate (spread) Spread between lending rate (see before) and deposit rate (weighthed average rate 
offered by non-MFIs on deposits of the private non-financial sector), in percentage 
points
IMF International Financial 
Statistics (Datastream)
Exchange rate volatility (er_vola) Percentage monthly variation of daily nominal exchange rates from their monthly 
mean, as measured by the coefficient of variation
WM / Reuters (Datastream)
2) Long-run (demand-side) determinants
3) Short-run (supply-side) determinants
Table A.1: Description of Variables
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Source: Authors' estimations. 
Note: Based on the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root tests, we show 
whether a series used in equation (1) has no, one, or two unit root(s), i.e. is integrated of order zero - 
I(0), of order one - I(1), or of order two - I(2). "TS" indicates that the series is trend-stationary, i.e. the 
hypothesis of a non-stable series is rejected as soon as a deterministic trend is included in the test 
equation in levels. The detailed test output is available from the authors on request. 
 
 
Table A.2: Unit Root Properties of Variables Used in the Cointegration Relation
Country Test log(ct
TOTAL
) log(ct
FIRMS
) log(ct
HOUSEHOLDS
) log(IPt) LRt πt
CPI
ADF I(1) TS I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0)
PP I(1) TS I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
ADF I(1) TS I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1)
PP I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1)
ADF I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0)
PP I(1) I(1) I(1) TS I(1) I(0)
ADF I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
PP I(1) I(1) I(1) TS I(1) I(1)
ADF I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1)
PP I(1) I(1) I(1) TS I(1) I(1)
ADF TS I(1) I(2) I(1) I(1) I(0)
PP I(1) I(1) I(2) I(1) I(1) I(1)
ADF I(1) I(1) I(2) I(1) I(1) I(0)
PP I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1)
ADF I(1) I(1) I(1) TS I(0) I(0)
PP I(1) I(1) I(1) TS I(0) I(0)
ADF TS TS TS I(1) I(0) I(0)
PP TS TS I(1) I(1) I(0) I(0)
ADF I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) TS I(0)
PP I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
ADF I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1)
PP I(1) I(1) I(1) TS I(0) I(1)
Latvia
Estonia
Czech Rep.
Hungary
Poland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Lithuania
Bulgaria
Romania
Croatia
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Source: Authors' estimations. 
Note: This table shows whether there are significant differences in the coefficients in equation (3a) and 
equation (3b), i.e. the Wald test statistics for rejecting the null hypothesis of bk1=bk2, where k represents 
the different explanatory variables. The asterisks *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. The results for the constant are not reported. 
  
Table A.3: Wald Tests for Differences in Coefficients Across Regimes
Country εt-1 Δlog(equity) Δlog(depos) Δlog(extpos) Δ(spread) er_vola Δlog(IP_EA) Δlog(ct-1)
Czech Republic 0.09 0.31 2.17 0.15 0.00 3.37 1.02 8.40**
Hungary 0.00 11.46*** 5.46* 32.64*** 0.00 10.13** 12.51*** 68.97***
Poland 0.22 0.46 20.58*** 1.89 0.00 0.00 28.99*** 0.97
Slovakia 12.88*** 146.16*** 3.61 8.98** 0.02 1.45 17.88***
Slovenia 2.67 31.74*** 0.07 1.03 0.04 1.52 2.11
Estonia 1.58 0.24 2.48 0.72 0.00 0.27 3.46
Latvia 0.14 0.02 0.25 1.20 0.00 3.89* 6.45*
Lithuania 10.31** 5.79* 2.07 0.02 0.00 0.38 0.75
Bulgaria 1.01 1.32 43.77*** 0.39 0.00 4.43* 6.47*
Romania 30.20*** 14.04*** 20.79*** 1.82 0.00 29.29*** 63.47*** 47.20***
Croatia 1.17 3.84* 32.09*** 15.78*** 0.04 12.89*** 21.11*** 0.33
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Abstract 
 
In this paper we examine whether factors determining bank lending in Central and Eastern 
European Countries (CEEC) have changed during the Financial Crisis. We us a sample of more 
than 250 banks from eleven CEEC over the period of eleven years, including both macroeconomic 
and balance sheet variables. Results show that bank lending in general depends on the 
considered macro- and microeconomic factors, although during the global crisis the impact of 
these determinants changed. Macroeconomic conditions matter for both domestic and foreign 
bank lending during the whole period, although we notice a decoupling from these factors 
during the crisis period.  Among microeconomic conditions, deposit base growth seems to affect 
both foreign and domestic bank lending in a similar way, but there are differences in how other 
factors shape lending –both across ownership and across different periods. 
 
Keywords:  Bank lending, transition economies, credit dynamics, macroeconomic factors, bank-
level factors 
 
JEL: C3, E4, E5 
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"A tide is a distortion in the shape of one body induced by the gravitational pull of another 
nearby object." The Planetary System (Morrison and Owen, 1966) 
 
1 Introduction 
This paper analyzes micro- and macroeconomic determinants of credit growth in eleven Central 
and Eastern European Countries (CEEC). Most of these countries experienced during the 
transition process in the 1990s a massive foreign bank entry leading to a market share of foreign 
banks which often often exceeds 90%. They are now characterized by a vast presence of foreign 
banks and developed management techniques and products, comparable to the banks in 
Western Europe. Bank lending in the last decades experienced surge due to financial deepening, 
privatization, foreign investments inflow, but also due to a higher demand as a consequence of 
low initial indebtedness of households, investment opportunities and other favorable factors. 
Credit growth in CEEC has gained a lot of attention. While most research focused on the 
questions how the entry of foreign banks affects the financial system in terms of efficiency and 
stability (see e.g. Claessens et al. 2001, Weill 2003, De Haas and van Lelyveld 2006) and later on 
whether credit growth was excessive (see e.g. Kiss et al. 2006, Zumer et al. 2009), the financial 
crisis raises the question how banks in CEEC master the current situation.  
We contribute to, and go beyond, the existing literature by explicitly looking at how the 
determinants of credit growth changed during the global crisis. In particular, using a large panel 
data set we seek to answer three questions.: 
First, we investigate whether it is micro- or macroeconomic factors that drive credit growth, and 
whether there is a difference between normal times and times of crisis. We have been 
witnessing a turnaround in the credit growth developments in the region since the beginning of 
the most recent crisis, and while there has been a plenty of research on drivers behind these 
developments in the years preceding the crisis, until now we have not seen evidence on the 
most recent developments nor drivers behind it. Hence, we aim to answer if there has been a 
change in determinants of the bank lending during the most recent crisis. 
Second, we attempt to answer if bank lending drivers changed to the same extent for foreign 
and domestic banks. Namely, some papers that are motivated by the financial stability concerns 
analyze the credit behavior of foreign versus domestic banks in the most recent crisis. However, 
currently there is no evidence on differences between drivers of the credit growth of foreign 
banks in normal times and in the times of crisis. It is interesting to check if foreign bank lending 
is determined differently by micro- and macroeconomic factors than for domestic banks, and 
moreover what is the behavior across economic cycles. By the same means, we test if credit 
drivers of foreign and domestic banks react at the same time to the crisis. 
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Third, in the last step we also distinguish between different types of ownership/ mode of entry, 
in order to detect possible differences between domestic state-owned, domestic private-
owned, foreign greenfield and foreign brownfield banks. 
We cannot discern if the current increase in non-performing loans came as a result of a high 
credit growth prior to the crisis or because of the crisis itself, or both. But we should seek to 
understand the credit demand and supply interplay that takes place in the CEEC in order to 
regulate the banking sector more efficiently. The trend of dynamic provisioning and 
countercyclical buffers falls into this category. If there is a major difference between banks’ 
behavior in normal times and in the times of crisis, then regulation should ensure that both 
scenarios are covered and there are no remaining caveats. Also, as foreign banks represent a 
substantial part of the banking sector in the region, if they tend to behave much differently than 
domestic ones it should be foreseen when constructing targeted regulatory measures. These 
notions help in designing a healthy banking system which follows and supports the real 
economy, instead of contributing to the buildup of macroeconomic imbalances.  
We find that the credit growth can be explained rather by macro- than microeconomic factors, 
and in the times of crisis it seems to be under major influence of bank liquidity. These findings 
are in line with previous results which confirm that deposit growth fuels bank lending, but we 
are also first one to show that in crisis deposits’ growth decouples from credit growth, and that 
the same holds for macroeconomic factors. We find differences between domestic and foreign 
banks, where the latter seem to be less affected by the liquidity and driven more by return on 
equity.  Of all the banks, lending of foreign greenfield banks seems to be the most susceptible to 
the macroeconomic conditions. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the existing literature. In the 
subsequent section 3 we describe our data set. In Section 4 we introduce our empirical 
approach, whereas Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Literature Overview 
 
Real GDP as well as long and/or short term interest rates are most commonly used in estimating 
credit equations (Calza et al. 2003, Brzoza-Brzezina 2005, Boissay et al. 2005). Other authors 
suggest adding further macroeconomic variables. Backé et al (2007) use the following 
independent variables: nominal short and long term interest rate, PPP-based GDP per capita, 
industrial production, CPI inflation, government credit, financial liberalization index, housing 
prices and existence of public and private registries. A slightly smaller set of independent 
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variables is used in Kiss et al (2006), namely real short term interest rate, PPP-based GDP per 
capita and CPI inflation.  
While the above mentioned authors exclusively rely on macroeconomic variables, Frömmel and 
Karagyozova (2008) for the case of Bulgaria and Eller et al (2010) for a broad set of CEEC 
countries go a step further and use besides standard macroeconomic determinants such as real 
GDP, real interest rates and inflation aggregate deposits and equity. Furthermore they introduce 
regime switches to the analysis, thus emphasize switches of determinants depending on the 
economic conditions. While Frömmel and Karagyozova (2008) and Eller et al. (2010) estimate 
regime switches endogenously, interaction terms with dummies for exogenous states are being 
employed in some of the papers relevant to our research, mainly to check whether independent 
variable’s property changes during the crisis. Detragiache and Gupta (2006) test whether the 
Asian crisis affected differently banks of different ownership in Malaysia. For this purpose they 
use interaction terms (product of a dummy for the crisis period and relevant variables) as 
independent variables and test whether the coefficient for the interaction term is significantly 
different from zero. A similar approach is used in de Haas and Lelyveld (2011) where they use 
the interaction term between the crisis dummy and domestic ownership to check if the 
domestic banks were better able to continue lending during the Great Recession as compared 
to the multinational subsidiaries. In the same paper, using an interaction term between the 
crisis dummy and deposits’ growth, they show that deposits as determinant of credit growth 
gain on importance during the crisis. However, they do not test for possible changes in 
importance of other micro and macro determinants during the crisis. 
In the same vein, one strand of literature examines if domestic bank credit growth reacts 
differently than foreign banks credit growth during the crisis. De Haas and Lelyveld (2006, 2010, 
and 2011) and de Haas et al (2012) examine if lending by domestic banks in crisis is more stable 
or less stable than lending by foreign banks. There is some indication that domestic and foreign 
bank lending stability differs, so it is desirable to inspect whether their behavior is motivated by 
micro- or macroeconomic variables, and does this alter during the crisis.  
 
3 Data Description 
 
We use an unbalanced panel dataset consisting of balance sheet data and macroeconomic 
variables for CEEC. It covers the years 2001 through 2011 and more than 250 banks from the 
following eleven CEEC: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. These are all transition economies which joined the 
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European Union including Croatia which will join EU in summer 2013. To avoid any survivorship 
bias, we also include banks that were founded, ceased to exist or merged during the sample 
period or changed their owner, which makes the number of banks per year slightly differ. The 
total number of banks decreased from 251 in 2001 to 213 in 2011 (Table 1), which is to some 
extent a result of the consolidation and reconsolidation processes paired with the privatization. 
We notice a stable trend in the state bank ownership during the observation period, whereas 
the number of foreign banks exceeds the number of domestic banks over the years. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Macroeconomic data was culled from different sources, including national central banks, IMF 
statistics and Eurostat. For the bank specific variables we rely on data from Bureau van Dijk’s 
BankScope database. This database contains balance sheet data for a large number of banks on 
a yearly basis. The variables we achieved from this source are  deposit stock and ratios such as 
solvency, liquidity, profitability, efficiency and loan quality. Data on bank ownership is the same 
as in de Haas et al. (2011)17. We distinguish not only domestic and foreign banks, but also 
domestic state-owned and domestic private banks, as well as foreign brownfield (takeovers) and 
foreign Greenfield (de novo) banks. A thorough description of data and data sources can be 
found in the Appendix.  
We have removed all implausible values, together with observations where the loan growth 
exceeded 100% in order to control for mergers and acquisitions. We have also removed 
observations with implausible values for the deposit growth. 
The following table gives an overview of the average growth in loans, deposits and equity in our 
sample. We notice that in the crisis period, i.e. the years 2008-2011, most of the presented 
variables deteriorated substantially across ownership types. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
4 Methodology 
We start with the following benchmark credit equation without consideration of the financial 
crisis: 
                                                          
17
 We would like to thank Ralf de Haas for sharing this data. 
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where Δcit is the credit growth of bank i in period t. The right hand side variables include both 
macroeconomic variables reflecting the condition of the economy and bank-specific variables. 
Macroeconomic variables are economic activity, proxied by industrial production, interest rates 
represented by nominal t-bill rates18 and the CPI based inflation rate. These variables are the 
most commonly used macroeconomic variables in the literature and mainly reflect the pure 
demand for credit (Pazarbasioglu 1997; Ghosh and Ghosh 1999; Barajas and Steiner 2002; Calza, 
Gartner and Sousa 2003; for a survey see Kiss et al. 2006). According to the existing literature 
we expect a positive relation between economic activity and credit growth, while for the the 
inflation rate we expect a negative coefficient. The interest rate is ambiguous, since on the one 
hand one might expect credit growth to be negatively related to interest rates, whereas the 
empirical literature suggests particularly for CEEC a positive coefficient (see Eller et al. 2010 and 
the references therein).  
The bank-specific variables are growth of deposits, solvency (measured as the ratio equity/total 
assets), loan quality (ratio loan loss reserve/gross loans), liquidity (liquid assets/customer and 
short-term funding) and return on equity as a measure of profitability. We expect a positive 
relation between deposit growth and credit growth since deposits are the main funding source 
for banks in the CEEC, which rely less on issuing securities than banks in Western Europe. The 
relation should therefore be particularly pronounced for domestic banks, but also visible for 
subsidiaries of foreign banks, which seem to be comparatively independent from their holding 
institution (De Haas and van Lelyveld 2006). In contrast, the relation between credit growth and 
solvency, liquidity, loan quality and profitability is ambiguous.  
We work in differences instead of applying a cointegration approach, because our time 
dimension is comparatively short compared to the number of banks. A cointegration approach 
over such a short period (with different regimes being likely) is hardly meaningful, second panel 
approaches such as dynamic OLS would substantially reduce our degrees of freedom. We 
therefore follow e.g. Peek and Rosengreen (2001), Kiss et al. (2006), De Haas and van Lelyveld 
(2006, 2012) and estimate the equation in differences. 
Furthermore, we construct crisis and ownership dummy variables for each year in the dataset 
and each type of ownership, distinguishing between foreign and domestic but also between 
private, state, brownfield and greenfield banks. Moreover, we add one more dummy for the 
crisis years, i.e. 2008-2011. In order to distinguish between effects of the different factors in 
                                                          
18
 Alternative specifications using the (also nominal) lending rate or government bond yields do not 
substantially affect the results. 
74 
 
normal times and the times of crisis, we introduce interaction terms: product of crisis dummy 
and relevant variable. This leads to our main equation of interest. 
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where dC is the crisis dummy, which takes the value one for the years 2008-2011, and zero 
otherwise. Equation (2) can be estimated for each of the four ownership types (domestic 
private, domestic state owned, foreign brownfield, foreign greenfield) or any combination of 
these subsets separately. Recall that the ownership variable is both, bank- and time-specific, 
since banks may have changed their ownership status during the sample period. 
In the final step we analyze differences between foreign and domestic banks, by repeating the 
estimation (3) separately for domestic and foreign banks. In particular we will investigate the 
hypothesis that domestic and foreign bank lending is determined by different factors at 
different times. We furthermore distinguish between domestic state, domestic private, foreign 
brownfield and foreign greenfield banks by repeating the estimation (3) separately for each of 
the four ownership types. 
Based on the results of the Hausman test which points to the possible correlation between our 
independent variables and bank specific effects, we estimate our main equation (2) using fixed 
effects estimator with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.  
In summary, based on equation (2) we can test the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Regime-dependence of determinants.  
The importance of determinants in the pre-crisis and the crisis period differ, i.e. the coefficients 
for the interaction terms are significant.  
 
Hypothesis 1b: Shift from macroeconomic to bank-specific factors.  
In some papers macroeconomic factors are interpreted as demand-side determinants, and 
microeconomic factors as supply-side determinants. During the crisis banks will be exposed to 
internal restraints and therefore rely on bank-specific factors when determining lending 
behavior. As a result, the interaction terms should have a negative sign for the macroeconomic, 
and a positive sign for the bank-specific variables. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Domestic versus foreign banks.  
Foreign banks are less exposed to macroeconomic influences of the host country and will 
therefore be less affected by the regime shift from hypothesis 1b.   
75 
 
 
5 Results 
 
In the first step we estimate the proposed model for the whole sample period, but without 
interaction terms, as a benchmark model. The results can be found in Table 3, second column. 
The estimated coefficients for all main variables suggested by the empirical literature show the 
expected sign, i.e. credit growth is positively related to the interest rate, the growth rates of 
economic activity, deposits and profitability, whereas the coefficient for inflation has a negative 
sign. Most of the coefficients are significant. We can thus conclude that the baseline regression 
describes the dynamics of bank lending sufficiently well. 
In the second step we add interaction terms to the variables of interest, which allows us to test 
hypotheses 1a and 1b, and the results are shown in the last column of Table 3. Some of the 
coefficients for the interaction terms turn out to be significant, indicating that the credit 
function is state-dependent and the financial crisis created a regime switch. We can thus 
confirm hypothesis 1a. 
Moreover, we can to a certain extent confirm the hypothesis 1b as well because the significant 
coefficients on the interaction terms show a negative sign for the macroeconomic variable of 
economic growth, and a positive sign for the bank-specific variable liquidity. Therefore we can 
recognize the expected shift from macroeconomic to bank-specific determinants. 
The exact nature of this regime switch, however, shows some specific features. First of all and 
as expected, we observe that the macro variables: interest rate, inflation and economic activity 
indeed change impact during the crisis. During the crisis credit growth becomes seemingly 
unrelated to the economic activity. Two results are particularly interesting: First, the interest 
rate coefficient is insignificant, reflecting the inability of monetary policy to push credit growth 
by lower interest rate. The common wisdom that monetary policy is like a string – you can use it 
for pulling, but not for pushing – might hold. 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
However, we do not observe a full shift to bank-specific factors, as we would expect. In contrast, 
only liquidity seems to take effect during the crisis.  It seems that while liquidity constraints play 
a role, other bank-specific variables do restrict banks’ ability (or willingless) to lend. The results 
therefore only partially support hypothesis 1b. 
We proceed by distinguishing among the four groups of banks: domestic private and state 
banks, and foreign greenfield and brownfield banks (Table 4). On the disaggregated level we 
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notice differences in the aforementioned behavior between domestic and foreign banks, and 
between different types of the ownership. 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
First, when distinguishing between domestic and foreign banks we find that macroeconomic 
factors, especially the economic activity, generally play an equally important role in domestic 
and foreign banks lending. While for domestic (private) banks we find that the interest rate 
seems to be an important determinant of credit growth, for foreign banks it is inflation, albeit 
with a minor economic significance.  
Among the bank-specific variables, lending in general shows a strong dependence on deposits, 
what is apparently offset for domestic banks during the crisis. As predicted, we see that bank-
specific factors do not contribute to the credit growth unless there is a period of crisis. Namely, 
liquidity seems to come into play to a big extent for domestic bank lending during the crisis. The 
results for foreign banks are somewhat different. They do not show the same pattern for 
liquidity determinants, as we suppose they can rely on liquidity lines from their mother banks in 
the case of emergency. Wald tests for all of the specifications can be found in the Table 5. 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
This paper aims to reveal how credit growth determinants in CEEE changed during the last crisis 
as compared to the normal times. Findings are further refined to differentiate between credit 
drivers for domestic and foreign banks, and even further between different types of ownership. 
The main contribution of our study lies in going beyond the analysis of developments of credit 
growth and differences between domestic and foreign banks, to dissect the interplay of demand 
and supply factors, which are shown to behave differently in the crisis period.  
Our results differ from de Haas and van Lelyveld (2011) by the effect of deposits’ growth on 
credit growth during the global crisis. That is, they find positive effect, which is challenged by 
our finding of significantly negative effect of deposit growth on domestic bank lending during 
the crisis. We go further in exploring macro- and microeconomic determinants of credit growth 
and find that both factors matter, but in a different way.  
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In general, macroeconomic and bank-specific factors play a substantial role in determining 
credit growth. But some of these effects seem to have switched importance during the last 
crisis. To a certain extent we find a shift from macro- to microeconomic determinants in crisis, 
and confirm stated hypotheses. Namely, whereas economic activity contributes to lending in 
normal times, bank-specific liquidity takes over as  main determinant during the times of crisis. 
Based on this evidence we conclude that the measures for credit growth recovery during the 
crisis which are directed toward macroeconomic effects, such as stimulation of GDP growth, 
might not have as positive effects as desirable, whereas the measures directed to liquidity 
enhancements might prove efficient. It would be interesting to verify findings from the CEEE for 
other European banks and make general policy recommendations on accelerating the credit 
growth during the crisis.  
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Appendix 
DATA DESCRIPTION 
Variable Description Source 
Total Assets Total assets - EUR Bankscope 
Deposits Deposits & Short term funding -EUR Bankscope 
Equity  Equity - EUR Bankscope 
Loan quality Loan Loss Reserve/Gross Loans-% Bankscope 
Solvency Equity / Total Assets - % Bankscope 
NIM Net Interest Margin - % Bankscope 
Profitability Return on Average Equity - % Bankscope 
CI Cost to Income Ratio - % Bankscope 
Liquidity Liquid Assets/Cust&ST Funding - % Bankscope 
Loans Loans - EUR Bankscope 
Gross Loans Gross Loans- EUR Bankscope 
Loan Loss Reserves Loan Loss Reserves - EUR Bankscope 
GDP growth Real GDP growth (% YoY) Datastream (WIIW) 
CPI Inflation CPI inflation Datastream (IFS) 
Tbill Treasury bills rate Datastream (mostly IFS) 
Deposits Growth Percentage growth in deposits calculated  
Loans Growth Percentage growth in loans calculated 
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Abstract 
This paper contributes to the literature on capital structure and banking relationships employing 
a large micro-data set covering the whole universe of Croatian companies. We show that bank 
loans, followed by short term trade credit are the major source of finance. Smaller companies 
concentrate their borrowing and rely heavily on external finance. We find evidence that industry, 
assets structure, collateral strength and profitability matter for the debt maturity and debt 
structure. Banking relationships are related to the industry in which the firm operates and to the 
company size, credit quality and ownership as well. 
JEL classification: G32 
Keywords:  financing patterns, financing mix, banking relationships, trade credit 
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1 Introduction 
 
Capital structure topics appear as interesting as ever in spite of the fact that it has been well 
over five decades since these issues were addressed by Modigliani and Miller (1958). The 
theoretical and empirical literature on capital structure decisions seems to be ever greening, 
from testing different theories, to using new methodologies or fresh data sets. In this spirit, we 
analyze financing pattern of Croatian firms, estimate its determinants, examine banking 
relationship and draw policy implications.  
We address three questions in our study, using company characteristics as the explanatory tool. 
Firstly, can we relate certain company characteristics to the observed debt maturity? Second, 
can they help explain the differences in the liabilities’ mix? And lastly, are they linked to the 
bank relationship that firms establish? 
Similar studies for groups or individual countries have been done, and there is a considerable 
literature on cross-country differences in the financing patterns of companies, mostly relying on 
explanations regarding differences in macroeconomic variables, financial and legal institutions’ 
development, and firm characteristics. Our contribution to the existing literature is using a 
detailed data set which allows for testing of a wide set of hypotheses, usually not tested or 
tested separately in the previous literature due to limited data. We are also the first to 
thoroughly examine the financing structure of Croatian firms and its determinants. 
Since the early nineties, as in every transition country, there have been a lot of changes in the 
finance industry, ownership structure of companies and banks, and institutional environment in 
general. The financial industry is nowadays largely dominated by banking activities, and the 
latter are dominated by foreign banks. Croatia has experienced a substantial penetration of 
foreign banks, so that they nowadays account for over 90% of total banks’ assets. State owned 
banks do not play a major role on the market, considering the fact that they represent less than 
5% of total banks’ assets. The concentration in the banking sector is higher than in the Western 
European countries, and also higher than the South-eastern European countries’ average: the 
five largest banks held three quarters of total banks’ assets at the end of 2012. The stock market 
is still quite shallow and narrow, with the market capitalization of around 55 per cent of the GDP 
(2012), with a deepening trend.  
It is worth noticing that EBRD transition indicators confirm that Croatia has reached the 
standards of an industrialized market economy when it comes to the banking reform and 
interest rate liberalization. However, the same indicators show that the competition policy and 
reform of non-bank financial institutions in Croatia could still be improved. Leasing activities 
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started to develop more intensively only after 1997, and the Leasing Act came into force as late 
as 2006. As of March 2012, insurance market assets amounted to EUR4.6 billion, whereas the 
total bank assets amounted to EUR55.6 billion. In comparison, total assets of leasing companies 
amounted to EUR3.3 billion. 
We believe that the Croatian case is of broader interest, because it is characterized by a high 
degree of banking concentration, extensive foreign banks participation, and a high share of 
cross-border credits. While our research focuses on Croatia, its conclusions are comparable to 
findings for other Central and Eastern European countries. Understanding financing choices is 
valuable in deciding in which direction the institutions and markets should be developed. Timely 
and targeted actions in these processes, as well as in the creation of government aided 
programs, can save a lot of resources.  
Results show that the determinants of funding can be found among the firm-level 
characteristics, such as industry in which the enterprise operates, assets structure and 
profitability of a company. Relationship lending is most strongly linked to the size of the 
company, but also to the credit quality and the ownership. Industry in which the enterprise 
operates matters for the bank relationship as well. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the related literature. 
Section 3 describes the data set and Section 4 presents the econometric specification we use. 
The results can be found in the Section 5, whereas the Section 6 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2 Literature overview  
 
Two lines of research on static capital structure models are relevant for this study. The first one 
explores the financing patterns and capital structure decisions, trying to relate them to firm 
characteristics, or to institutional differences and macroeconomic variables. The second strand 
explores credit availability and bank relationships. 
One of the most relevant cross-country studies on determinants of capital structure using data 
from G-7 countries was done by Rajan and Zingales (1995). They do not set out on testing any 
capital structure theory in particular, but rather look for empirical correlations and conclude 
that theoretical underpinnings of their findings are problematic. The capital structures were 
studied also by Booth et al. (2001) and Fan, Titman and Twite (2004) who use an extensive 
sample of developed and developing countries. The latter find that the taxes, inflation and legal 
institutions have substantial impact on financing of corporations, and in general we observe 
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that cross-country studies devote their attention to the institutional differences in explaining 
financing decisions. Another interesting study on developed and developing countries was done 
by Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998).  
Beck et al. (2008) use disaggregated debt instead of debt-equity ratios to examine how financial 
and institutional development affects financing of small firms, using a broad data set covering 
almost fifty countries. Dependent variables are proportions of investments financed externally: 
by bank debt, equity, leasing, supplier credit, development banks and money lenders, together 
with the aggregate measure of proportion of investments financed externally.  
Terra (2009) investigates simultaneously the choice between debt and equity and between 
short- and long term debt, on a sample of almost thousand firms from Latin America. Another 
study of companies in emerging markets, especially financing of small- and medium-size firms, 
was conducted by Klapper et al. (2002) on a sample of firms from Eastern European countries 
including Croatia. Because of their data set coverage, it qualifies rather as a general analysis of 
the debt maturity choice than a thorough capital structure examination. 
There is also evidence from individual countries which typically exclude institutional 
determinants from the models. Kumar and Francisco (2005) on the Brazilian data set explore 
the extent to which the firm size affects financing patterns, together with credit constraint of 
small firms. Their analysis of financing patterns is limited to a simple comparison across firms of 
different sizes.  
Relationship lending was interesting to Berger and Udell (1995, 2002) but in the context of 
small firms. In the same line, small business lending was of importance to Petersen and Rajan 
(2002), Cole et al. (2004) and Berger et al. (2007). Another typical focus in this strand of 
literature is the impact of foreign bank penetration on small business lending as in Kraft (2002), 
Clarke et al. (2001, 2005), or on lending in general, as in De Haas and Naaborg (2006), 
Detragiache et al. (2006), Haber and Musacchio (2005), Giannetti and Ongena (2009) and 
Berger et al. (2008).  
Geršl and Jakubik (2010) use the Czech sample to analyze whether firm- and industry-level 
variables determine the choice of bank financing model, using the share of the main 
relationship lender in the firm’s total bank debt as dependent variable. They find that older 
companies with more turnover have less concentrated loans, whereas firms in technology and 
knowledge intensive industries concentrate their borrowing. Memmel et al. (2008) examine the 
impact of borrowers’ characteristics on relationship banking, measured as the number of 
lending relationships. German evidence shows that larger and older companies have more 
lenders whereas R&D intensive firms have significant less lending relationships.  
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3 Data and descriptive analysis 
 
In this paper we combine companies’ balance sheet data (FINA-Croatian Financial agency 
database) with anonymised firm-level data on loans from the credit register of the Croatian 
National Bank. Our period of interest covers three years, 2008-2010, and altogether we have 
201,553 firm-year observations. The panel is unbalanced and allows us broad overview of firm 
characteristics and banking relationship characteristics.  
We start by justification of our main variables, followed by summary statistics. Thorough 
explanation on the construction of variables can be found in the Table 8 in the Appendix. One of 
the core factors is industry median, as a measure of industry conditions. By choosing this factor, 
we take into account different forces and processes which would otherwise influence our 
results. The next factor is growth, measured as change in log assets. Under the pecking order 
theory it should be positively related to debt. Better measure for growth would be the asset 
market-to-book value ratio, but our data set entails non-listed firms as well. Alternatively, we 
can use the ratio of research and development investments to total assets as a proxy for growth 
opportunities.  
Ratio of short term assets to total assets and collateral strength both assess the nature of 
assets. In the case of maturity matching, we would expect the firms with more short term assets 
to have more short term liabilities as well. Tangible assets on the other hand are easily used as 
collateral and the lower expected costs of distress together with less agency problems should 
yield a positive relation between tangibility and debt. 
We measure profitability as the return on assets. Different theories have opposing views on this 
variable, but according to the pecking order theory, profitable firms become less levered over 
time. We also plug in the ownership and region dummies in our model because these factors 
might influence the financing choices and should be controlled for. 
Substantial part of the companies in the data set is situated in three regions: Zagreb with 
surroundings and the two coastal regions- Dalmatia, Istria and Primorje. Over 60% of the total 
assets in the sample are concentrated in the companies in Zagreb and surroundings, together 
with almost 60% of the total income. Another interesting feature of the sample is that the 
number of small firms21 makes around 97% of all companies, but less than one third of the total 
                                                          
21 We define a company size according to the Croatian Accounting Act, where small, medium and large firms are 
classified according to the three criteria: amount of the total assets, amount of the total income and the average 
number of employees. Accounting Act in Article 3 offers the following definition. Small firms satisfy at least two of 
the following criteria: total assets below HRK 32,5 million (≈EUR 4,5 million), total income below HRK 65 million 
97 
 
assets and total income, respectively. In contrast, large firms count for over half of the total 
assets and total income, respectively. 
The prevalent industry in all of the regions and in the Croatian national income is trade, which 
counts for one third of all of the firms in Croatia. It is followed by professional, scientific and 
technical activities, construction and manufacturing. The latter is only second to trade in the 
total income. Construction is expectedly the ‘heaviest’ industry when it comes to asset size, due 
to the nature of the business. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Over 96% of the companies in Croatia are privately owned, and they make one half of the total 
assets and 2/3 of the total income. State-owned companies represent only 1% of the total 
number of firms in the sample, yet they own almost one third of all firms’ assets. Similarly, the 
firms that became private after privatization or they have mixed ownership with major private 
stake account for only 1.7% of the total number of firms but own over 20% of the total assets. 
State owned firms create only 12.5% of the total income even though they hold big assets’ 
share. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Table 2 gives an idea about the first part of the research question, the maturity structure of the 
liabilities. The major part form short term liabilities and together with long term liabilities they 
represent on average 60% of total liabilities. The firms in Croatia have a high share of debt 
financing compared to the equity.  
In support to the findings of Titman and Wessels (1988), in Table 2 we observe that the small 
firms employ more short term financing than large firms, which could be a reflection of their 
constraints in obtaining long term debt or equity. These firms might be simply matching the 
maturities of their assets and liabilities, so that if the short term assets prevail, they would 
prefer obtaining short term debt. This remains to be inspected in the following Section, together 
with the hypothesis that the firms with more borrowing capacities have more long term debt, 
possibly also because they have lower transaction costs when issuing long term debt or equity. 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) find that the small firms are destined to use more short 
term liabilities, claiming it is because this limits time during which they can exploit creditors 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
(≈EUR 8,9 million) and maximum 50 employees. Medium firms are the firms which do not satisfy at least two of the 
mentioned criteria, but do satisfy at least two of the following criteria: total assets below HRK 130 million (≈EUR 
17,8), total income below HRK 260 million (≈EUR 35,6 million) and maximum 250 employees. Big firms are then 
those firms which do not satisfy at least two of the previously mentioned criteria. 
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without ending up in default. In that sense, it is rational that lenders protect themselves by 
monitoring the firm more frequently and changing the terms of financing before any large 
losses occur. 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
As for the second part of the main research question, the dominance of bank loans and (short 
term) trade credit is obvious. This finding contradicts similar studies on transition countries, 
where the trade credit is found to be low. In the study conducted on transition countries world-
wide, bank loans were found to be the most common source of external finance, whereas on a 
study conducted on a set of Baltic, CESEE22 and CIS23 countries it was found to be low. Finding 
that the bank finance is leading might be pertinent to CEE countries, and definitely to Croatia. 
As we have pointed out, another important source of financial intermediation in Croatia are 
firms providing trade credit among themselves24.  
Finally, we observe that securities issuance is the least used funding source and this indicates 
underdeveloped financial markets and classifies Croatia as a bank-based economy.  
The next interesting observation is that small firms have on average fewer loans obtained from 
the group of connected parties. A plausible explanation is that they less commonly belong to a 
group of connected parties or holdings, and operate more on stand-alone basis.   
A decreasing share of short-term trade credit over the sample period, and an increase in loans 
from the Group deserve a closer look. Trade credit seems to have decreased the most for the 
small, private companies in the construction, manufacturing and services industry- but more for 
the regions other than Zagreb. As we know that small private companies mostly do not belong 
to holdings, it is an indicator of their endangered position during the most recent crisis. 
Interesting increase and then sudden decrease in the short-term bank loans, together with less 
short-term advanced payments could be pointing to a liquidity squeeze. 
Interestingly enough, Table 2 showed that small firms have on average less equity than large 
firms, but here we notice that on average they also use less short-term bank credit. This could 
be in line with the hypothesis proposed by Berger et al. (2001) that the large and foreign-owned 
banks have difficulties in extending relationship loans to informationally opaque small 
businesses, but it requires further analysis. We observe the average amount borrowed from big 
                                                          
22
 Central, Eastern and South Eastern European countries 
23
 Commonwealth of Independent States 
24
 This potentially interesting issue requires further analysis, and we find that the bigger companies with 
more collateral strength and more bank loans act as the trade creditors on the Croatian market. 
Smaller companies with less collateral strength and less bank loans act as trade debtors. 
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and foreign banks for all firm sizes in Figure 2. While the share borrowed from big banks 
increased for firms of all sizes over the observation period, it is obvious that the share of foreign 
banks’ loans improved only for large companies, whereas the small and medium ones 
experienced decreasing portion of foreign banks’ loans in total bank loans. These trends brought 
to ever larger gap between the loans that large companies can obtain from big/foreign banks as 
compared to the small companies.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Analysis of the concentration of borrowing reveals the number of lenders per company. 
Relationship lending is defined as a close tie between the firm and the bank, signaled by a very 
concentrated borrowing. Data set allows us to calculate the share of single biggest lender in the 
total banking debt of a company25. Table 4 shows that the fraction of loans obtained from the 
single biggest lender for the smallest firms is close to 100% on average and decreases gradually 
to 90% on average for the biggest firms. Small firms borrow at least 39% of bank loans from the 
primary bank, whereas large firms diversify their loans so that they borrow at least 18% of all 
bank loans from the primary bank. Furthermore, in the first part of the table we present the 
average number of bank relationships for firms of different sizes. We observe that the smallest 
firms have on average less banking relationships than bigger firms. While small companies 
obtain loans from a maximum of four banks, for large companies the number of bank 
relationships can go up to 16. This could as well be a reflection of legal provision which prohibits 
banks to invest more than 10% of their total exposure in one group of connected parties. Due to 
that provision, a large firm which needs substantial financing could get only a limited amount 
from one bank. Consequently, such a firm would have to approach other banks when the 
current bank has reached the legal lending limit. Also, there is endogeneity arising from the 
mere fact that firms of particular size require more funds for their investments which can be 
sometimes obtained from multiple banks only. 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
These figures agree with the previous work of Petersen and Rajan (1994) who use various 
measures of borrowing concentration and find that the small firm borrowing is the most 
concentrated, and that larger firms diversify their borrowing.  
  
                                                          
25
 In our data set the correlation coefficient between these two indicators (the number of lending 
relationships and the share of the single biggest lender in total bank loans) is 0.76, which makes it 
possible to use these two indicators equivalently in analyzing relationship lending. 
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4 Empirical methodology 
 
4.1 Capital structure choices 
 
The capital structure studies look primarily at variations in debt ratios, whereas we try to 
explain the variations in the structure of debt as well. We analyze separately every decision of 
financing mix- the disaggregated sources of finance- rather than the aggregate measures of 
debt. Admittedly, we do not check for institutional differences because we do not deal with 
cross-country data set.  
Based on the literature review and data availability, we opt for the following firm level variables 
as financing determinants: industry median, growth, ratio of short term assets to total assets, 
collateral strength, profitability as well as control variables: ownership and region dummies. The 
correlation tables26 for dependent and independent variables show that our dependent 
variables are correlated to the firms’ characteristics that we have included.  
After examining unconditional correlations27, we proceed to the regression analysis. In order to 
answer our research questions, we will examine different kinds of dependent variables. In the 
first set of regressions (Table 5) our dependent variables will be equity, long- and short term 
liabilities in proportion to total assets. We aim to discover what affects the sort and maturity of 
liabilities. In the second set of regressions (Table 6), our dependent variables will become the 
ratios of different classes of liabilities to total assets, and we will examine which of the firm-level 
factors are relevant for financing mix decisions.  
The most straightforward approach would be to employ, as many other studies on this topic, 
the pooled model but for different reasons it might result in the inefficient or biased estimates. 
Therefore we use it only as one of the alternative models for the robustness check purposes.  
The dependent variable takes values between 0 and 1, but barely ever touches boundaries. 
Hence, we use the fixed effects28 model in estimating a specification of the following general 
form (1): 
                                                          
26
 Available from authors on request. 
27
 In spite of the detailed data set, we decided to leave some of the variables out of the analysis because 
of the possible multicollinearity concerns. 
28
  Hausman specification test declines random effects model. In addition to the fixed effects, we also run 
cross section regressions for each of the years using OLS. Additionally, we run pooled OLS and 
Tobit model as a robustness check. 
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Where FinancingSourcei,t is firm i’s ratio of particular financing source to total assets at time t, 
and FirmCharacteristicsk,i,t is a vector of k firm i’s characteristics. Determinants that we employ 
in this study surely have different effects on demand and supply side, but the aim of this paper 
is not a structural test of any of the capital structure theories. We try to discover which factors 
work empirically. As many authors conclude, unfortunately none of the existing capital structure 
models satisfactorily explains all of the observed structures, i.e. they do not yet cope with all of 
the factors that are empirically observed as important. 
It is important to mention that the firms in our sample which are joined in a group of connected 
parties do not report their balance sheets in a consolidated manner, which means that they 
might appear to have lower leverage than actual, because they might report affiliates’ net 
assets as long term investments. Also, when window-dressing the balance sheet firms 
sometimes place the debt they take on in subsidiaries and then borrow it back via inter-firm 
trade credit or similar instrument.  
Besides the concern of concealing debt in subsidiaries, there are some other country-specific 
characteristics of Croatia. Namely, until a few years ago, a principle of notional interest rate on 
equity was applied, which enabled entrepreneurs to report higher costs and consequently 
report lower profit and taxes. However, since this rule was abandoned, there is a suspicion that 
entrepreneurs tend to report minimum equity in their balance sheets and the rest of the equity 
as a loan because the interest rate is accepted as a profit deducing cost. Firms that have zero 
shareholder equity remained in the sample (0.7%), due to the fact that the lenient enforcement 
of minimum equity provision enables enterprises to operate without the shareholder equity29. 
 
4.2 Relationship banking 
 
We use similar firm specific variables in our examination of the relationship banking. Here we 
add a dummy for big companies as the size variable, as it is considered to be a valid measure of 
informational transparency. Growth variable is often used in empirical analysis as well, and to 
the ownership variables we add a dummy variable indicating if the company has foreign 
                                                          
29
 Our data set excludes companies with equity<0EUR and total assets<150EUR,  but in order to 
additionally control for possible ―ghost‖ firms we ran all regressions excluding companies with no 
reported employees. Results remain robust. 
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ownership. Our equity ratio turns into independent variable indicating creditworthiness of a 
company.  
There are a couple of indicators proposed for the relationship banking, including the number of 
lenders, duration of the lending relationship and the share of the biggest lender in the firm’s 
total bank loans. It could be that, in spite of many lenders, firms have actually close ties with 
only one lender. This is why we opt for the ratio of loans obtained from the biggest lender in 
total bank loans as dependent variable. It takes values between 0 and 1 and mostly lies on or 
close to the boundaries. We estimate a specification of the following general form (1): 
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Where ShareSingleBiggestLenderi,t is firm i’s ratio of funds obtained from the single biggest 
lender in total bank loans at time t, and FirmCharacteristicsk,i,t is a vector of k firm i’s 
characteristics. Tobit model appears as the most suitable considering the truncated nature of 
the dependent variable.  
 
5 Empirical Results 
 
The three main questions we try to answer are: which firm level factors are relevant for the 
maturity structure of liabilities, which of them are relevant for the choice of various classes of 
liabilities and lastly to which extent do they influence banking relationship? To that end, in our 
regression analysis we have examined three different kinds of dependent variables. We 
interpret a significant positive (negative) coefficient in the regressions as evidence of positive 
(negative) relation between the examined dependent and a particular independent variable. We 
restrict to commenting only the significant results. 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Table 5 shows that the use of equity finance is mostly determined by the industry in which the 
firm operates. Change in log assets increases the financing deficit, and the growth variable is 
consequently related to less equity and more debt, but economically hardly of any significance. 
We also find evidence for maturity matching, as the companies that have more short term 
assets also have more short term liabilities. As expected, collateral strength is positively related 
to long term liabilities because companies can pledge tangible assets as collateral. Profitability 
as measured by ROA has strong positive effect on the equity, and we can argue that firms over 
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time possibly inactively accumulate profits. In the same line, profitability has strong negative 
impact on short term liabilities. Ownership and region dummies serve as a control variables and 
indeed do not contain economic meaning even when statistically significant. We proceed by 
summarizing the results from the Table 6.  
[Table 6 about here] 
 
Loans depend strongly on industry, and this is even more pronounced for other loans than for 
the bank loans. Industry variable captures specific features that are positively related to credits. 
As a confirmation of the findings in the Table 5, we find that the companies with more short 
term assets also have a higher level of long and short term debt. Other debt on short term 
comprises salaries, contributions and taxes, which are probably offset by the short term assets.  
As expected, collateral strength is positively related to the loans, which we believe reflects the 
policy of Croatian banks to rely mostly on the tangible assets as credit collateral. In that sense, 
companies that have more tangible assets prefer loans as a funding source to other financing 
sources. Profitable firms are clearly less levered, which can be best explained by the pecking 
order theory, according to which the firms prefer internal over external funds where fixed 
dividends and investments lead to less leverage of profitable firms. Besides the vague economic 
significance of ownership and region characteristics, we again find very low economic 
significance of the growth variable. 
We continue by examining the determinants of relationship lending, using a broader set of 
variables that are shown to matter in the empirical literature. 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
The most important association is found for the size variable, whereas size acts also as a 
transparency proxy. Larger companies concentrate their borrowing less with one single lender, 
as expected. Credit quality of the borrower, proxied by the equity ratio, is positively related to 
the concentration, meaning that more creditworthy companies concentrate credits with one 
lender.  
Foreign owned companies also concentrate their borrowings with one lender. State owned 
companies disperse their borrowings, hence we note a negative relationship between state 
ownership and the share of the single biggest lender. Industry seems to matter as well, which is 
in line with existing research. Quite opposite, region dummies have doubtful economic impact 
even when statistically significant. 
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5.1 Robustness checks 
 
A possible limitation of our results might be the loss of some time-invariant variables, but we 
employ alternative models including the pooled OLS and Tobit model, and confirm our findings. 
Next to limiting our data set to companies which have positive value of equity and total assets 
higher than 150EUR, we also control for possible “ghost” companies by excluding all companies 
with no reported employees. Our findings remain robust. We also include different variables 
which might be perceived as interchangeable30 to cross check our results, and they do not show 
major differences.  We split our sample into net trade credit creditors and net trade credit 
debtors to see whether their financing mix is determined by different factors. We notice no 
major differences in results. At last, we run the model by size group and conduct quartile 
regressions in order to see whether the determinants of capital structure and financing mix 
operate differently for companies of different sizes. All of the signs and significance of the 
coefficients remain the same with some minor changes in the magnitude. 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
In this study we use Croatian data set to examine the impact of firm-level determinants on the 
financing patterns and banking relationships. We explore a wide range of firm-level 
characteristics and financing sources. An important strength of this research is the unique micro 
data set which contains the whole universe of Croatian companies.  
Trade credit and bank loans are the most prevalent financing source. It is confirmed that the 
access to finance is of the paramount importance for the endurance of smaller companies. 
Moreover, our results confirm the fragility of small, mostly private, companies that rely heavily 
on the external funding from the mere start-up. Policies that can improve access to finance for 
small firms include strong creditor protection laws and regulations, development of credit-
rating system, and small-business co-financing programs. 
We find that the large firms diversify their borrowings across many banks, whereas the small 
companies tend to have fewer lenders and borrow more from the single biggest lender. 
Notably, some previous studies pointed to the low levels of trade credit in the region, whereas 
                                                          
30
 Instead of ln(Total assets) growth, Total assets growth; instead of ln(Total assets) growth, research and 
development investments to total assets as alternative measure of growth opportunities etc. 
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we show that one of the most popular debt class for the firms in our sample is a short term 
trade credit.  This is broadly in line with findings for developing countries. Thus, firms act as 
financial intermediaries in providing the trade credit. Consequently, a strong legal enforcement 
of payment agreements is crucial for a sound liquidity of Croatian economy.   
 
Of particular interest are the results identifying firm characteristics that affect liabilities’ 
maturity and structure. Industry characteristics are a very important determinant of equity and 
loans of a company. Assets structure is another important determinant of financing patterns. 
More short term assets are related to less equity and more tangible assets are related to more 
long term liabilities, in particular bank credit. One feasible explanation is maturity matching, 
which states that firms with more long term assets opt for longer term liabilities, whereas firms 
with short term assets are not using long term liabilities intensively. Profitability is positively 
related with equity and negatively to all other financing sources, which confirms theory 
according to which firms passively accumulate profits over time. Interestingly, net trade credit is 
negatively related to short term assets. Ownership and region dummies serve as a control 
variables and are not economically relevant even when statistically significant. 
Examination of the bank relationships points to the size as the most important determinant, 
where bigger firms tend to disperse their borrowing from the single lender. There are numerous 
explanations for this dispersion, while we propose two possible reasons: one bank can hardly 
meet all of the investment needs of a big company and bigger firms might be less 
informationally opaque and therefore borrow more easily from different lenders. We find that 
the foreign owned companies concentrate credits with one lender, just like the more 
creditworthy enterprises. Industry seems to matter for bank relationships as well, which is in 
line with similar research. Quite opposite, region dummies have doubtful economic impact even 
when statistically significant. 
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Tables and Figures 
TABLES 
 
TABLE 1.: Ownership break-down 
Ownership 
Number of firms % 
sample 
Asset 
size 
Total 
Income 
Small 
Mediu
m Large 
% 
sample % sample 
Private since established 88179 881 197 96.41% 49.34% 64.81% 
Private after 
privatization and mixed-
with major private stake 
1078 351 144 1.70% 20.30% 22.39% 
State and mixed-with 
major state stake 
774 167 81 1.10% 30.05% 12.48% 
Common 719 8 0 0.79% 0.32% 0.31% 
TOTAL 90750 1407 421 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Asset size (% sample) 
28.74
% 
16.09% 55.16% 100.00% 
  
Total Income (% 
sample) 
24.72
% 
21.01% 54.27% 100.00% 
  
 
TABLE 2.: The structure of the liabilities 
Firm size Equity 
Long term  
liabilities 
Short term 
liabilities 
Other 
Small 31.07% 14.01% 53.53% 1.39% 
Medium 37.45% 17.95% 39.83% 4.77% 
Large 40.63% 16.02% 38.69% 4.66% 
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TABLE 3.: Debt breakdown 
Debt class 
Term31/            
Firm size 
2008 Average 
2008 
Average 
2009 
Average 
2010 Small Medium Big 
Trade credit 
Long term 0.8% 0.3% 0.2% 0.4% 0.7% 0.7% 
Short 
term 24.4% 24.5% 19.5% 22.8% 20.7% 18.3% 
Loans from banks 
and other FI 
Long term 24.7% 26.9% 25.3% 25.6% 25.2% 25.4% 
Short 
term 8.2% 31.7% 23.9% 21.3% 24.4% 18.5% 
Other loans, 
deposits and similar 
Long term 9.1% 4.8% 7.4% 7.1% 8.3% 7.3% 
Short 
term 9.8% 3.6% 2.5% 5.3% 5.7% 6.3% 
Loans from Group32 
Long term 5.0% 5.2% 10.0% 6.7% 7.3% 10.3% 
Short 
term 4.3% 9.1% 11.1% 8.2% 8.5% 9.3% 
Advance payment 
Long term 0.2% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
Short 
term 2.4% 2.5% 2.2% 2.4% 2.0% 1.7% 
Issued securities 
Long term 0.2% 1.1% 1.9% 1.1% 1.0% 0.7% 
Short 
term 0.4% 0.7% 2.1% 1.1% 0.9% 1.0% 
Other debt33 
Long term 1.4% 1.3% 0.8% 1.2% 1.1% 1.5% 
Short 
term 9.1% 7.4% 6.0% 7.5% 7.7% 7.2% 
TOTAL DEBT 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
                                                          
31 Short term is due within one year and long term is due after one year 
 
32 Group refers to a group of connected parties, via ownership or otherwise 
 
33 The biggest portion of Other debt on long term refers to balance sheet category “other long term liabilities” and only smaller 
part refers to “long term deferred tax liabilities”. Half of the Other debt on short term refers to taxes and contributions, one 
third are the salaries and the rest is mostly balance sheet category “other short term liabilities”. 
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TABLE 4.: Concentration of borrowing from banks34 in 2008 
Total assets 
(000EUR) 
Assets  
Percentil
e 
Number of banking 
relationships 
Loans from single biggest 
lender 
Avera
ge 
Minimu
m 
Maximu
m 
Avera
ge 
Minimu
m 
Maximu
m 
Less than 
100.7 0-25 1.07 1.00 4.00 0.99 0.39 1.00 
100.7-311.8 25-50 1.16 1.00 4.00 0.97 0.30 1.00 
311.8-
1,126.5 50-75 1.25 1.00 8.00 0.96 0.26 1.00 
Over 1,126.5 75-100 1.62 1.00 16.00 0.90 0.18 1.00 
F test value 752.83     523.24    
p value 0.0000     0.0000     
The F-test is used for equality of means hypothesis 
 
TABLE 5.  Determinants of maturity structure 
 
*, **, *** indicate significance levels  at 10, 5 and 1 % respectively 
Regressions use unreported constant, ownership and region dummies. We employ heteroscedasticity robust standard errors 
 
                                                          
34
 It should be noted that the Figure 2 and Table 4 were produced based on a reduced sample, which 
excluded firms that do not have any relationships with banks and consequently no bank loans. 
Dependent variable
Equity
Long-term 
Liabilities
Short-term 
Liabilities
Industry median 0.112*** 0.273 0.044
0.0050 0.302 0.3780
Growth -0.007*** 0.001*** 0.005***
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Short term assets -0.044*** -0.014*** 0.065***
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Collateral strength -0.037*** 0.156*** -0.107***
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Profitability 0.356*** -0.047*** -0.299***
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Method FE FE FE
Hausman test statistic 1342.6*** 700.9*** 1105.7***
R2 0.18 0.04 0.10
Number of observations 93587 93587 93587
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TABLE 6. Determinants of financing patterns 
 
*, **, *** indicate significance levels  at 10, 5 and 1 % respectively 
Regressions use unreported constant, ownership and region dummies. We employ heteroscedasticity robust standard errors 
Loans 
from 
banks 
and other 
FI
Other 
loans, 
deposits 
and 
similar
Net trade 
credit
Other 
LT&ST 
debt
Other 
liabilities
Industry median 0.301*** 2.843*** 0.002 0.138 -0.002
0.0000 0.0000 0.9800 0.3070 0.9780
Growth opportunities 0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.8830 0.0000
Short term assets -0.017*** -0.013*** -0.610*** 0.025*** -0.006***
0.0000 0.0090 0.0000 0.0000 0.0070
Collateral strength 0.103*** 0.070*** 0.000 -0.063*** -0.009***
0.0000 0.0000 0.9930 0.0000 0.0010
Profitability -0.047*** -0.093*** -0.136*** -0.043*** -0.009***
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Method FE FE FE FE FE
Hausman test statistic 437.0*** 779.4*** 445.3*** 275.7*** 705.7***
R2 0.03 0.02 0.31 0.01 0.01
Number of observations 93,587 93,587 93,587 93,587 93,587
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TABLE 7. Determinants of relationship lending 
 
*, **, *** indicate significance levels  at 10, 5 and 1 % respectively. Regressions use unreported constant. 
Share of single biggest lender
Big -0.215***
0.0000
Growth 0.000
0.8870
Equity ratio 0.068***
0.0000
Foreign 0.018***
0.0020
Private ownership 0.011
0.2190
State  ownership -0.051***
0.0000
Manufacturing -0.003
0.6740
Electricity, gas 0.013
0.6470
Construction 0.011
0.1020
Wholesale and retail trade 0.002
0.7710
Transport -0.015**
0.0120
Information and communication -0.014**
0.0320
Professional and technical activities 0.025***
0.0000
Zagreb 0.003
0.2140
Dalmatia -0.005
0.1460
Istria -0.003
0.2770
Northern Croatia -0.003
0.3590
Slawonia -0.009**
0.0310
Central Croatia 0.002
0.6920
Method Tobit
Number of observations 27,038
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FIGURES 
FIGURE 1.: Percentage of bank loans borrowed from big and foreign banks 
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Appendix 
TABLE 8. VARIABLES DESCRIPTION 
 
Capital structure- variables Calculation Basis for calculation
Equity Equity/Total assets Balance sheet categories
Long-term liabilities Long term liabilities/Total assets Balance sheet categories
Short-term liabilities Short term liabilities/Total assets Balance sheet categories
Advanced payments Advanced payments/ Total assets Balance sheet categories
Loans from banks and other FI Loans from banks and other FI/ Total assets Balance sheet categories
Other loans, deposits and similar Other loans, deposits and similar/ Total assets Balance sheet categories
Net trade credit (Accounts payable- Accounts receivable)/ Total assets Balance sheet categories
Other LT&ST debt Other LT&ST debt/ Total assets Balance sheet categories
Other l iabilities Other l iabilities/ Total assets Balance sheet categories
Firm characteristics- variables
Growth Percentage growth of ln(Assets) Balance sheet
Size ln (Total assets) Balance sheet
Big Dummy (1=large company, 0 otherwise)
Short term assets Short term assets/ Total assets Balance sheet
Collateral strength Tangible assets/ Total assets Balance sheet
Growth opportunities Research and development investments/ Total assets Balance sheet
Profitability ROA=(Profit before taxation/ Total assets) Balance sheet, P/L account
Private ownership Private and majorly private ownership FINA database
State ownership State and majorly state ownership FINA database
Industry median Median value of particular dependent variable for industry/ year Balance sheet
Agriculture Agriculture-industry National classification
Manufacturing Manufacturing-industry National classification
Electricity, gas Electricity, gas supply-industry National classification
Construction Construction-industry National classification
Wholesale and retail  trade Wholesale and retail  trade-industry National classification
Transport Transport-industry National classification
Information and communication Information and communication-industry National classification
Professional/technical services Professional and technical services-industry National classification
Zagreb Zagreb and Zagreb county See Appendix Table 9
Dalmatia Dalmatia region See Appendix Table 9
Istria Istria region See Appendix Table 9
Northern Croatia Northern Croatia region See Appendix Table 9
Slawonia Slawonia region See Appendix Table 9
Central Croatia Central Croatia region See Appendix Table 9
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TABLE 9.  Construction of the region variable 
REGION COUNTIES 
Zagreb  
 
Zagrebacka 
City of Zagreb 
Dalmatia 
 
 
 
Zadarska 
Sibensko-Kninska 
Splitsko-Dalmatinska 
Dubrovacko-Neretvanska 
Istria and Primorje 
 
Primorsko-Goranska 
Istarska 
Northern Croatia 
 
Krapinsko-Zagorska 
Varazdinska 
Koprivnicko-Krizevacka 
Medjimurska 
Slawonia 
 
 
 
 
Viroviticko-Podravska 
Pozesko-Slavonska 
Brodsko-Posavska 
Osjecko-Baranjska 
Vukovarsko-Srijemska 
Central Croatia 
 
 
 
Sisacko-Moslavacka 
Karlovacka 
Bjelovarsko-Bilogorska 
Licko-Senjska 
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ECONOMY OF RAGUSA, 1300-1800 
The Tiger of Mediaeval Mediterranean 
Oleh Havrylyshyn and Nora Srzentic 35 
 
  
                                                          
35The authors are at the University of Toronto and Ghent University respectively (o.havrylyshyn@utoronto.ca; 
nora.srzentic@UGent.be). 
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Abstract 
Using data for proxying economic activity, we confirm historical consensus that the mediaeval 
Republic of Ragusa (now Dubrovnik) was a prosperous small open economy, rivaling bigger 
competitors like Venice. More tentatively we test a number of hypotheses on determinants of 
success, finding partial evidence that Ragusa had strong fundamentals with prudent finances, 
effective rule of law, good governance, social fairness, business-friendly institutions, and trade 
openness. Ragusa may be an early example of a “Tiger” economy with growth-promoting 
institutions. Future research should test the “resilience hypothesis”, that such economies are 
best able to deal with external shocks.36 
Keywords: small open economy, strong fundamentals, institutions, rule of law 
JEL: D002, N10, N123, N83, N94 
  
                                                          
36 We wish to thank for their encouragement and suggestions: Frank Lewis, Susan Mosher-Stuard and Nenad Vekaric, as well as 
two anonymous referees and participants of the 18th DEC. The Croatian National Bank has been kind in allowing  us to 
participate in the annual Dubrovnik Economic Conference, and we admit the views from the Conference venue of Ragusa’s 
majestic city walls were an important part of our inspiration. Nora Srzentic acknowledges support from the Fund for Scientific 
Research (Flanders). 
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There where your argosies with portly sail… 
 Do overpeer the petty traffickers … 
As they fly by them with their woven wings
37
.” 
(Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice) 
 
1 Introduction and motivation  
 
While the Republic of Ragusa was one of the smallest Mediaeval city-states in the 
Mediterranean, it is widely considered by historians as one of the most successful, with volumes 
of shipping and trade, level of wealth, architectural and cultural achievements, disproportionate 
to its size. Innumerable authors over the centuries have attributed its success to effective 
governance based on a political regime of republicanism that may not have been democratic 
but relatively fair and benevolent providing pioneering social provisions like education, health 
care, quarantine systems, and provision of grain reserves for times of shortage. To this was 
coupled a generally liberal, open economy, with prudent state finances, limited market 
intervention, and encouragement of private enterprise. The Croatian economic historian 
Vladimir Stipetic captures this nicely in a recent article (Stipetic, 2000, p.24): “Dubrovnik traded 
like Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan …but did so some five hundred years before ..[and like these 
countries] became prosperous ..because of their adopted economic policy”. 
One is tempted to think of Ragusa as the “Adriatic Tiger“ of yesteryear, an early example of a 
small open economy with strong fundamentals and outward orientation. The paper has three 
aims. First it will demonstrate Ragusa was a very successful economy, using a quantitative38 
approach with a dataset of economic variables or proxies we have compiled. Second and more 
tentatively we test the strong fundamentals hypothesis that success was due to sensible 
policies, and thereby show that Ragusa was an early example of today’s “favourable 
institutions“ development model. Third, the paper demonstrates that the vast historical 
literature on Ragusa can be revisited using quantitative methods. 
                                                          
37Webster’s Dictionary, NY, 2003 gives: ―Argosy: a large merchant ship especially one with a rich cargo [1570-80]; earlier Ragusy, 
Italian = Ragusea, a ship of Ragusa‖  
38For some, any use of data in historical analysis is a form of ―Cliometric‖ (from Clio, muse of history, and metrics=measuring). We 
do not have enough time series to run actual regressions, but do show the possibilities of working in the mode of the new 
economic history, exemplified by work of North, Fogel and Temin – Ravancic (2010) gives a succinct review. 
126 
 
Two points tempt one to test further the resilience hypothesis: a small economy’s ability to 
mitigate external shocks. First are current discussions on how to minimize the impact of 
external crises39, and second the fact that rich detail on commercial activities going back to 13th 
century exists in Dubrovnik Archives -potentially allowing more detailed quantitative analysis. 
That Medieval Europe experienced many economic crises, including financial ones not unlike 
the current global one, is very clear in the literature and is most recently reviewed in the 
popular work of Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)40. How Ragusa reacted to such shocks would add an 
important early example of present day relevance, but apart from a tentative interpretation of 
reactions to loss of Eastern markets in the 16th century, this will be left to future archival 
research. 
The present paper relies on prior archival studies culling a large amount of economic data from 
secondary sources. While a lot of data are available in the literature, they are for infrequent 
intervals, of varying periodicity and unsystematic in coverage or definition. Interpolation41 was 
done to create the time-series shown below. Despite these qualifications, the data is consistent 
with the common view that Ragusa was a prosperous economy. To what extent this was due to 
its prudent and open policies is more conjecturally tested as data are very partial, but 
complementary qualitative information abounds, and also supports the ‘strong fundamentals 
hypothesis’. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II. reviews the historical 
literature on Ragusa and derives some key “hypotheses“ amenable to quantitative testing. 
Section III proposes a phasing of the main economic periods different from historic-political 
ones, and for each undertakes quantitative tests of hypotheses on what happened.. Section IV 
analyses the main determinants of this success, that is: why it happened. Section V summarizes 
the main findings and points to future research directions.  
Three clarifications are in order. First, we generally use the Latin name Ragusa, as  Dubrovnik 
was then known. Second, we do not claim Ragusa was the only example of a prosperous city 
state with sensible policies, indeed we accept the view of some scholars that a lot of Ragusa’s 
wise policy was an emulation of -with perhaps improvement upon- those of its main rival and 
overlord Venice. Third, while the analysis here is based on numerous sources, references are 
limited to the key sources. 
                                                          
39Numerous recent work exists on this –an illustrative paper is Ghosh et.al.(2009) 
40 Postan (1952, p.340) wrote of the 14th century:‖It was not one world yet, but there was a sensitive world market and it reacted 
quickly to crises in distant countries.‖ Cipolla (1987) describes for Florence  the 14th century ―excess ―credit boom followed 
by a policy-induced credit squeeze-very like  modern boom-bust cycles. 
41 We have collected all of the available data points from the references and then used linear interpolation to obtain new data points, 
with  about one observation each 25 years. At times we had to interpolate only between the neighboring fifty years, and at 
times we had to interpolate for broader data range. Details are in the Appendix tables, Havrylyshyn and Srzentic (2012). 
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2 The historical literature on Ragusa’s economy 
 
The voluminous literature on Ragusa is almost entirely the work of historians, and generally 
contains little statistics, most interpretations are based on written evidence in archival works or 
contemporaneous writers. When data are shown they are fragmentary, illustrative, lack long-
term continuity, rarely in tables or charts. We have culled statistics from the literature, 
systematized them as much as possible, and used them to analyze this important historical case. 
Several recent works by Croatian scholars do use a quantitative approach, with careful data 
collection, sorting out unreliable estimates, and presenting the most solid ones to complement 
qualitative analysis. The earliest is the time-series population estimate in Vekaric (1998), then a 
partial but careful and very useful estimate of GDP in Croatia 1500-1900 by Stipetic (2004), and 
Zlatar’s  (2007) analysis of  private credits in 16th-17th century42. Our new data set allows us to 
add to this research with some longer-term analysis of Ragusa’s evolution.  
 
2.1 Timeline of Ragusa’s Political-Historical Evolution 
 
The first “records *of+ Dubrovnik’s arsenals (shipyards) date from the year 782,”43 a factoid 
broadly consistent with the consensus that Ragusa was founded as a significant settlement by 
the 7th century, allegedly by Greek-Italian denizens fleeing from the 639 Avar invasions of 
Epidaurus (Cavtat). As for all early history, there is a mixture of myth and fact, as argued inter 
alia by Carter (1972), and Stuard (1992). That from the 11th century Ragusa emerged as a 
maritime and mercantile city, is a view widely shared by contemporary and modern writers. In 
1153 Andalusian geographer Idrisi wrote: “Ragusa was a large maritime town whose population 
were hard-working craftsmen and possessed a large fleet which traveled to different parts.” 
(Carter, 1972, p.74). In 1553 Giustinani noted that its nobles had fortunes far in excess of other 
Dalmatian cities, and comparable to the Venetian elite, with “many individuals having [wealth] 
                                                          
42 A fourth is the much narrower but extremely novel socio-economic exercise  by Ravancic (2010) using  archival data on court 
cases related to tavern disputes and finding they are highest on weekends  and off season! Lonza (2002) contains many data 
on criminal court procedures, of potential value in future research about the quality of legal institutions, analogous to  
indicators in the World bank’s Doing Business reports. 
43 Nicetic (2002, p.11) 
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of 100.000 ducats and more“44. Stuard (1981, p.808) notes that while Shakespeare’s term 
Argosy only alludes to Ragusa, other English writers of the time explicitly recognised its 
greatness, as did Pepys in Diary: 1660-69: “a small country, but it is said older than Venice”45. 
The renowned 20th century economic historian of capitalist development, Fernand Braudel, 
labeled Ragusa “the Jewel of the Adriatic”. 
Many observers emphasize its “uniqueness” as an independent Republic with relatively lot of 
democratic procedures.46 This is arguable, though de facto it was certainly quite autonomous in 
its internal governance and external commerce, justifying its motto LIBERTAS47. But de jure it 
was usually in a suzerainty, tributary, or protectorate status under one or another of the larger 
powers. Historians vary in designating historical phases, but a broad consensus allows us to 
propose the following periodicity: 
 The Byzantine period to 1204 saw Ragusa mostly under Constantinople’s suzerainty, with 
many short periods of forced or voluntary submission to Venice, Hungarian kings, Normans 
in Naples, and even some years of independence. But distance allowed considerable 
autonomy with the help of strong fortifications, and diplomatic efforts to play off one 
power against another, and enough neutrality to achieve trading rights with all sides. 
 The Venetian period, 1204 to 1358 required Ragusa to accept formal submission to 
Venice, a Republic at least 10 times larger, and a far more powerful naval fleet. It had to 
accept Venetian Counts as formal heads of state, pay tribute, contribute one vessel per 
thirty Venetian ones in wartime. Nevertheless, a great deal of autonomy was practiced 
particularly in trading, including the valuable privilege of intermediation between the 
Balkans and Venice. But even during this period -and certainly afterwards- Ragusa was a 
significant rival of Venice in Mediterranean trade. 
 Hungarian suzerainty, 1358-1526 allowed Ragusa even greater autonomy. In the middle of 
the 14th century, the Kingdom of  Hungary and Croatia under Ludovik began to strengthen 
regional power, and undertook to drive the Venetians from Dalmatia, succeeding in its 
conquest with the 1358 Treaty of Zadar, Hungary conjured most of the coast including 
Ragusa under de jure dependency. But the Hungarian kings were content with inland 
superiority over Venice and not interested in Mediterranean trade. Thus all trade was freely 
allowed for Ragusa with little interference. 
                                                          
44 Krekic (1997, p.193) Well-paid sailors could earn  a few hundred ducats yearly, captains 3-4 times.  
45 Reference given by Basic (2006, p. 152) 
46 Havrylyshyn and Srzentic (2012) discuss these claims 
47 .Kuncevic (2010) elaborates on the reality and myth of LIBERTAS. 
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 The Ottoman period: 1526-1684 brought a new protectorate status under The Porte after 
the Hungarian defeat at Mohacs. Importantly, under the loose control of Hungary, formal 
relations with the Ottomans began much earlier. The first treaty was in 1392, with 
expansion of its terms in 1397 to fully free-trade in Ottoman regions, with yet another 
treaty in 1459 after Turkish occupation of Serbia. The well-remembered defeat of Serb 
forces at Kosovo Polje in 1389, and Ottoman’s crowning achievement with the fall of 
Constantinopole in 1453, clearly signaled the need of Ragusa to deal directly with the 
Porte.  
 The Austrian period, 1684-1806 was a faint echo of the earlier tributary periods, with 
continued governing autonomy, particularly for Balkan trade with Ottomans. However 
diplomacy was decreasingly effective as Ragusa’s economic strength had been sapped by 
the overall economic decline of the eastern Mediterranean. Some interpretations suggest 
Austrians did not seek firmer authority over Ragusa (now mostly called  Dubrovnik) partly 
because its relative commercial importance was much reduced.48, 
 French occupation in 1806 ends independence of Dubrovnik, not just de facto, but de jure. 
During the Austrian-French wars, facing overwhelming French forces, and unable to use its 
earlier diplomatic efforts to retain neutrality, it surrendered and became a mere city in the 
Illyrian province. With Napoleon’s defeat the 1815 Congress of Vienna returned Austrian 
control over Dalmatia, but not Dubrovnik’s city-state privileges49. By 1900 railroads had 
further undermined Dubrovnik’s advantages. It became part the South-Slav Kingdom in 
1918 as a much reduced maritime power, though increasingly an important tourist 
destination, designated as a UNESCO World Heritage site in 1979. 
 
2.2 Common Hypotheses on Ragusean Economic Prosperity 
 
The historical literature is virtually unanimous on the fact that Ragusa was extremely 
prosperous despite its very small size and poor resource base. Authors vary somewhat on the 
question of the when, how, and why of this success, but enough consensus exists to allow us to 
derive some economic hypotheses (HH), subject to quantitative testing. The first five are related 
                                                          
48 ―Relative‖ is the operative word here: In Sec II we show data suggesting absolute level of economic activity might have been still 
very large . 
49This lends truth to the assertion by Luetic (1969, p107) : ―the French occupation…overthrew the 1,000 year historical thread of 
Dubrovnik’s sea-based livelihood, and destroyed the significance of Dubrovnik as a world-class maritime power.‖  
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to economic evolution -or WHAT happened- and the other four to explaining prosperity -or 
WHY it happened. 
 HH1: The Golden Years of prosperity were about 1350-1550. 
 HH2: The preceding Silver Period was economically also very dynamic50, 
 HH3: sustainable population level was very limited, well under 100,000, 
 HH4: The commercial fleet of Ragusa at its peak equaled that of Venice, and exceeded that 
of England. 
 HH5: Ragusa’s decline began with the discovery of The Cape of Good Hope route in the early 
16th century, 
 HH6: State laws , regulations, institutions were favorable to commercial activity, 
 HH7: The State conducted very prudent and conservative financial policies, avoided budget 
deficits, debts, inflationary debasement, 
 HH8: Enlightened social policies provided for basic needs of the entire populace, 
 HH9: Ragusa had very low military-naval expenditures, relying on diplomacy for its 
achievements. 
 
3 Testing hypotheses on the evolution of the economy  
 
Virtually all histories of Ragusa are structured on historical political models, with period 
classifications dependent on key events: wars, victories, treaties, regime changes. Given this 
paper’s focus on economic evolution we propose a  classification based on the nature of the 
economic development shown in Table 1 with approximate dates.51 For all but the last of these 
periods we test the above hypotheses using quantitative indicators as available, and 
complementing the analysis with other fragmentary statistics or qualitative assessments from 
the literature. 
                                                          
50 In fact most historians do not give special importance to this period, with possible exception of Stuard  (1975,1992); we take the 
liberty to make it a more explicit hypothesis than she does in her many works on this period. 
51 The rationale is explained in Havrylyshyn and Srzentic (2012) 
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[Table 1 about here] 
But first consider as a broad overview an indicator which may differentiate the relative 
economic dynamism of each period. A chart in Carter (1972) listing the major monumental 
buildings in the city from the 9th century to 1877 is used to create Figure 1, showing for each 
period the absolute numbers, the share of the total, and a crude index of building intensity 
(=number of buildings per 100 years)52. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Taking this at face value –the data are consistent with HH1 that the Golden Years 1350-1575 
were indeed the most prosperous, with the largest number of buildings, the highest share by 
period and the highest per century intensity. The foundational period shows a start but still very 
modest. However, perhaps most interesting in this chart is how large a share of the major 
structures were put in place in the Silver period, with an intensity of building far greater than 
the late periods and second only to the Golden Years.  
Most histories of “The Adriatic Jewel” justifiably focus on the late 14th to late 16th century as the 
period of greatest prosperity. We propose this new thesis be added HH2- the preceding Silver 
Period was economically also very dynamic. Some data we present is consistent with this, 
suggesting that the prosperity of the Golden Years came on top of a very strong buildup in the 
Silver period53.The data in Figure 1 reflect the subsequent decline in the 17th and 18th century, 
with a far lower number of buildings, smaller share and intensity. There were none in the brief 
revival, and only a few more in the post-independence period. We turn now to some 
elaboration of the individual periods.  
 
3.1 Foundational period -until 1100 
 
There is a broad consensus that in its early years the economy was very simple, largely self-
sufficient, based on fishing, some agriculture, building of small craft. This was nevertheless an 
important period in building the foundations of future prosperity and dominance in Dalmatia. 
One sees a gradual movement into nearby coastal entrepot trade, as well as intermediation 
                                                          
52 This may underestimate the number in later periods since it shows only buildings within the city walls, and territorial expansion 
over time likely meant more major building projects outside as well. 
53 Several works of Stuard imply such a thesis—we suggest it be made explicit in the literature. Those who have studied the 
Industrial Revolution will recall the later partial revision of economic history showing that it was preceded and made possible 
by an earlier agricultural revolution and attendant growth. 
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between the Balkan hinterland and thriving Italian cities  like Venice, Florence, Bari, Ancona. 
With the first shipyard already in 782 -within a century of its founding- Ragusa was already 
moving beyond local fishing into maritime activities. Early documentary mention of its shipping 
prowess notes that in 783 Charlemagne hired Ragusean ships to transport Croatian and Serbian 
mercenaries across the Adriatic in his campaign to drive Saracens out of Apulia54. 
Another indicator of an early economic development was its ability to withstand for 15 months 
the 866 Saracen siege until Byzantine ships lifted it -indirect but strong  evidence that: 1) Ragusa 
was worth seizing, and 2) defenses were already quite  strong.  
Numerous accounts describe the caravan trade between Balkans and Italy through Ragusa well 
before 1100. Resources like cattle, leather, wood/lumber, honey, wax came from the Balkans, 
to be traded for textiles, household goods, metal products, and various luxuries from Italy. The 
share of this Balkan-European trade in Ragusean economy varied in importance over time as the 
products changed, and other entrepot trade with Levant and elsewhere became at times far 
more important. However, throughout Ragusean history, the Balkan trade remained a 
significant component of its income.  
 
3.2 The “Silver” period (1100-1350) 
 
The 13th century saw a boom in minerals trade as mines opened and expanded in the 
hinterlands (Srebrenica, Novo Brdo, Rudnik). The main item was silver, but other minerals (gold, 
lead, iron, etc.) also played a role55, as did salt exports. Stuard (1975-76, 1981, 1992) describes 
how  Ragusa quickly became a principal intermediary for the silver export to Europe; Stipetic 
(2000, p.26) states that Balkan silver production about 1400 provided almost one-third of the 
Europe total, and of this almost one half (i.e about 16% of European total) was exported 
through Ragusa. He also contends that required sales to the Ragusa mint provided the basis for 
a considerable amount of seigniorage profits for the state treasury. The silver was brought by 
caravans and then shipped to Italian city states, Florence, Venice, Genoa etc. The return voyages 
would bring textiles, luxury clothing for Balkan nobles, jewelry, glass, and other manufactures. 
This is most comprehensively analyzed by Stuard (1975-76). It is significant that the earlier 
Balkan trade in raw materials continued, though silver and other minerals proved much more 
                                                          
54Carter (1972, p.53), based on writing of the Byzantine Porphyrogenitos -though Carter warns in many places such early writings  
are uncertain. 
55 Often the location names define the mineral:  e.g. Srebrenica for silver, Olovo for lead, but Rudnik simply mine. 
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profitable, providing a big boost to the Ragusa economy, including the local development of 
silver and goldsmithing. 
The hypothesis we propose based on Stuard, (HH2) that the Silver Period was economically very 
dynamic is confirmed by Figure 1 and to some extent by the large increase in area, shipping and 
probably population as well (Figures 2, 4). 
This period also saw awareness by the Ragusean elites and authorities that greater benefit 
would come from Balkan-Italian trade with ships than with land caravans. Thus one sees almost 
a doubling of the commercial fleet (Figure 4),from about 22 long-distance ships in 1300 to 40 by 
1325. These figures are less certain than for later periods (hence a dashed-line in Figure 4), and 
no reliable estimates are available for earlier years, but the trend and dynamism seems clear.  
 
3.3 The “Golden Years” of maritime prosperity (1350-1575) 
 
This period is almost universally recognized by scholars as the apogee of Ragusean  economic 
prosperity. The Republic’s population reaches its maximum in 1500 of about 90,000 (Figure 2), 
as does per capita GDP (Figure 3)-though we raise some doubts about this later. The fleet size 
grew sharply (Figure 4, from the 40 noted in 1325 to 200 by 1575, and tonnage even more 
substantially (Figure 5), with a sharp increase in the average ship size56. All these support HH1: 
the golden years of maritime prosperity came about 1350-1550/75. We use 1575 as the end –
date based on the peak value of shipping tonnage. 
On population, Vekaric (1998) argues much of the expansion prior to 1500 was due to Balkan-
Slavic refugees fleeing the advance of Ottomans. However, economic attraction also played a 
role: there is little doubt that  the level of per capita income in Ragusa was well above that of 
the immediate Croatian hinterland (Figure 3). A more intriguing hypothesis stated in Vekaric 
(1998) concerns the strong decline in population after 1500 notwithstanding the strong growth 
of shipping activity. He attributes some of this to renewed episodes of the plague, but also to 
the “correction” of the earlier refugee boom, arguing that the peak population was 
unsustainable because the Republic was very small and land rather infertile. Hence, we 
tentatively confirm HH3 that the carrying capacity for population was very limited, well under 
100,000. 
 
                                                          
56 Luetic (1969), S. Vekaric (1954), and Nicetic (2002) all emphasize the constant expansion of  capacity over this period. 
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[Figure 2 about here] 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
The new, additional basis for prosperity in this period now becomes maritime trade, not only 
throughout the Adriatic but increasingly with the Levant territories under Ottoman rule, 
providing goods from the Far East such as spices, silk, oriental perfumes, grains, and other raw 
materials. But with the Balkans the commodity structure of trade continued to be quite similar 
to that in earlier periods and there is little doubt that the strong preceding experience and the 
extensive slavicization of Ragusa/Dubrovnik, provided a critical comparative advantage. It is a 
tribute to the governing elites of Ragusa- both the nobility and the merchants- that they used 
this comparative advantage to provide capital, skills and experience leading to even more 
maritime trade in the 15th and 16th century. Thus the economy in this period was based largely 
on  entrepot trade services including shipping profits and value of the direct and indirect labor 
services. One also begins to see Ragusean sailors and officers hiring out to foreign powers -
though this becomes much more important in the decline period. Thus Lane (1973, p.425) notes 
that as Venetian dominance declines in 18th century “shipmasters were no longer Venetian … 
*but+ mostly Dalmatians with Slavic names”. 
That domestic production probably accounted for a quite small portion of value-added cannot 
be verified quantitatively –even for England and western Europe GDP estimates only go back to 
late 18th century- but the qualitative analysis makes clear that this was so. Agriculture produced 
very small amounts of grains (at best one-third of needs according to Carter and others), some 
wine, olive oil and market garden products, salt exports. Manufacturing was limited to ship-
building, gold and silversmithing57, with jewelry exports to Balkans increasingly coming from 
domestic production not only  imports from Italy. Shipbuilding had always been largely local 
(recall that the first arsenal dates to 792) but in this period it becomes very significant and 
includes sales outside Ragusa, based on the reputation of high-quality58 
This was the period in which Ragusa became, as a prominent American historian of Venice, Lane 
(1973, p.379, p.381) notes “Venice’s most damaging competitor..bidding cargoes away from the 
Venetians on all seas, even in the Adriatic…*as+ their ships were increasing in number and 
                                                          
57 Efforts to subsidise textiles eventually failed as elaborated in Havrylyshyn and Srzentic. (2012) 
58 Havrylyshyn and Srzentic (2012) cite numerous such references. 
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size”59. Other accolades include claims of Ragusean equality with Venice, based on fleet size and 
tonnage about 1575 (Figures 4 and 5). As Figure 6 shows, at this time the English fleet was still 
only about the same size60. 
The patriotic implication of HH4, that Ragusa was on the par with Venice, is perhaps 
exaggerated, for over these centuries equivalence only occurred when Venice had lost 
numerous ships during wars. It is clear in the figures the Venetian fleet had far larger numbers 
in the 14th century, falling sharply with the many wars with Genoa. Both in defeat and victory, 
many ships were destroyed, then the fleet was rebuilt to even higher levels about 1425 (over 
300 ships), then once again declined as many wars -now with the Ottomans- again decimated 
the fleet. Ragusa’s neutrality and Ottoman privileges  spared its fleet, so that at its peak in 1575 
with about 200 ships and peak historical capacity of 33,000 tons it was technically “equal“ to 
Venice -as was also true about 1400. 
Of course, to affirm that over the long-term Ragusa did not quite “equal” Venice should not be a 
surprise or a negative commentary: Given its much smaller size and poor agricultural fertility. 
The fact that Ragusa “La Città Felice” could be put in same league as  “La Serenissima” is already 
a strongly positive characterization.61 
 
3.4 Vasco da Gama rounds Cape of Good Hope, Ragusa (gradually) declines (1575-1750) 
 
Most historians attribute the eventual decline of Ragusa’s importance to the shift of economic 
dynamism to Western Europe, and the related opening of the Cape of Good Hope eastern 
route. The decline is reflected in the values for population (Figure 2), GDP per capita (Figure 3), 
number and tonnage of ships (Figures 4 and 5), and GDP (Figure 7). The Italian city-states also 
declined; for Venice, Lane (1973, p.384-6) refers to the “The Collapse”. However, our data 
suggests that Ragusa’s decline was not immediate. After Vasco da Gama established a colony in 
India in 1503 and the first spices are brought to Europe by Portuguese ships in 1506, Ragusean 
shipping capacity continues to expand until 1575. 
                                                          
59 This is also reflected in the work of Fernand Braudel who writes of Ragusa’s ability to ―snatch away goods from under the eyes of 
Venetian merchants‖ as cited in Stuard (1992) 
60 Some historians claim before mid 16th century Ragusa’s fleet exceeded that of England; we were unable to find hard evidence 
before 1575. 
61Arguably, the lack of a large and fertile hinterland should not matter, as resources can be imported. But in a mediaeval period, with 
many episodes of famine, states often forbade food exports, with long travel times, size mattered. Larger size also provided a 
labor force : sailors, soldiers, chandlers. Venice was in this sense far better endowed than Dubrovnik. 
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[Figure 6 about here] 
 
The enormous growth of Western European naval powers (Portugal, Spain, then Netherlands, 
England) is particularly clear in Figure 6. While in 1575 England’s fleet tonnage was about the 
same as in Venice and Ragusa, and that of the Netherlands is “merely“ 3-4 times larger, after 
1600 both of these move into exponential growth, with both Adriatic cities falling far behind. 
This creates an eventually unbeatable competitive force for Ragusa unlike the earlier rivalry 
with Venice which it was able to outcompete because of advantages in Slavic lands and skillful 
diplomacy with the Porte and the Pope.  
The new competition was unbeatable for two reasons. Western European markets for which 
Balkan resources are insignificant, soon surpass those of Italy. Ragusean authorities and 
merchants undertook efforts to move into these markets, with some success for a few decades, 
but not enough to prevent an eventual decline. Second, even with the privileges granted by the 
Ottomans for eastern trade via the Levant, this becomes far too costly compared to the new sea 
route around the Cape. Again, Raguseans made efforts to compensate, by providing shipping 
services to western powers, (ships were re-based, at first mostly to Spain) and perhaps most 
importantly individuals hired themselves out to the new western fleets –maybe the first 
significant episode of Dalmatian‘s famous quest of “trbuhom za kruhom” (loosely translated as 
following your stomach in a quest for bread). In addition some attempts were made to engage 
in trans-Atlantic trade, but again with limited success62. All this helped mitigate the decline, but 
in the end was not enough to keep the glory-days alive. Thus available data confirms HH5 that 
the rounding of Cape of Good Hope did not immediately lead to Ragusa’s decline, though with 
a long lag it was the key factor. One could argue further the diversification efforts succeeded in 
delaying the decline, and giving continued growth almost a century after Vasco de Gama, which 
in a limited way is consistent with the resilience hypothesis. 
Note the above is largely based on shipping tonnage data (Figure 5) which is perhaps the best 
available proxy for economic activity as Figure 7 and the correlations in Table 2 suggest. One 
sees indeed a slight decline from 1475 (29 tons)  to 1550 ( 24 tons), but a strong rebound to its 
peak value in 1575 (53 tons), after which it declines quickly. Note the same trend is seen for 
Venice, which also suffered from these two new competitive factors. Carter (1972, p.352-3) 
summarizes earlier arguments of ,Libyer and Lane for Venice and Marinkovic for Ragusa: “trade 
of Dubrovnik and Venice was not halted at the Levantine ports…but was carried by merchants of 
these Republics as far as Goa and possibly even Malaca and Batavia at a period when Portugal 
                                                          
62 Several articles  in Filipovic and Partridge (1977) discuss this, including: Luetic, Filipovic and Zivojinovic  
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was supposed to have a ‘monopoly’ of the spice trade.” Thus, the efforts by Raguseans (and 
Venetians)–e.g. establishing a trading colony in Goa, diplomatic efforts with the Ottomans to 
maintain the sole rights of spice trade in Alexandria—succeeded for some time. 
 
3.5 The short revival period (1750-1806) 
 
After the decline from 1575-1750, a short revival occurred, not in population, but in the size of 
the fleet (Figure 4), though the average capacity probably fell63. This revival does not seem to be 
given much attention by historians, either because it is not clearly understood, or perhaps 
because by this time the uniqueness of Ragusa /Dubrovnik has long passed and academic 
interest in the later periods is not as great. 
 
[Figure 7 about here] 
 
The strong correlation between aggregate GDP, tonnage and population points to two puzzles 
for future research. First, as tonnage continues to rise until 1575, indicating economic 
expansion, why did population fall? Second, if population declined from 1500 already with 
continued expansion, why did GDP per capita  fall64?   
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
4 Explaining Ragusa’s prosperity and decline 
 
This section will systematize and assess the many explanations in the literature for Ragusa’s 
success. Our central thesis is that while its locational advantage played some role, Ragusa 
leveraged this role with wise policies -strong fundamentals- to achieve greater prosperity than 
other cities also located on the Dalmatian coast. Based on the literatrure we propose that four 
                                                          
63 Luetic (1969) and other fleet estimates generally agree on this. 
64 Stipetic (2004) shows a modest increase 1550-1575, then a decline. But later values in Figure 4a are based on the vaguer 
estimates: he gives only values for all of Dalmatia, we assume earlier proportions—which may be incorrect.  
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main policy areas be analyzed: good governance including rule-of-law, prudent financial policies 
and commerce-friendly institutions; an enlightened social policy addressing basic needs of 
entire populace, and finally minimal reliance on defense expenditures with maximal diplomacy.  
But location must not be ignored. Some historians argue that being on the margin between 
Christian and Muslim worlds was the key factor allowing trade intermediation. Most accept that 
location was a factor, but gave more emphasis to the above explanations. This seems 
reasonable given many Dalmatian cities like Kotor, Ulcinj to the south, Split, Zadar to the north 
had similar location, probably larger and more fertile hinterland resources, some had larger 
harbours, and did indeed act as trade intermediators, but apparently did not approach the 
prosperity and reputation of Ragusa . It is more useful to ask how Ragusa leveraged its location 
to greater success. 
We now go on to assess the four policy explanations, with a qualification. Information on policy 
and institutions is very sparse, with the exception of budget data for about 1800. Therefore the 
conclusions in Section IV are far more conjectural than those of Section III. Nevertheless we 
view this preliminary effort as a useful first step that points to future research. 
 
4.1 Good governance  
 
If the World Bank’s Governance, and Doing Business surveys were being done in the middle-
ages Ragusa might score quite high in the rankings. From today’s perspective it provides an 
early example of good institutions promoting development. Krekic (1980, p.38) captures this: 
“[Dubrovnik was] vulnerable [to] Ottoman occupation…This is why the government felt the urge 
to resolve the daily problems and to improve the functioning of institutions. They knew that 
internal stability and economic prosperity were the only way to strengthen the international 
position of the city”. In the current jargon, it had all three components of good governance: 
voice, rule-of-law, and ease of doing business). 
Voice: Ragusa was by no means a democracy, government being almost entirely in the hands of 
a nobility mythically based on the “original” settler families, though in fact many rich merchants 
and Balkan princes were often quietly “ennobled” in turn for the benefits they could bring65. 
Commoners had no voting rights, but rich merchants and skilled professionals did comprise a 
large part of officialdom.  Grubisa (2011) exemplifies a consensus that the political regime is 
                                                          
65  Vekaric (2011) , Vol.1 shows in Table 7 the roots of the noble families whence it is clear that a large proportion were not from 
Epidaurus.  
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best characterized as a benevolent rather than rapacious oligarchy,providing many basic needs 
of the population to an extent not seen in this period. Upward mobility is often  considered 
evidence of good-governance. Vekaric (2011), Krekic (1980), Carter972), and others document 
the shifts of noble lineage, the impoverishment of many noble families, and the rapid growth of 
wealth of non-noble merchants who were gradually and volens-nolens “absorbed“ into the 
upper classes, the ruling elites, government officialdom. One indicator is the increase over time 
in the share of credit issued by commoners. Thus, Krekic (1980) estimates that as early as 1280-
1440 this was already one third; (Zlatar 2007, p.139) shows this increased to about 42%  in the 
next century66. 
Rule of Law: More important, justice was apparently meted out not with feudal arbitrariness, 
but on the basis of laws, legislation, judicial process, as symbolized by very early legal 
codification in the “Statut” of 1272. It was not perfect, but numerous instances of well-applied  
justice in the law in practice dominate the literature67. Sisak (2011) argues this rule-based 
governance gave long-term stability with virtually no significant peasant uprisings as seen 
frequently elsewhere, and far fewer internecine revolts within the nobility68. 
Ease of doing business: Many historians note how favorable institutions promoted economic 
prosperity. Stipetic (2000) reviews a number of early Ragusean writers with very “modern” 
views of economic theory. A 1440 work of Filip de Diversis states: “among the permanent 
institutions…first is the one responsible to preserve  justice and order among the wholesale and 
retail merchants, customers, irrespective of whether they are foreigners or citizens”. He goes on 
(p.32) to documents- the pioneering development of accounting and double-entry bookkeeping 
by the Ragusean Kotruljevic69, whose 1440 handbook detailed the value of instruments like bills 
of exchange, letters of credit. In his 1458 treatise “Il Libro dell’Arte di Mercantura” he 
expounded economic philosophy views very radical for the times: interest as the price of capital, 
credit being critical to fuel commerce and “only” usurious if excessive (5-6% was his proposed 
limit). Even the strong fundamentals hypothesis is found in his work, arguing the state must 
ensure an open mercantile and trading environment conducive to making money and creating 
                                                          
66 Another striking statistic suggesting upward mobility is in Luetic (1969, p.101): by the mid-18th century, of 380 registered ship-
owners only 80 were nobles. 
67: Lonza (1998)  uses  a quantitative review of 2,440 court cases to demonstrate effective implementation. noting incidentally .many 
cases were settled out of court, a  practice authorities encouraged. Lonza (2002) gives further quantification of judicial 
effectiveness. 
68 Vekaric (2006) describes a major exception the short-lived and futile rebellion by Lastovo nobles . 
69Stipetic (2000) refers to non-Croatian scholars Postma and van der Helm –presumably less-biased- who have found clear 
evidence that Kotruljevic was the first to develop double-entry book-keeping, well before the 1496 work of Venetian Lucca 
Paccioli. A personal communication from van der Helm clarifies that Kotruljevic /Cotrugli did write briefly about double-entry, 
in his unpublished work, but a first printed manual was indeed that of Paccioli. 
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wealth, with minimal interference in commerce, and ensuring prudent state finances. 
Kotruljevic seems to have presaged by six centuries today’s received wisdom about ROL and a 
good business climate. 
Stipetic (p.18 ff.) also lists the formalization of institutions, noting notary and registration 
procedures, records for business contracts existed as early as 1200, then enshrined in the 1272 
Statut, and further elaborated in the Customs Book of 1297. Implemetation did lead to 
corruption, but Stipetic (2000) points to many mitigating institutions: annual reviews, oversight 
by auditors and inspectors who were regularly replaced, hiring only foreigners for some 
positions. Krekic (1997, p.32-5) describes many cases of bribery, but concludes efforts to curtail 
it by punishing offenders were generally as effective as can be expected. 
In general most historians agree ROL and EDB went beyond formal laws, with effective 
implementation. Institutional quality is not easily quantifiable even today, but consider  some 
illustrations. In a historical period of state-rivalry there exist numerous instances of Ragusean 
authorities enforcing claims by foreigners on citizens of Ragusa. Bankruptcy of the Paboras in 
1315 led to claims by many creditors from Venice, and the well-known Peruzzi bankers of 
Florence. Courts ruled in the latter’s favor and conveyed Pabora  assets to them (Krekic, 1997, 
p.13).The Ragusean noble and merchant Bunic, a tax-farmer for the Ottomans in 1471 became a 
fugitive from the Sultan after alleged embezzlement of 55,000 ducats. The Ragusean courts 
seized his local assets to cover the claim. Years of litigation followed, with Bunic and the Porte , 
coming to an eventual settlement with encouragement of Ragusa court70. 
Many other early institutional elements that today would be labeled “a favorable business and 
rule-of-law climate”, can be pointed out. Luetic (1969, p.107), and Carter (1972, p.157) note the 
beginnings of the first maritime insurance policies in the 14th century, and Doria (1987) notes 
how elaborate they became by the 16th century. A revealing description of bankruptcy 
procedures in 14th-15th century by Palic (2008) further attests to the favorable business climate. 
He emphasizes that -unlike the “debtor’s prison” practices found elsewhere- “the ultimate aim 
of bankruptcy…was not just settling *with the+ lender but also…helping the debtor overcome 
inability of paying…*thus creating+ an atmosphere for further co-operation and doing business 
together.” This further confirms the frequent reference to Ragusean Courts encouraging 
settlement –surely a wise and effective policy for promoting business. All the above provides 
consistent support for HH6 which we might re-label “The Kotruljevic Hypothesis”: Ragusa 
conducted a policy of good governance, effectively implemented ROL, and provided market-
enhancing institutions. 
 
                                                          
70 Bojovic (1998, p.114) cites numerous similar cases. 
141 
 
4.2 Prudent fiscal and monetary policies 
 
The literature is replete with references to conservative finances, prudence on expenses, low 
debt, but virtually no data is shown, with one exception: budget numbers for 1800 reproduced 
in Bjelovucic (1970)71. There we find first, evidence of a large budget surplus of about 10% of 
Revenues, consistent with HH7, the prudence hypothesis. Figure 8 indicates shares of different 
revenue and expenditure categories that provide further evidence of fiscal prudence  
[Figure 8 about here] 
Reinhartt and Rogoff (2009) remind us that the current recession is NOT that different from 
historical, cases pointing to the common instance of high debts and defaults in Europe over 
centuries. In contrast, Ragusa appears to have avoided serious debt problems as strongly 
implied by interest payments on loans which represented only 1.7% of budget expenditures, far 
below comparable values. Venice about this time paid out a third to service debt, and more in 
earlier years, Lane (1973). Koerner’s (1995) analysis of 25 states from 1500 to 1800 concludes 
that “service on the debt varied between 17 and 36% of total expenditures.”  
Qualitative evidence supports HH7 strongly: one finds no references to defaults, though 
instances of payment difficulties arose. Krekic (1980) and Sisak (2011) note among the  “social 
obligations” of nobility “sharing proportionately in lending to the state and accepting less than 
full payment when exigencies arise”. Ragusa’s net asset position was strongly positive in 1800. 
Dividends on deposits in Italian and Viennese banks provided 25% of revenues -excluding 
holdings by individuals! The share of maritime trade in revenues is substantial with customs 
revenues of 9.3% and various taxes on shipping, shipbuilding, ship sales, navigation, adding 
30.2%. Financial conservatism is further reflected in the double-use of consular staff being 
hired-out to others and yielding revenues of 6.3%. 
Another indicator of prudence may be in the low inflation and limited debasement which many 
writers note.. Most agree with Krekic (1980) that inflation was not high; Stuard (1992, p.810) 
writes of “mild inflation” in the 17th century but much higher in the next. We have not found 
enough quantitative evidence to confirm the low-inflation consensus as all such discussions are 
at best fragmentary and sometimes inconsistent. We were unable to compile inflation or even 
                                                          
71 The ―Bara Bettera Memoirs‖ on which there is some dispute among specialists today; table in Bjelovucic must have a transcription 
error as total exceeds sum of expense components by 30%. Havrylyshyn and Srzentic (2012). Note how this could be 
adjusted to calculate probable proportions. 
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consistent goods price data; while inflation estimates in Northern Italy might be a good proxy, 
these are less available than numbers for Western Europe72. 
Banking activity in Ragusa in the 14th and 15th centuries, unlike the large Italian city-states, was 
at first limited to the Zecca73 (Mint) stamping silver coins, and exchanging currencies. We found 
no mention of private banks in the historical writings, but it seems over time the Zecca 
expanded to limited lending activities with explicit references to its  credits to the state, state 
institutions and large influential brotherhoods, and with goods-collateralization and 8% interest 
for commercial entities. This resembles the function of public banks in other, much bigger, 
countries of that period. Namely, they relieved the government in bridging intertemporal 
budget constraints74 by providing access to central bank credit, although we cannot talk about a 
central bank in the proper sense of the term. 
The Zecca probably also served as a bank for rich Balkan princes and merchants wary of 
unfamiliar Italian banks75. The activity of Zecca is recorded as early as of 1327, and it certainly 
had a monopoly on creating silver coins, whereas the monopoly over exchanging gold and silver 
coins dates back to 1683. There were no deposit banks, but the state pawn shop did provide 
some degree of lending to those with lower income (Bjelovucic, 1970, p.67). We noted earlier 
credits issued among private individuals for trading and shipbuilding participation, but these 
data are too fragmentary to give a clear picture of the nature or magnitude of credit creation, 
thus it is not possible to seriously discuss the monetary policy of that time  
While the 1800 budget and qualitative evidence consistently support HH7 -the prudence 
hypothesis, it is reasonable to ask how representative is this late data point. On the one hand, 
qualitative evidence suggests similar prudence in all earlier periods; also the fact that well into 
the period of decline, Dubrovnik still had strong finances with unusually low debt servicing and a 
positive balance of interest earnings, certainly implies prudence in the preceding decades, if not 
centuries. On the other hand, this positive balance could reflect the lack of domestic investment 
opportunities in a declining economy; and certainly one data point is indeed too little to be 
conclusive. 
 
 
                                                          
72  See Allen-Unger Global Commodity Prices database at Oxford  and UBC ( www.history.ubc ca/faculty/unger/ECPdb/about.html ) 
73 http://numismatica-italiana.lamoneta.it/ explains the derivation of the word ―zecca‖, which apparently comes from the Arabian 
word with pronunciation ―sikka‖=―coinage‖ 
74 M. Fratianni and F.Spinelli (2006, in European Review of Economic History, 10, p.260) 
75 Carter (1972, p.172 )   and  Kurtovic (10) ; a good example of the advantage of Slavic charatr of Ragusa. 
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4.3 An enlightened social policy 
 
While self-interest may have been the motive, the Ragusean nobility apparently paid unusually 
significant attention to the well-being of those who must necessarily be the labor force on ships, 
shipyards, and trade related activities. Such “fairness” led to a high degree of social stability 
according to Sisak (2011, p.182) “the loyalty of the Dubrovnik population to the social order and 
hierarchical structure of government was atypical compared to other cities in the Adriatic”. 
Most historians broadly agree with this, while recognizing large disparities of status. Carter 
(1972, p.116) gives a more balanced view: “the ‘cittadini’ and peasants were ruled with wisdom 
and without oppression”, “*but governors of the territories+ governed despotically…Dubrovnik’s 
ideas of liberty were not only restricted to a limited class, but did not extend a yard beyond the 
walls”. Leaving aside some uncertainty on “just how fair was fair“ in Ragusa, we turn to illustrate 
the main social welfare measures. 
Infrastructure for the populace included street paving as early as the 14th century; sanitation, 
regulations for wooden buildings to minimize fires, wells, aqueducts for water, public fountains, 
orphanages and indigent homes. Provision of health care is considered by many a pioneering 
high point of Ragusean social fairness. A recent systematic review by Lang and Borovecki (2001) 
concludes: “it is obvious that Dubrovnik had a high level of health and social care”. Frati (2000) 
details the first regional introduction of quarantine in 1377, as well as other measures: free 
pharmacies, hiring top physicians from Italy, sending talented youth to study medicine there 
and so on. Frati realistically notes that the motivation for  quarantine  “*was+ mainly to protect 
the safety and quality of the commercial network rather than for medical aethopathogenic 
purposes”, but leaves no place for question: the public spillover benefit was considerable and 
unique for the time. 
Provision of education for all classes in the city -but not rural areas- provides additional 
evidence of “patrician’s enlightened attitude toward talent”, Bjelovucic (1970, p.62.). At least as 
early as the 16th century, Jesuits were given funds “to teach all youth who wish to attend public 
schools” and “send bright boys overseas to study at government expense”. Figure 8 shows that 
education expenses were 6.8 % of the total, but this is disputed with some sources giving a 
value as small as 3.3%. Is this high or low? Unfortunately the Bonney (1995) volume on state 
finances does not provide comparative values.76 
 Another  important social measure was the maintenance of emergency grain reserves provided 
to population at low-cost during the periods of famine. In the mediaeval period this was an 
                                                          
76 The implication may be that other states undertook minimal education expenditures; but this requires future research. 
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arguably justifiable intervention. Overall, even without formal tests, the available information is 
supportive of HH8: social policies went far to provide basic needs of the population, especially 
in comparison to other states. 
 
4.4 Minimal military expenditures, maximum diplomacy77 
 
Our subtitle refers to the common view that Ragusa, unlike other city states of the region, did 
not achieve commercial power by use of force, but substituted this with skillful and constant 
diplomacy. On the face of it, Figure 8 supports this with defense accounting for only 12.2% and 
diplomatic costs 43%.expenditure. In comparison, Bonney (1995) calculates for the 13th-17th 
century European states’ military expenditure were at least 20% to as much as 80% in times of 
conflict. For Venice in 1763 Lane (1973, p.426) shows one-third after a sharp decline from 
preceding periods. But since the 1800 situation of Ragusa may not be representative of earlier 
periods, we again rely on other fragmentary data and qualitative judgement. 
Minimal use of naval and military force forms the central thesis of Berkovic (2010, p.220). His 
assertion that it was “a small country with no military force“ surely overstates the case, but that 
“foreign policy and diplomatic skills played a key role in the survival and development of the 
Dubrovnik Republic” represents a virtually universal consensus among historians. That naval 
forces were small is shown by many fragmentary estimates of numbers of warships. Treaty 
obligations to provide 1 war galley per 30 Venetian ones, implies only 3-4 at-the ready78. Less 
specific demands were made under the Hungarian overlordship. Luetic (1969, p.77) emphasizes 
”The Most Modest War Fleet” with vague references to types of warships for 17th century from 
which one can infer a larger number of about 10 –hardly a case of “no military force” but still 
small.  
 Thus, the available evidence points to a modest force which at best provided a minimal 
deterrent, mitigated the threats of pirates, and allowed Ragusa to meet its treaty obligations -
and when not used in war, served as diplomatic couriers or escorts of commercial convoys. But 
some evidence suggests this underestimates defense costs. First several writers emphasize that 
even the commercial fleet was outfitted to allow swift modification for cannon and decks for 
armed sailors/soldiers. Second .the cost of massive fortifications (today’s great tourist 
attraction) must count as defense expenditures; the literature gives virtually no information on 
this. Third one might hypothesize that before Ragusa’s commercial and intermediation 
                                                          
77 This section is based to a large extent on the comprehensive analyses of Carter (1972) and Berkovic (2010). 
78 Lane (1973) enumerates Venice’s war fleets at about 100  
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importance was built up enough to make diplomacy a credible option, military actions and costs 
may have needed to be much  larger. Suggestive of this, Carter (1972) mentions several early 
attacks and sieges besides the Saracen siege of 866-7: In the 14th century at different times 
Kings of Serbia and of Bosnia are known to have considered capturing Ragusa, but were 
discouraged by the likely very high cost of breaching the defenses. 
Nevertheless, there is reason to conjecture that even these factors would not alter materially 
the consensus on HH9: available evidence suggests Ragusean military expenditures were small 
relative to what typified the period.  
That diplomacy was a substitute for defense is also broadly accepted in the literature. Figure 8 
data certainly supports the view with diplomatic costs about 42% of expenditures: 11% for 
consular expenses (though note fees recouped for services to others yielded 6% of revenues), 
and nearly one-third -31.9%- for various tributes, “good relations”, diplomatic travel costs etc. 
The focus on diplomacy was both a choice and a necessity.. Ragusa was not only very small, but 
its hinterland was infertile, hilly, narrow and difficult to defend, hence diplomacy inevitably 
became necessary. The relationship between diplomacy and defense is best thought of in a 
circular causation: early efforts to provide defensive walls and forces were surely needed to 
discourage attacks and give time for negotiations, but the small size and indefensible territory 
led to emphasis on diplomacy and neutrality; over time, the increasing success of diplomacy 
lessened the need for military efforts. 
Berkovic (2010, p.220 ) again typifies the consensus: “aware of their geopolitical  
position…Dubrovnik entered into numerous international political and trade relations  [using 
this] wisely and skillfully in the defense of independence, sovereignty and economic growth, 
resorting almost exclusively to diplomatic means and diplomatic skill.” A few examples follow. 
The 866-67 siege may not have come to a good end were it not for the appeal to the Suzerain, 
Emperor Basil, who sent a Byzantine fleet to relieve the city. As Venice began to dominate the 
region Ragusa often yielded to some informal form of “submission”, accepting Venetian Counts 
and Archbishops, while still fleeing the Byzantine Imperial standard, and turning frequently to 
Constantinople diplomatically to offset Venetian pressure. About 1095, still under formal 
Byzantine protection, Ragusa turned to their enemy Venice to help ward off the incursions of 
King Koloman of Hungary. In 1186, the Normans of Naples and Sicily occupied Ragusa, but  
negotiated favorable terms: a Norman titular count, but all decisions of government  made by 
the Great Council, no significant tribute required, and all commercial treaties remaining in force. 
During the Venetian protectorate from 1204 the formal treaty of submission was signed only in  
1232, reflecting Venice’s limited authority and was not very onerous while the obligation of 
Venice to defend Ragusa and the trading privileges accorded were of great value. Significantly, 
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Ragusa was exempted from the prohibition for other states to import goods into Venice or 
export to the Levant. 
The height of complex many sided diplomacy and intrigue is exemplified by Ragusa’s sobriquet 
in the late 16th century of “Le Sette Bandieri” (The Seven Flags):“Thus by her successful 
diplomacy Dubrovnik was under the aegis of seven different powers -Spain, the Papacy, The 
Empire of Naples, Venice, Hungary, the Turks, and the Barbary Deys.” … although they often 
were in difficulties with some of their protectors, they could always play one off against the 
other.” (Carter, 1972, p.333). 
 
5 Conclusions and future research 
 
Ragusa in the medieval period is widely considered to be a unique case of a very small economy 
which, despite having virtually no agricultural or other resources, already by the 14th century 
was a prosperous entrepot port for Balkan-Italian trade, then built on this to become by the 16th 
century a major commercial maritime power in the Eastern Mediterranean, competing 
successfully with much larger Venice, especially in Ottoman lands. Historians give many reasons 
for its success. Location was important initially but of greater weight was how its ruling elite 
leveraged this with wise policies to promote prosperity. We have compiled the available 
economic data from secondary sources for the period 1300-1800, and complementing it with 
qualitative judgments by historians and some fragmentary statistics, tested nine common 
hypotheses in the literature. Table 3 summarizes our findings and given the data uncertainty 
indicates the degree of confidence in the results. 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
On Ragusa’s economic evolution, we find the data consistent with all but one of the five 
hypotheses, but with some new interpretations that point to future research. Hypothesis HH1 
that peak prosperity came in the “Golden Years“ of the 15th-16th century is corroborated by data 
on population, major buildings, fleet size and tonnage, as well as a rough GDP estimate. 
However, shipping tonnage which is perhaps the best proxy for economic activity, suggests the 
peak came about 1575-1600, as opposed to the earlier date many historians use, namely 1550. 
Most historians give greatest attention to this period but we argue that Stuard’s extensive work 
suggests that the preceding Silver period was also very dynamic. Further, we offer as HH2 that 
this period -while still not as prosperous- was perhaps equally dynamic in the sense of economic 
growth, and built up the basis for the Golden Years. Data on major buildings is consistent with 
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such a view, but other indicators are too sparse to consider this a strong result, hence a good 
theme for future research 
Population reached its peak in 1500, much earlier than other proxies of development a fact 
consistent with HH3, that carrying capacity of this small infertile territory was extremely limited, 
to well below 100,000. But like the HH2, the test is very limited. 
The “patriotic“ hypothesis HH4, that  Ragusa’s fleet equaled that of much larger Venice, should 
be rejected, even though technically at the peak the fleets were equal in a very narrow sense 
Indeed, in the late 16th century this was literally true, but only for this period and only because 
Venice had suffered naval defeats decimating its fleet. Over the centuries, the Venetian fleet 
was certainly greater albeit not by multiples, as one might expect given their relative size. The 
inherent pride of this hypothesis can therefore be justified: that Ragusean merchants came 
even close, were considered by Venetian authorities as its main rivals, and were known to 
“snatch goods from under the eyes of Venetians,” is a testament to great commercial success.  
Last, HH5 posits the consensus that decline came with opening of the Cape of Good Hope route 
to the East. The quantitative evidence in the long-run is consistent with this, but as already 
noted, the timing points to a nuanced interpretation. Trading by Portugal via the new route 
began early in the 16thcentury, followed by Netherlands and England, yet Ragusa’s fleet and 
wealth continued to grow considerably for nearly a century. This hints at the resilience 
hypothesis: Ragusean elites and merchants succeeded for a long time in maintaining 
competitiveness against the overwhelming cost advantage of the new route. But it is too weak 
and indirect a test to make a firm conclusion- only further research could do this. 
Four hypotheses on the “wise policies” were addressed but given the very partial “hard“ data 
and the need to rely on fragmentary “soft” data plus qualitative judgments by historians, the 
conclusions are best considered as indicative and still conjectural. HH6 -that Ragusa pursued 
good governance, rule-of-law, and institutions favorable to commerce- was impossible to test 
quantitatively, but innumerable instances of historians’ arguments lend very strong support.  
HH7 -that the state conducted prudent and conservative financial policies- is strongly confirmed 
by the one set of budget data available. Perhaps most striking here is the 1.7% of expenditures 
for interest on loans, far below the 20%+ seen in other states. Unfortunately, no budget data 
was found for earlier periods, and arguments can be made on both sides on how representative  
the 1800 budget might be. It is true but not sufficient that the qualitative evidence on earlier 
centuries shows a nearly universal consensus by historians that Ragusean finances were very 
conservative and prudent. 
That military expenditures were low, and instead diplomatic efforts were substantial, are 
complementary hypotheses HH8 and HH9, and available evidence appear consistent with both. 
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Certainly the 1800 budget Figure 8 shows this, with expenditure shares for diplomacy being four 
times greater than for military ones. For earlier years, the evidence is supportive but much 
weaker, with some soft data on naval fleet size as well as most historical interpretations 
pointing to the same conclusion. But it is not inconceivable that for very early periods e.g. 
before 1200, defense expenditures on walls, vessels, armed soldiers may have needed to be 
proportionately larger until Ragusa’s wealth and reputation permitted a greater reliance on 
diplomacy. 
Indeed, the last is one of the several general directions for future research. Another general 
area would be to re-test some of the above hypotheses using primary data from the very rich 
and under-exploited Dubrovnik Archival material on commercial activity. Thus the budgetary 
prudence reflected in the 1800 source could be investigated for earlier periods. Of particular 
relevance for current global issues might be a deeper investigation of the resilience hypothesis, 
focused on short-term movements of trade, shipping, budgets around the time of some external 
shock episodes. Both the recent retrospective  of Reinhart and Rogoff and a lot of earlier 
economic history literature makes clear that there were many such episodes which must have 
affected little Ragusa, like the current global crisis has affected many small “tiger” economies, 
be they Celtic, Baltic or other. 
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Tables and Figures 
TABLES 
TABLE 1.  Classification of economic periods 
Economic period Year Nature of Economic Activity 
Foundational 
Period 
To 1100 
Agriculture, fishing, short-distance maritime trade 
Silver Period 
1100-
1350 
Above, and hinterland trade especially Balkan silver and other 
minerals, including Adriatic entrepot trade 
Golden Years 
1350-
1575 
Above, and increasing long-distance maritime trade- mostly to 
Levant 
Cape Hope,  
Gradual Decline 
1575-
1750 
Levant trade gradually lost to  Western European competitors,  
efforts to trade in West Mediterranean and Atlantic 
Revival Interlude 
1750-
1806 
Balkan trade continues, hire-out ships  and sailors to new big 
powers 
Post-
Independence  
1806-
1900 
Decline sharpens, maritime activity is undermined by railroads; 
late-19thc. beginning of tourism-economy 
 
TABLE 2.  Correlation matrix: GDP,  ship capacity and population 
  
GDP (in million 
1990 USD) 
Tonnage of 
Ragusan ships 
Population (in 
000) 
GDP (in million 1990 USD) 1 0.53 0.88 
Tonnage of Ragusan ships  1 0.64 
Population (in 000)   1 
Source: The correlation analysis has been done using values in Figure 5 with interpolation 
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TABLE 3.  Findings 
 
  
HISTORICAL HYPOTHESIS 
CONSISTENCY OF EVIDENCE 
AND HYPOTHESIS 
EXPLANATION FOR 
QUALIFICATIONS 
HH1: Golden Years of 
Prosperity (about 1350-1550) 
Strongly consistent  The most ample and the most 
robust dataset 
HH2: Silver Period was also 
very dynamic 
Weakly consistent Only one limited dataset 
examined 
HH3: Carrying capacity below 
100,000 
Weakly consistent Only population data 
examined 
HH4: Ragusa fleet equal that 
of Venice 
Consistent only for one 
period, but not for long-run 
Strong data, direct measure of 
shipping 
HH5: Ragusa decline begins 
(early 16th century) 
Mixed result Data consistent with long-
term decline but exact timing 
unclear 
HH6: Laws, institutions 
favorable to commerce 
Weakly consistent No data examined, only 
qualitative evidence 
HH7: Ragusa had prudent 
state finances  
Strongly consistent for one 
time point 
Only 1800 examined; 
otherwise only qualitative 
evidence 
HH8: Enlightened social 
policies 
Weakly consistent Only qualitative evidence so 
far 
HH9: Military expenditures 
relatively low, diplomacy high 
Strongly consistent for one 
time point 
Data on 1800 budget, 
supported by fragmentary soft 
data and qualitative evidence 
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FIGURES 
  FIGURE 1.: Principal buildings in Dubrovnik by period 9th-19th century 
 
Sources:  from Chart XIII Carter (1972) and authors’ calculations  
 
FIGURE 2.: Population and area: Ragusa 1300-1800 
 
Source: Appendix tables in Havrylyshyn, O. and N. Srzentic. ―Economy of Ragusa, 1300-1800 The Tiger of Mediaeval 
Mediterranean‖, 2012 
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FIGURE 3.:  GDP per capita Ragusa and comparators (in 1990 USD) 
 
Source: As for Figure 2 
FIGURE 4.:  Number of ships: Ragusa and Venice 1300-1800 
 
Source: As for Figure 2 
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FIGURE 5.:  Ship capacity (in 000 tons): Ragusa and Venice 1300-1600 
 
Source: As for Figure 2 
 
FIGURE 6.:  Ship capacity (in 000 tons): Ragusa, Venice, Netherlands and England (1375-1800) 
 
Source: As for Figure 2 
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FIGURE 7.:  Comparison of GDP and a GDP proxy (ship capacity): Ragusa 1300-1800 
 
Source: As for Figure 2 
 
FIGURE 8.:  Structure of Ragusa budget about 1800. 
 
Sources: Shares are calculated using absolute ducat values in Bjelovucic (1970, p.44-45) 
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